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Abstract
This thesis consists of three chapters on investment climate in developing countries.
The rst chapter examines the investment climate (IC) e¤ects on the growth of devel-
oping countries. In contrast to past studies in the IC literature, which narrow their
investigation to a subgroup of IC variables, I measure multiple dimensions of the in-
vestment climate in a single index. To construct an IC index, I use the methodology
proposed by Escribano and Hacihasanoglu (2012 and 2013) to combine 87 rm-specic
variables for 27,624 rms in 113 developing countries. This index overcomes multi-
collinearity and the dimensionality problems of the World Banks enterprise survey
database and makes it possible to compare di¤erent countries. I show both theoreti-
cally and empirically that IC as a whole does matter to explain cross-country income
di¤erences in developing countries. Once I control for the IC, trade or macroeconomic
policy does not have any explanatory power on GDP per capita while geography has
a weak e¤ect on it. My results contribute to the institutionsliterature by showing IC
as a specic type of institution to achieve higher levels of income.
In chapter 2, joint with Alvaro Escribano, we develop an investment climate index
(ICI) using enterprise surveys of the World Bank. We propose a simple methodology
that allows us to combine a large set of continuous and binary IC variables into an
index which proxy the good and the bad qualities of the investment climate. As a
byproduct, we also construct IC sub-indices for ve di¤erent blocks of IC variables:
infrastructure; corruption and crime; nance; quality, innovation, and labor skills; and
other control variables. When aggregating, we use two options, one with equal weights
and the other with unequal weights of those IC variables. The unequal weights of ICI
are obtained using principal component analysis (PCA), after transforming all IC vari-
ables to binary variables. We identify at least three important advantages of using our
IC indices. First, they minimize the loss of information in regression analysis when
compared with individual IC explanatory variables. We show, by using a probability
of export equation with Turkish data, that our IC indices can proxy a large set of IC
variables in regression analysis. Furthermore, we show that these IC indices make a
regression analysis, with more than 100 explanatory IC variables, simpler and avoid
a serious multicollinearity problem. Second, the ICI o¤ers the possibility of making
cross-country comparisons based on the description of the investment climate. For that
purpose, we calculate the ICIs for 113 developing and transition countries, and then
we show the cross correlation of the aggregate ICI with other aggregate indices like
the World Economic Forums Global Competitiveness Index (GCI), which is equal to
0.52, etc. Third, these IC indices allow us to incorporate the aggregate investment cli-
mate information of a country as an interesting determinant in macroeconomic models
analyzing the IC impact on economic growth, cross-country convergence, etc.
In chapter 3, I analyze the competitive restrictions of the exporters of Turkish
manufacturing sector in terms of the IC variables. Although the Turkish economy
experienced certain improvements after 2000, a poor investment climate of Turkey is
one of the most important factors of the countrys competitiveness with respect to its
competitors. Improvements in IC may raise competitiveness by increasing rm-level
performance, provide a sustainable growth perspective through higher productivity,
and moderate the severe unemployment problem of Turkey by encouraging both do-
mestic and foreign investment. The aim of this chapter is to investigate how IC
constraints in Turkey a¤ect exports by showing which components of IC have partic-
ular importance for the exporters. This analysis enables us to exactly determine the
microeconomic structural reforms for the long-run prospect of Turkish manufacturing
export. I estimate the model by using the Heckman model because of the nature of
the data at hand.
Resumen
La presente tesis consta de tres capítulos sobre el clima de inversiónen los países en
vías de desarrollo. El primer capítulo examina los efectos del clima de inversión (CI)
sobre el crecimiento de los países en desarrollo. A diferencia de estudios anteriores
recogidos en la literatura especializada sobre CI que centran sus investigaciones en un
subgrupo de variables del CI, en esta Tesis se tienen en cuenta las múltiples dimensiones
del clima de inversión agregándolas en un único índice.
Dicho índice ICI solución en parte los problemas de multicolinearidad y dimen-
sionalidad de la base de datos del Banco Mundial basada en encuestas de empresas
y posibilita la comparación entre distintos países. Se muestra, tanto de forma teórica
como empírica, que el CI en su conjunto es sin duda un factor de peso a la hora de
explicar las diferencias de ingresos entre países en vías de desarrollo. Un resultado
importante muestra como una vez que se controla por las variables del CI otras vari-
ables como las políticas comerciales o las macroeconómicas dejan de tener capacidad
explicativa del PIB per-cápita, a la vez que la geografía tiene un débil efecto. Los
resultados de esta Tesis representan una contribución novedosa sobre el importante
papel que juega la calidad de las instituciones i el CI en el crecimiento de los países
en vías de desarrollo.
El capítulo 2, desarrolla un índice del clima de inversión (ICI) a partir de las en-
cuestas de empresas del Banco Mundial. Para la elaboración del índice del clima de
inversión (ICI), se desarrolla una metodología que permite combinar 87 variables es-
pecícas de empresa para 27.624 empresas de 113 países en vías de desarrollo. Esta
metodología permite combinar en un índice un amplio conjunto de variables contin-
uas con binarias que representan los aspectos positivos y negativos del entorno de
inversión. Como subproducto, desarrollan también subíndices del CI para cinco blo-
ques distintos de variables CI: infraestructuras, corrupción y delincuencia, nanzas,
calidad, innovación y trabajo cualicado; junto con otras variables de control. A la
hora de agregar, ponderamos siguiendo dos alternativas, una con igual peso y otra
con pesos desiguales para las mencionadas variables del CI. Los pesos desiguales de
ICI se obtienen utilizando el análisis de componentes principales (ACP), después de
transformar todas las variables del CI en variables binarias.
Identicamos al menos tres ventajas importantes en la utilización de estos índices
del CI. En primer lugar, minimizan la pérdida de información en análisis de regresión
si se compara con los resultados de utilizar variables explicativas del CI a nivel indi-
vidual. Se muestra, mediante un cálculo de la probabilidad de exportar en Turquía,
que nuestros índices ICI pueden resumen elmente a un gran conjunto de variables de
CI en un análisis de regresión. Además, mostramos que estos índices ICI hacen que
un análisis de regresión con más de 100 variables explicativas, sea mucho más sencillo,
además de evitar un grave problema de multicolinearidad. En segundo lugar, el ICI
ofrece la posibilidad de efectuar comparaciones entre países basadas en la descripción
del clima de inversión. Con ese propósito, calculamos los ICI de 113 países en vías
de desarrollo y en transición, para después mostrar la correlación del ICI agregado
con otros índices agregados, tales como el índice de Competitividad Global del Foro
Económico Mundial (GCI), con una correlación igual a 0,52, etc. En tercer lugar, es-
tos índices ICI nos permiten incorporar la información agregada del clima de inversión
de un país como un interesante factor determinante en los modelos macroeconómicos
que analizan el impacto del CI sobre el crecimiento económico, la convergencia entre
países, etc.
El capítulo 3, analiza las restricciones competitivas del sector manufacturero turco
en términos de variables del CI. A pesar de que la economía turca experimentó cierta
mejoría a partir del año 2000, el deciente entorno de inversión en Turquía es unos de
los factores que más afecta a la competitividad del país frente a la de sus competidores.
La mejora deI CI puede incrementar la competitividad de la economía al aumentar
el rendimiento de las empresas, proporcionar perspectivas de crecimiento sostenible
gracias a la mayor productividad, y al mismo tiempo aliviar el grave problema del
desempleo en Turquía fomentando las inversiones tanto nacionales como extranjeras.
El propósito de este capítulo es investigar cómo las barreras causadas por el CI en
Turquía afectan a las exportaciones, mostrando qué componentes del CI tienen especial
importancia para los exportadores. Este análisis permite identicar algunas reformas
microeconómicas estructurales a largo plazo para impulsar las exportaciones turcas.
Para ello se utiliza el modelo Heckman teniendo en cuenta la naturaleza de los datos
del CI disponibles a nivel de empresa.
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Chapter 1
Investment Climate and
Cross-Country Income
Di¤erences
1.1 Introduction
The World Bank (2005a) denes investment climate (IC) as a set of location-specic
factors shaping the opportunities and incentives for rms to invest productively, create
jobs, and expand. Specically, IC includes infrastructure, access to nance, the reg-
ulatory framework, corruption, and security (absence of crime) dimensions. Escribano
and Hacihasanoglu (2012 and 2013) propose a methodology to construct indices of IC
measures based on rm-level IC data. Figure 1 shows the GDP per capita of countries
against their index of IC (average of rm-level IC of all rms within each country).
The correlation between the two variables is 0.56, and the R2 is 0.31. The objective
of this paper is to investigate, theoretically and empirically, the relationship between
IC and GDP per capita.
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
The hypothesis of this paper is that di¤erences in GDP per capita in developing
countries are fundamentally related to di¤erences in IC across countries. The IC of an
economy may be bad and put constraints on producers or may be good and make it
easier to operate. A good IC framework provides a hospitable environment for growth
by encouraging domestic and foreign investments and by providing an e¢ cient envi-
ronment for existing producers. On the other hand, in case of a poor IC, which is not
under the control of producers, some parts of resources of producers are devoted to
1
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compensate for unproductive activities, such as money spent on private security ser-
vices or time spent on bureaucratic issues, making no positive contribution to output.
Such an environment not only deteriorates the productivity of existing producers but
it can also discourage new investments. Acemoglu (2009) emphasizes the importance
of IC factors by writing, Economic growth not only requires secure property rights
and low taxes, but also complementary investments, often most e¢ ciently undertaken
by the government. Provision of law and order, investment in infrastructure and public
goods are obvious examples.
Inadequacies of infrastructure and nance dimensions of IC create barriers to rm-
level productivity and economic growth (Rajan and Zingales, 2003). For example,
rms with access to modern infrastructure invest more, and their investments are more
productive. Without credit constraints, productive rms can expand their businesses,
and less productive rms can make the necessary investment to raise their productiv-
ity. While good infrastructure and a good nancial system are benecial for producers
and country as a whole, the World Development Report (WDR) 2005 mentions that
inadequacies in infrastructure and nance are large in developing countries. Figure 2
shows the share of rms that report access to nance and infrastructure (electricity,
telecommunications, or transportation) as "major" or "severe" obstacles to the opera-
tion and growth of their business. Asian Development Bank (2007b) emphasizes that
the region remains below the world infrastructure average in terms of both its quality
and its quantity. A similar report from Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)
(2013) explains Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) regions deep infrastructure
gaps as a constraint on economic growth.
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
After the nancial crisis of 2008, global foreign direct investment (FDI) ows de-
creased by 33% from 2008 to 2009 (Figure 3). In addition, there is limited space for
traditional scal and monetary policies to foster economic growth and countries should
consider more structural reforms. Improving IC is an example of structural reform,
and we will show in this paper that it has an important e¤ect on the growth of devel-
oping economies. Consequently, given a period of lower expected growth in the world
economy, awareness of the necessity of having a good IC is increasing in developing
countries to attract more FDI and to boost long-run growth.
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]
In this paper, we combine IC with the technology di¤usion model of Nelson and
Phelps (1966) in a simple Solow growth model. The empirical contribution of the paper
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is to show quantitatively how important IC is for success of developing countries using
2007 GDP per capita as a dependent variable. In the instrumental variable section, we
show that IC is the leading determinant to explain cross-country income di¤erences
in developing countries, using the instruments from the institutions literature that
are not subject to reverse causality. With a large number of robustness checks, we
show that IC overcomes the other theories of growth such as geography, policy, and
integration. To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst paper showing the causal
aggregate relationship between IC and growth using the enterprise survey data of the
World Bank. This has not been done before, because it is not possible to have an
aggregate IC measure in the previous methodology of the IC literature. Moreover,
our estimation results in the ordinary least squares section ts the cross-country data
better than the Solow model and provides an implied capital share of 0.38, which
is more similar to the conventional value of 0.33. The country-specic IC variable,
which is calculated as an average of rm-level IC of all the rms within each country,
is also a convenient control variable for country-specic IC status. In addition, this
paper contributes to the macro institutionsliterature by showing the importance of
a specic type of institution in developing countries.
The next section reviews the IC literature. Section 1.3 shows the theoretical foun-
dations of the IC e¤ect on growth. Section 1.4 presents the data and Section 1.5 shows
the ordinary least squares (OLS) results, whereas Section 1.6 provides the instrumen-
tal variable (IV) results. In Section 1.7, we analyze the robustness of our results. We
conclude in Section 1.8.
1.2 Literature
In the IC literature, enterprise survey data of the World Bank are used to examine the
e¤ect of IC variables on di¤erent rm performance measures in developing countries.
The main purpose of this literature is to provide policy prescriptions. The literature
provides evidence that a good IC stimulates growth through higher productivity and
investment by showing a signicant e¤ect of various IC variables.1
Hundreds of academic papers and policy reports use this data. However, most
of them look at the e¤ects of individual dimensions of the IC. For the ones who
consider di¤erent dimensions, they only concentrate on a few IC variables in those
dimensions. Because of restricting the analysis to a limited number of IC variables,
they face the potential omitted variable bias. But do variables used by those studies
provide a representative sample of the IC? Does the particular selection of variables
a¤ect the validity of the results? An IC index should consider as many IC variables as
1See survey paper by Dethier, Hirn and Straub (2008) for details of the empirical IC literature.
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possible. This paper generates a composite indicator by using all of the IC variables.
To measure country-level index of IC, we use the methodology developed by Escribano
and Hacihasanoglu (2012 and 2013). For each country, we take the median value
of their rm-level IC measure of all the rms within each country to represent the
country-level quality of IC. We explain the details of this methodology in Appendix
A.4.
Prescott (1998) argues that explaining productivity di¤erences is necessary to un-
derstand large international income di¤erences. Productivity di¤erences across coun-
tries have been explained by barriers to technology adoption in Parente and Prescott
(1994). Another approach developed by Nelson and Phelps (1966) emphasizes the
importance of absorption capacity of countries. Two important parts of both models
are the distance of the country to the world technology frontier and the ability of the
country to catch up with the world technology frontier. In the rst model, the catch-
up-with ability is a function of technology adoption barriers like laws, regulations, and
union power or monopoly rights of industry insiders. In the second model, it is a
function of human capital, which determines the absorption capacity of the country.
Both models explain the constraints on technology di¤usion. We will use the second
approach in our theoretical model.
Douglas North (1990) shows that technological change and institutional change
are the basic keys to explain country-level income di¤erences. We combine the tech-
nology di¤usion model of Nelson and Phelps (1966) with an augmented Solow growth
model with IC. Since our model has both technology and institution (IC) variables, we
have the opportunity to check which one is the most important factor for developing
countries.
Recent literature emphasizes the importance of di¤erent types of institutions. Some
of the studies emphasize the importance of policies. Using endogenous growth models,
Perotti (1993), Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993), Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson
and Tabellini (1994) analyze the e¤ect of redistributive taxation on economic growth.
They show that political mechanisms have an important impact on growth. Similarly,
using political economy models, Alesina and Perotti (1996), Acemoglu and Robinson
(2000), Bourguignon and Verdier (2000), and Gradstein (2007) show that redistribu-
tion of resources from the elite to the masses promotes growth and investment through
alleviating socio-political inconsistency.
Another branch of the literature highlights property rights institutions. Knack
and Keefer (1995) presented one of the rst papers analyzing the relationship between
property rights and economic development at the country level. Their study does not
establish a causal e¤ect because of endogeneity and simultaneity concerns. Mauro
(1998) and Hall and Jones (1999) show the rst instrumental variable estimates on
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the e¤ect of institutions on economic development in the long run. Another inuential
instrumental-variables strategy is used by Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001,
2002). These papers show the impact of institutions on growth with a large number
of robustness checks. Once the e¤ect of institutions is controlled for other factors such
as religion and geography have little e¤ects on growth. Rodrik, Subramanian, and
Trebbi (2004) and Easterly and Levine (2003) obtained similar results. The consensus
among these papers is the dominant e¤ect of institutions in contrast to the geography
hypothesis.
This paper contributes to the macro institutions literature by showing the im-
portance of a specic type of institution, which is IC. Having a better IC reduces
the number for obstacles of rms, allows them to operate more e¢ ciently, discourages
them from using their scarce resources for unproductive or less productive purposes,
while it allows them to use these resources for productivity-increasing activities such
as innovation, and this stimulates economic growth.
1.3 An Augmented Solow Model with Investment Cli-
mate
In this section, we introduce a Solow model with Nelson and Phelps(1966) technology
dynamics. The model is an extension of the Acemoglu (2009) version with an IC index
in the production function.
The world economy consists of J closed countries, j = 1; :::; J . Time is discrete.
There is a unique nal good that can be produced or invested. Prices are expressed
in terms of the unique good.
Y jt = IC
j
tA
j
t

Kjt
 
Ljt
1 
(1.1)
where Y jt is the output of the unique nal good in country j at time t, IC 2 (0; 1] is the
IC index, Kjt and L
j
t are the capital stock and labor supply used for production, and
Ajt is the country-specic and time-varying technology of country j. The aggregate
production function satises the standard neoclassical assumptions. We dene y =
Y=AL and k = K=AL to be the income and physical capital per e¤ective unit of
labor. In our model, IC represents the impact of an economys IC. IC is measured by
IC indicators, denoted by ICI;t; such as quality of infrastructure, quality of nancial
system and level of corruption, etc. The index is IC = ICI;t where  shows the
elasticity of GDP with respect to IC. In per capita terms,
yjt = IC
j
t

Ajt
 
kjt

(1.2)
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World technology frontier, At, is assumed to grow exogenously at a rate x so that
At = (1 + x)At 1 (1.3)
with an initial condition A0 > 0:
The technology of country j is governed by the following di¤erence equation
Ajt  Ajt 1 = jh(At 1  Ajt 1) + jAjt 1 (1.4)
where jh 2 (0;1), and j 2 [0; x) for each j. Equation (1.4) denotes that each country
j absorbs frontier technology at a constant exogenous rate jh using its skilled labor
force, and each country innovates through R&D activities at some exogenous constant
rate j(R&D). We use the terms innovation activities and local technology advances
interchangeably.
Country j0s technology at time t grows endogenously and its growth rate is given
by
Ajt = (1 + x
j
t )A
j
t 1 (1.5)
with an initial condition Aj0 > 0: Since At represents the world technology frontier
Ajt  At for all j and t. If Ajt = At, country j is at the frontier technology and nothing
can be absorbed from the frontier. But country j can still improve its technology
through its local technology advances, which is represented by the parameter j .
The capital accumulation equation for each country is given by
kjt = s
jf(kjt 1)  (nj + xjt 1 +    1)kjt 1 (1.6)
where kjt is e¤ective capital labor ratio of country j at time t, n
j is the constant labor
force growth rate of country j, sj 2 (0; 1) is the exogenous saving rate of country j, 
is the depreciation rate for capital, and xjt 1 is the endogenously determined growth
rate of technology of country j at time t. Exogenously given initial condition is kj0.
To solve the model, let us dene
ajt 
Ajt
At
(1.7)
as an inverse measure of technology distance of country j to the world technology
frontier.
Equation (1.4) becomes
ajt (1 + x)  ajt 1 = jh   jhajt 1 + jajt 1 (1.8)
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A world equilibrium is an allocation
n
[kt; at; ICt]t0
oJ
j=1
that satises equations
(1.6) and (1.8) for each j = 1; :::; J and for all t, with initial conditions fk0; a0; IC0gJj=1.
World equilibrium at the steady state is then an equilibrium with kt = k; at = a; and
ICt = IC
 for each j = 1; :::; J and for all t. Given this model, there is a steady-state
world equilibrium where aj and kj are determined by
aj =
jh
jh + x  j
(1.9)
and
kj =
0@sj

ICjI

A
nj + x+ 
1A
1
1 
: (1.10)
Putting into the production function
yj =

ICjI
 
1 
 
jh
jh + x  j
(1 + x)tA0
! 1
1   sj
nj + x+ 
 
1 
(1.11a)
In terms of logarithm
ln yj =

1   ln

ICjI

+
1
1   ln
 
jh
jh + x  j
!
+
1
1   ln
 
(1 + x)tA0

+

1   ln

sj
nj + x+ 
 
1 
(1.11b)
Proposition 1 Steady-state income per capita is increasing in ICjI ; 
j
h; 
j ; and sj
and decreasing in nj ; ; and x:
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
The central predictions of the model concerns the impact of IC, technological
progress (absorption from the world technology frontier through stock of human capital
and local technology advances), and savings and population growth on real income.
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1.4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The focus of our analysis is 113 developing and emerging-market countries. The log-
arithm of PPP-adjusted GDP per capita in 2007 will be our measure of economic
performance. This data is from the Summers-Heston Penn World Tables (PWT). The
standard deviation value 1.1 of this variable indicates the large GDP per capita di¤er-
ences in the sample. The average investment to GDP ratio over the 2000-2010 period
(s) and the average population growth rate from 2000-2010 (n) are from the same
PWT data set.
We construct composite indices using the World Banks enterprise survey data to
measure IC, ICjI , human capital, 
j
h, and local technology variables, 
j . The main
advantage of this survey is the information collected directly from rmsmanagers
on the characteristic of physical and social infrastructure. We use 87 rm-specic
variables for 27624 rms to measure IC in 113 countries. Appendix A.5 presents the
data by country and year. Following Escribano and Hacihasanoglu (2012 and 2013),
we construct a rm-specic relative measure of IC, which ranks rms based on how
much they are a¤ected by IC. Later, we take the median value of the IC index in
each country as a measure of the quality of IC in this country. IC index takes values
between 0 and 1 for each country, with 0 corresponding to the poorest IC. We construct
human capital and local technology variables as indices. The total number of rm-
specic variables for the local technology and human capital indices are 7. Similar to
IC index methodology, we construct rm-specic local technology and human capital
variables and then we take the median value of these variables in each country. We
provide a complete list of all the variables that we use for IC, human capital, and
innovation indices in Appendix A.3. In addition, we also explain the details of the
index methodology in Appendix A.4.
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the key variables of interest. Eastern
European countries have the best IC. This continent is followed by Latin America,
Asia, and Africa. The same ranking is valid for subdimensions of IC, human capital and
local technology. We give the denition of additional variables used in the robustness
analysis in Appendix A.3.
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
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1.5 Ordinary Least Squares E¤ects of Investment Cli-
mate on Per Capita Income
To analyze the key hypothesis of the model investment climate signicantly a¤ects
GDP - we consider a linearized version of equation (1.11a) that relates the logarithm
of GDP per capita to the logarithms of measures of investment climate, human capital
and local technology, and savings and population growth. In particular, we have the
following regression equation
ln yj = constant+  ln

ICjI

+
1
1   ln

j;h
j;h + x  j

(1.12)
+

1   ln (sj) 

1   ln (nj + x+ ) + "j
where yj is GDP per capita in country j, IC
j
I is IC index, h is human capital mea-
sure,  is local technology measure, sj is saving rate, nj is population growth, x is
world technology growth rate,  is depretiation rate and "j is a random error term.
Investment climate (IC) is on a scale from 0 to 1, where a higher score means better
investment climate. We consider x is equal to 0.02 following Kim (2008). The in-
vestment (s) and population growth (n) rates are averages for the period 2000-2010.
Following Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) we assume that x+  = 0:05.
We include (1 + x)tA0 term in constant for t = 2007, and separate the terms
ln (sj) and ln (nj + x+ ). Separation of these two terms allows us to test the Solow
models restriction. The restriction implies that their coe¢ cients are equal in terms
of magnitude and have opposite signs. Specically, because the share of capital in
income is approximately one-third, the coe¢ cient of ln (sj) should be approximately
0.5 and the coe¢ cient of ln (nj + x+ ) should be approximately -0.5.
Throughout the paper, our objective consists in testing the statistical signicance
of ; which is an evidence that IC matters to growth. Table 2 presents OLS re-
gressions, with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. Specication in column
(1) includes only Solow variables, savings and population growth. Both variables are
highly signicant and have the expected signs. Column (2) reports results with only
Nelson and Phelps variables, human capital and local technology. Two variables are
important determinants of GDP per capita, with signs predicted in the theoretical
model. On the other hand, while Nelson and Phelps variables explain 16% of the
cross-country income per capita di¤erences, Solow variables explain 44% of it. In col-
umn (4), we include Solow variables, Nelson and Phelps variables, and the IC variable
in the model. After the inclusion of the IC variable, Nelson and Phelps variables lose
their signicance, but Solow variables are still signicant. We see the same pattern
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if we combine Nelson and Phelps variables (column 5) and later on include the IC
variable (column 6). Specication 6 is going to be our base specication. Although
we do not have developed countries in our sample, there are still large cross-country
income di¤erences among sample countries. Our model can explain 54% of the overall
variation in income per capita among these countries.
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Three supporting sides of the results in Table 2 to the Solow model are worth
mentioning. First, implied alfa for the main specication is close to one-third. The p-
value for the test of alfa equal to one-third is 0.47 for the main specication in column
6. Second, savings and population growth variables have the expected signs, and they
are highly signicant for all of the specications. Third, as the Solow model predicts,
the coe¢ cients of ln (sj) and ln (nj + x+ ) are equal in absolute value and opposite
in sign. The p-value for the test of equality of these variables in absolute value is 0.79
for the main specication in column 6.
In all specications, the variable IC has a positive and signicant impact on GDP
per capita, which shows strong correlation between IC and economic performance.
Countries with a better IC are likely to have higher levels of income as the model pre-
dicts. If we compare columns (3) and (4), the coe¢ cient estimate on IC decreases from
6 to 3 when savings and population growth and human capital and local technology are
added to the model, implying that the omission of these variables biases upward the
impact of IC. To understand the comparative strength of the independent variables,
we have calculated beta coe¢ cients for our base specication (column 6). We report
those coe¢ cients in column (7). One-standard-deviation increase in IC would yield a
34 percent of a standard deviation increase in the logarithm of GDP per capita, which
has the biggest positive e¤ect among the explanatory variables. On the other hand,
one-standard-deviation decline in population growth generates analogous changes in
the logarithm of GDP, with an impact of 43 percent.
1.6 Instrumental Variable E¤ects of Investment Climate
on Per Capita Income
Overall, OLS results strongly conrm the theoretical models forecast between IC and
economic performance. But is this relationship causal? IC a¤ects growth. However,
economic growth may increase the demand and supply of better quality IC. This is the
potential endogeneity problem due to reverse causality. Instrumental variables is one
way to deal with the endogeneity problem in the institution literature. In this section,
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we treat IC as endogenous and following the institution literature, we employ IV
regressions with the instruments that can take into account the institutional variation.
Dollar, Hallward-Driemeier, and Mengistae (2006) write, the concept of invest-
ment climate is closely related to what some authors in the macro literature have called
high-quality institutions (Knack and Keefer 1995, Acemoglu; Johnson, and Robinson
2001) or social infrastructure(Hall and Jones, 1999).Four measures of institutions
used in the current growth literature are protection against expropriation (Acemoglu,
Johnson, and Robinson 2001), the rule of law (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton
2002; Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi 2004), institutions index (Easterly and Levine,
2003) and social infrastructure (Hall and Jones, 1999). Table 3 shows high correlation
between IC and these institution variables in the literature. Our IC index has the high-
est correlations with the social infrastructure variable in Hall and Jones (1999) and
the institutions index in Easterly and Levine (2003), which are 0.45 and 0.4, respec-
tively. In addition to this high correlation, the institution literatures emphasis on the
role of institutions to encourage investment for economic prosperity makes IC a valid
institution measure. For example, Acemoglu et al. (2001) use risk of expropriation as
a measure of institution because this set of institutions is essential for investment.
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
One strategy to search for good instruments in institution literature depends on
looking for di¤erent variables, which show Western European inuence. Acemoglu et
al. (2001) use a settler mortality measure to account for settlements of Europeans in
the previous colonies as an instrument for institutions. Their idea is that the settlement
of Europeans a¤ects the following institutional development of the former colonies. On
the other hand, Hall and Jones (1999) and Dollar and Kraay (2002) emphasize the
legal origin of a colonizer as an instrument because the identity of the colonizer is
what matters for current institutions. Other proposed instruments depend on the
geographic locations of countries such as the distance from Equator (latitude) and
being landlocked. Easterly and Levines study (2003) is an example of this approach.
In this section, we are going to use all these variables to instrument our IC variable
and check whether the OLS results in the previous section are robust to IV estimation.
Before concentrating on IV results, it is useful to look at the correlation of IC with
proposed instruments in the literature in Tables 4, 5, and 6. Correlation of IC with
instruments in Acemoglu et al. (2001) (Table 4) and Hall and Jones (1999) (Table 5)
is bigger than the correlation of these papersinstitution and instrument variables.
[TABLES 4, 5 & 6 ABOUT HERE]
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The basic results are presented in Table 7, in which we consider IC as endogenous.
The exclusion restriction requires that instruments for IC are not included in equation
(1.12). 2SLS estimates with settler mortality as an instrument are reported in column
(1) of Table 7. Since settler mortality data is available only for former colonies, the
sample size for this specication is almost half of the original sample. However, even
with this small sample size, IC is statistically signicant. The IC coe¢ cient in the IV
estimation is higher than the OLS counterpart (3.7 vs 5.9). This coe¢ cient implies that
one-standard-deviation increase in IC causes a 0.54 of a standard deviation increase
in the logarithm of GDP per capita. The rst-stage regression with an R2 of 0.32
indicates the signicant impact of settler mortality on our measure of institutions (IC).
This R2 is higher than Acemoglu et al.s counterpart (2001) of 0.27, which conrms
the higher correlation of IC with settler mortality than the correlation between risk
of expropriation and settler mortality. Moreover, when we restrict the sample of the
main specication in Acemoglu et al. (2001) to the countries which have IC data,
then not only settler mortality is a weak instrument for their institution measure of
the risk of expropriation but the risk of expropriation also has no e¤ect on GDP
per capita (Table 8). The group of institutions that a¤ect the performance of the
economy is quite complex, and these results show that what matters for growth are
not the property right institutions, but IC institutions for developing countries. The
results in column (1) of Table 7 and columns (1) and (2) in Table 8 conrm that the
e¤ect of IC is robust to a smaller sample of colonial countries and even much smaller
sample (only 48 countries) of developing former colonies. Hence, we believe that IC is
a better measure for institutions than the risk of expropriation used by Acemoglu et
al. (2001). On the other hand, population growth variable loses its signicance when
we run a 2SLS regression.
The second column in Table 7 represents the main equation for a larger sample of
113 countries that includes those that were not colonized. In this specication, follow-
ing Hall and Jones (1999) and Dollar and Kraay (2002), we use the English-speaking
population fraction and other European languages-speaking population fraction as in-
struments for IC. Since we have this information for all countries in the sample, we do
not lose any observation for this specication. The IC estimate of 11.3 is signicant
at the 99% level with a standard error of 2.2 and, in fact, larger than the estimate
for former colonies sample in column (1). Based on the IV-point estimate of 11.3,
one percent increase in the IC index is associated with an 11.3% increase in GDP per
capita. We can understand the quantitative meaning of this coe¢ cient by comparing
the index values of two countries, say Tanzania and Russia. The di¤erence in the
IC index is 0.12. Hence, the log GDPs of Tanzania and Russia di¤er by a factor of
1.36 in log-term based on our point estimate. This corresponds to an 8-fold di¤erence
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(e1:36   1) in GDP per capita. In real data, GDP per capita of Tanzania and Russia
has a 15-fold actual di¤erence.
Finally, in column (3) of Table 7, following Easterly and Levine (2003), we use set-
tler mortality, latitude, landlocked, and crops/mineral (10 variables) as instruments
for IC. Once again, IC is highly signicant with a coe¢ cient close to our main spec-
ication in the OLS results of Table 2 in column (6). Exclusion of settler mortality
from IV list does not change this result.
For a di¤erent set of instruments in columns (1)-(3) in Table 7, p-values of the
rst stage F-test conrms that instruments are highly correlated with IC and the
Hansen test cannot reject the validity of the instruments, that is, the instruments
are uncorrelated with the second-stage error term, and the instruments are correctly
excluded from the regression in the second stage. Both tests show the appropriateness
of the instrumental variables. The strong positive impact of IC on GDP per capita
is robust to alternative instrumental variable groups. We choose Hall and Jones
instruments (1999) as our main specication because, for these instruments, we have
the maximum number of observations in 2SLS estimation. For the rest of the paper,
baseline column in any table corresponds to the specication in column (2) of Table
7. Overall, the robustness of IC to alternation in the instrumental variable set and
di¤erent samples conrm that it has a causal e¤ect on GDP per capita. In addition,
out of the three specications, population growth has a negative and signicant e¤ect
in two of them; investment has a positive and signicant e¤ect in two of them. In the
rest of the paper, we investigate further the robustness of these results.
[TABLES 7 & 8 ABOUT HERE]
1.7 Robustness of the Results
1.7.1 Geography, policy, and integration
The purpose of this section is to assess empirically di¤erent theories of growth. Specif-
ically, geography, institutions (IC in our context), policy and integration inuence
economic development according to growth literature. We are going to show in this
section that IC trumps the others.
Geography
As explained by Easterly and Levine (2003), geography has an e¤ect on GDP per
capita by inuencing work e¤ort (Machiavelli, 1519; Montesquieu, 1748, Landes 1998)
and agricultural productivity (Myrdal, 1968; Kamarck, 1976; Diamond, 1997; Sachs,
1. Investment Climate and Cross-Country Income Di¤erences 14
2001). In this section, we concentrate on two di¤erent papers proposing two di¤erent
sets of geography variables.
In Table 9, we use the geography variables suggested by Rodrik et al. (2004).
These are distance from the equator, percentage of tropical land area, access to the
sea, number of frost days per month in winter, the area covered by frost, and average
temperature. Three out of six geography measures are signicant individually in Table
9. However, when we use all the measures together, p-value is 12 percent for joint
signicance of all of them. Moreover, all the individual e¤ects become insignicant
with the exception of area under frost. Masters and McMillan (2001) argue that
the key disadvantage of tropical climate is the absence of winter frost. Nevertheless, it
seems that more frost area has a negative e¤ect on GDP per capita, which is reasonable
because probably there is less economic activity in those places. But more importantly,
all of these geography variables do not qualitatively change our estimate of IC, which
is robust in terms of the magnitude, sign, and signicance.
[TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE]
In Table 10, we use the geography variables proposed by Acemoglu et al. (2001).
These are humidity, soil quality, natural resources and whether the country is land-
locked. Since there are a set of variables for temperature, humidity, soil quality and
natural resources, we report the joint signicance levels of these sets. Natural resources
are highly signicant both individually and in the larger pool. The components of nat-
ural resources that matter for growth are gold, iron, and oil reserves. Having those
reserves has an additional explanatory power on GDP per capita. However, whether
the country is landlocked has no e¤ect on income. Again, with geography variables
proposed by Acemoglu et al. (2001), there is almost no e¤ect on the 2SLS estimate
of IC on GDP per capita. The coe¢ cient of IC is 11.49 with a standard error of 2.6
when we control all geography factors. This is very close to the baseline specication
coe¢ cient of 11.3.
[TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE]
McArthur and Sachs (2001) consider health characteristics of countries as geog-
raphy. In particular, they propose life expectancy and infant mortality as health
measures. Since health is endogenous, they use geographic variables such as latitude
and mean temperature to instrument health variables. In Table 11, we investigate
the e¤ects of those health variables by replicating the regressions of McArthur and
Sach (2001) with their dependent (GDP per capita in 1995) and health variables. We
include our 2007 IC variable into their specications. The lack of time correspondence
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between the variables is not a serious problem, because institution variables move
slowly and show high persistence. Durlauf, Kourtellos, and Tan (2011) and Barro and
McCleary (2003) face the same problem and argue that the usage of variables with
lack of time correspondence is satisfactory if the variables are slow moving. In columns
(1)-(3), we consider health as exogenous while in columns (4)-(6), we consider health
as endogenous. Although McArthur and Sachs (2001) nd that both institutions and
health are signicant, we nd that only institutions, IC in our context, are signicant
with a smaller estimate than our baseline specication. None of the specications
in Table 11 provide a signicant coe¢ cient for health variables. Instrumenting health
variables does not change this result. McArthur and Sachs (2001) use settler mortality
as an instrument for their institution variable. Using the same instrument for IC does
not materially a¤ect our results.
[TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE]
Integration
A second group of explanations emphasize the role of integration. In this view, interna-
tional trade drives growth by encouraging productivity. Some of the recent examples
of this approach include studies by Frankel and Romer (1999) and Sacks and Wagner
(1995). Following Rodrik et al. (2004), we use the ratio of nominal trade to nominal
GDP as a measure of integration. Since trade is endogenous, we instrument trade
variable with an instrument proposed by Frankel and Romer (1999). They suggest
using the share of trade in GDP. This share is constructed by using a gravity equa-
tion for bilateral trade ows. Their methodology consists of two steps. First, they
regress bilateral trade to PPP-GDP share on country mass, trade partnersdistance,
and some other geographical variables. Second, based on the coe¢ cients estimated,
they construct a predicted aggregate trade share for each country. Later on, they use
this constructed trade share as an instrument for actual trade shares in a regression of
income on trade. Rodrik et al. (2004) proposes a similar instrument by re-estimating
the gravity equation in the rst step of Frankel and Romer (1999) with nominal bi-
lateral trade to nominal GDP as the dependent variable. We check the robustness of
our results with the instrument proposed by Rodrik et al. (2004) as well.
In Table 12, we use Frankel and Romer instruments (1999) in columns (1)-(3)
and Rodrik et al.s instruments (2004) in columns (4)-(6) for trade. To replicate the
regression used by Rodrik et al. (2004), we use the same dependent variable, GDP
per capita on a PPP basis for 1995, and the same right-hand side variables. The
only di¤erence of our regressions is IC as a measure of institutions. Integration or
trade variable does not have additional explanatory power in the GDP per capita
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equation in columns (1) and (4), which is similar to the results obtained by Rodrik et
al. (2004). However, in contrast to their result, the trade variable has a positive sign
in our regressions, which is what is expected from economic theory. The coe¢ cient of
IC is slightly lower, but still signicant at 1 percent.
Since smaller countries are more likely to trade, because less trade occurs within
borders relative to across borders, Frankel and Romer (1999) argue to control for
country size. The columns labeled (2) and (5) in Table 12 include area as a measure
of country size. This variable is highly insignicant, and the coe¢ cient on IC does
not change quantitatively. As a nal robustness check in this section, we use real
opennessmeasure proposed by Alcalá and Ciccone (2002), which is the ratio of trade
to GDP on a PPP basis instead of previous trade to GDP measure proposed by
Frankel and Romer (2001). Columns (3) and (6) show that the alternative measure of
integration does not change previous results. Still integration has no e¤ect on GDP
per capita, and IC has a strong causal e¤ect on GDP per capita. These results are
independent of the measures of trade, choice of instrument for trade, or taking into
account the size of the countries. Once again, the second integration measure has an
expected positive sign in our results in contrast to the results obtained by Rodrik et
al. (2004).
[TABLE 12 ABOUT HERE]
Macro policy
The policy hypothesis explains the current levels of economic development as a function
of macroeconomic policies. Following Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), we control a
number of macroeconomic variables (average ination, government consumption, and
exchange rate overvaluation) in Table 13. While IC continues to signicantly account
for international di¤erences in the level of GDP per capita, none of the macroeconomic
policy variables individually add additional explanatory power. Inclusion of these
variables decreases the coe¢ cient of IC. Coe¢ cient of IC, 6.28 in column (4), implies
that one-standard-deviation increase in IC causes a 0.64-standard-deviation increase
in GDP per capita. Coe¢ cient of exchange rate overvaluation of 0.003 in column (4)
implies that one-standard-deviation increase in exchange rate overvaluation causes a
0.07-standard-deviation decrease in GDP per capita. As emphasized, for example, by
the IADB report, there is no room for traditional scal and monetary macroeconomic
policies and countries should consider more structural reforms like improving IC. It
seems that this is not only true for Latin American countries but also for all developing
countries. Although it is not presented to save space, when we estimate the same
regressions with macro policy variable values before 2000, government consumption
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turns out to be signicant, and both government consumption and exchange rate
overvaluation have a negative e¤ect on GDP per capita. It seems that scal policy
is more limited now than it was before 2000. Moreover, the results also show that a
somewhat looser monetary policy to counter exchange rate appreciation may have a
positive e¤ect on growth. However, this e¤ect is limited and countries should consider
more fundamental reforms to boost growth.
[TABLE 13 ABOUT HERE]
1.7.2 Other controls
To examine the further robustness of our baseline specication, in this section, we
selected a set of additional controls used in the literature and consider a range of
specications. These alternative specications are reported in Table 14.
The rst specication adds religion variables to the baseline model. Specically,
these are the fractions of populations that are Catholic, Muslim and other religions
with Protestants as the omitted groups. We report the joint signicance level (p-value)
in the table. The point estimate of IC does not change, and these variables do not
enter signicantly into the regression.
The second specication examines the ethnolinguistic fragmentation as another
control. Now the coe¢ cient of IC is 11.41 with a standard error of 2.8. It is almost the
same with our baseline estimate. On the other hand, ethnolinguistic fragmentation is
statistically insignicant.
Following Hall and Jones (1999) in specication three, we add an indicator variable
taking the value of 1 for countries that are categorized as capitalist or mixed capitalist
by Freedom House (1994). Contrary to Hall and Joness odd result (1999), we get a
positive coe¢ cient for this variable. However, it is not signicant and the inclusion of
this variable has no e¤ect on IC.
In column (4), we add continent dummies to our baseline specication to analyze
whether the di¤erences across continents are the driving force for the relationship. We
report the joint signicance level (p-value) in the table. Continent dummies lower the
coe¢ cient estimate on IC, but its signicance level does not change. They are neither
individually nor jointly signicant.
The fth and sixth specication of Table 14 checks whether our results are robust
to the inclusion of dummies for the identity of the colonizer in column (5) and legal
origin in column (6) using the colonial sample. As with the other specications, the
coe¢ cient on IC is unchanged by the addition of legal origin and identity of colonizer
variables.
[TABLE 14 ABOUT HERE]
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Our theoretical model considers human capital as a factor used to absorb the
frontier technology. Another approach put human capital into the production function
and considers it as a factor of production. One example of the second method is
Mankiw, Romer, and Weils model (1992). To check the robustness of our results
to di¤erent considerations of human capital, we solved Mankiw et al.s model (1992)
with IC and estimated the steady-state equation with a human capital variable which
is similar to that used by Mankiw et al. (1992). Specically, we use average years
of schooling of the total population aged over 25 from 1960 through 2000. Results in
column (1) of Table 15 show that the e¤ect of IC on GDP per capita is independent
of the specic functional forms of human capital in the theoretical model.
Our IC measure is a rm-level measure and to obtain the aggregate measure, we
take the median value of the rm-specic IC within countries. As a nal robustness
analysis, in column (2) of Table 15, we take the mean of IC in each country. As in the
previous robustness analysis, we have a highly signicant IC.
[TABLE 15 ABOUT HERE]
1.8 Conclusion
What is the e¤ect of IC on growth? To answer this question, we presented an extended
Solow model with an IC index and Nelson and Phelps (1966) type of technology
di¤usion dynamics. We developed a new measure to account for the relative positions
of countries in terms of the quality of the IC. We measured multiple dimension of
IC using the IC index. Our index overcomes multicollinearity and the dimensionality
problems of the World Banks enterprise survey database. Since many IC variables
are highly correlated, using all of them separately causes an identication problem
because of multicollinearity in an econometric analysis. By incorporating as many IC
variables as preferred for having a representative sample of IC, we use all of them to
create an index.
In the empirical part, using the survey data from the World Bank, we show that IC
dominates other potential determinants of growth like geography, trade, and macro-
economic policies. This result is robust to include alternative control variables, and to
use di¤erent IC measures. In addition, the e¤ect of local technology and human capital
variables are not robust to those considerations. This strengthens the argument that
better IC is even more important for developing countries, where local technology is
far from the technology frontier. It seems that IC is more crucial than innovation and
imitation activities if the country is at the early stages of development. The structure
of todays global economy with rapid technology di¤usion is consistent with this result.
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The aggregate model and estimations in this paper show the causal relationship
between IC and growth, and the importance of investment-based institutions. This
is a good starting point that shows specic institutions that boost economic growth.
As a mobile factor of production, whether capital is owing to investment-friendly
destinations remains an area for future research. Another important area for future
research is the investigation of more specic questions with disaggregated models.
Firm-level IC measure developed by Escribano and Hacihasanoglu (2012 and 2013)
allows us to make those analyses.
Chapter 2
Investment Climate Indices:
Methodology and Applications
2.1 Introduction
Corporations operating in an economy are inuenced by conditions of the rms as well
as the exterior environment of the economy. The specic rules of the economy which
we call the investment climate (IC) may put constraints on rms or make it easier
for them to operate. Although the World Banks enterprise survey database covers
around 130,000 rms in more than 100 countries, the IC comparison of those countries
based on IC indices is an interesting open question. Considering a large number of
IC variables for any particular country generates multicollinearity problems that make
econometric analysis di¢ cult. The objective of this paper is to solve the dimension-
ality problem while keeping as many IC variables as we can. We reduce the large set
of IC variables into an IC index (ICI) which proxies the level of the investment cli-
mate of the aggregate economy. We show the usage of ICI in an econometric analysis
of Turkish exports. We also calculate the ICI for 113 countries and show that it is
correlated with other well-known cross-country level indices such as; the World Eco-
nomic Forums Global Competitiveness Index (GCI), the World Banks the Ease of
Doing Business Index (DBI), International Country Risk Guides (ICRG) index, the
Heritage Foundations Index of Economic Freedom (IEF), and Transparency Interna-
tionals Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), but at the same time add relevant new
information.
We construct composite positive and negative IC indices as a proxy for the good
and the bad quality of the investment climate for ve IC groups: a) infrastructure,
b) red tape, corruption, and crime, c) nance and corporate governance, d) quality,
innovation, and labor skills, and e) other control variables. To the best of our knowl-
20
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edge, this is the rst attempt to construct an IC index making use of all available IC
variables, combining information from continuous and binary IC variables. For the
aggregation of each individual IC variable into the index, we use equal and unequal
weighting schemes. The weights in the unequally weighted ICI are derived from prin-
cipal component analysis (PCA) on all IC variables after being transformed to binary
information.
Creating IC indices has several advantages. First, one advantage of creating ICI
is making the econometric analysis simpler without losing relevant IC information or
explanatory power in a multiple regression context. Second, an ICI enables us to
compare the country IC evolution from di¤erent years. Third, this ICI can be used
in studies of cross-country di¤erences based on the IC nature of the countries. The
ICI and their corresponding IC sub-indices are useful tools to make cross country
comparisons of the investment climate situation. Beyond its usage to estimate IC
e¤ects on rm-level performance measures, the ICI is also a convenient control variable
for country-specic investment climate status for future research. Fourth, using ICI
eliminates multicollinearity problems in the IC literature without a priori removing
any of the IC variables. Fifth, the discretization method used in the construction of
ICI helps us also to reduce the degree of endogeneity of the explanatory IC variables.
The reason is clear: a binary version of a continuous IC explanatory variable is less
correlated with the continuous error term of the regression model than with the proper
continuous IC variable.
As an example, we use Turkish export data to show the advantages of ICI in a
multiple regression context. There are three reasons for choosing data from Turkey to
show the econometric applications of ICI. First, although similar data is available for
113 countries, the sample size in most of these countries is very small as compared to
Turkey. Second, Turkish data has been analyzed extensively using individual IC vari-
ables, see Escribano, Guasch, de Orte, and Pena (2008a and 2008b) and Escribano,
de Orte, and Pena (2008), which allow us to compare our index methodology with
the previous literature. Finally, the aggregate and political stability of Turkey from
the years 2000 to 2010 increase the relative importance of IC constraints on rm-level
performance and make Turkey an interesting country to improve country competive-
ness based on micro fundamentals. Improvements of macroeconomic factors of Turkey
after 2000 have raised the relative importance of microeconomic factors such as the
investment climate.
Most of the IC literature has analyzed the e¤ects of a few IC variables on di¤erent
rm performance measures (TFP, employment, exports, etc.) to identify bottlenecks
to economic growth and provide policy prescriptions in developing countries. The
literature gives evidence that good IC stimulates growth through higher productivity
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and investment by showing the signicant e¤ect of several IC variables.1 Although
many academic papers and policy reports use IC data, most of them investigate the
impacts of the individual blocks of the IC such as infrastructure, nance or corruption.
For the ones who consider more than one IC block, they only concentrate on a few
IC variables in those blocks. When restricting the analysis to a limited number of IC
variables, they face a problem of omitted variables. On the other hand, do those few
IC variables used present a relevant description of the IC? Are those empirical results
because of the particular selection of the IC variables? To overcome these problems
and to precisely represent the investment climate, in this paper we propose and IC
index that uses the information on all IC variables allowing for a more microeconomic
analysis of the obstacles to GDP growth than that provided by macro-institutions
literature.
The macro literature has used aggregate variables to explain cross country GDP
di¤erences. Firm-level studies are superior to macro studies because of taking into
account within-country heterogeneity and providing clear policy proposals. Durlauf et
al. (2008), Straub (2008), Pande and Udry (2005) and Dethier et al. (2008) are some of
the papers explaining the shortcomings of the macro literature. Hence, cross-country
comparisons based on aggregation from rm-level data could provide interesting new
hypotheses for the macro literature.
The structure of the rest of the paper is the following. In section 2.2, we present the
details of the data based on IC surveys of the World Bank. In particular, the IC survey
of Turkey provides 125 IC variables for approximately 903 rms in 2008. We divide
the ICs into ve groups and then construct Negative and Positive IC indices as a
proxy for good and the bad investment climates. The details of the index construction
are given in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 gives the main empirical relationships between IC
indices and the probability of export. We compare the current IC methodology of the
general to specic approach of Escribano and Guasch (2005 and 2008) with our new
index methodology in Section 2.5. Section 2.6 gives the ranking results of the ICIs
for 113 developing and transition countries and the comparison of those results with
that of other economic indicators such as the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI)
and explain the strengths of our ICI. Special attention is paid to the di¤erential IC
e¤ects on rm size. Finally, in Section 2.7, the paper ends with the main conclusions.
2.2 Investment Climate Surveys (ICS)
Our data source is the World Banks Investment Climate Surveys (ICS). In particular,
for the investment climate assessment (ICA) based on investment climate indices (ICI),
1See survey paper by Dethier, Hirn and Straub (2008) for details of the empirical IC literature.
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we use data from Turkey in 2008, previously analyzed in Escribano et al. (2008). ICS
are very useful to identify bottlenecks to economic growth based on rmsinformation.
The questions of the surveys are generally answered by top managers or the owners
of the rm, sometimes with support of human resource managers and accountants
of the rm, in face-to-face interviews. To reduce measurement errors and missing
information in aspects such as corruption, condentiality of answers is assured. In
addition, to reduce coding and processing errors, quality control procedures are carried
out. The data covers both rmssubjective impediments evaluations and also objective
numerical values related to the cost of doing business and the competitive environment
where rms operate.2 Following previous literature, we divide the investment climate
variables into ve groups: a) infrastructure, b) red tape, corruption, and crime, c)
nance and corporate governance, d) quality, innovation, and labor skills and e) other
control variables such as exporting, importing, and FDI status; capacity utilization;
size and age of the rm, etc. Appendix B.2 lists all IC variables by groups and gives
their corresponding denitions.
The IC database is stratied by size, region, and industries. Our main emphasis,
in this paper, is on the manufacturing sectors. There are nine di¤erent sectors ac-
cording to their ISIC code: 1) food; 2) textiles; 3) garments; 4) chemicals; 5) plastics
and rubbers; 6) non-metallic minerals products; 7) basic metals and fabricated metal
products; 8) machinery and equipment; 9) other manufacturing including electronics.3
Despite a careful attention is placed when running the survey, missing observations
and outliers are important problems regarding the data set. There are missing values
both in rm performance and rm characteristics variables. Escribano and Guasch
(2005 and 2008) and Escribano and Pena (2009) have developed a recent econometric
methodology for the World Bank. Following their methodology, we use industry,
region, and size averages to replace the missing values of the variables. This is the
rst stage of the cleaning process for the data base (imputation method).4 We remove
the outliers in the second stage of the cleaning process. We specify outliers as those
rms with material to sales or labor cost to sales ratios are bigger than one. If all of
the production function variables of a rm are missing, we delete this rm from the
analysis.
Endogenous nature of some of the explanatory IC variables is another problem
that we face while working with this data set. Existence of only one year data elimi-
nates the possibility of using lag values of IC variables as instruments. Hence, we use
2Gelb et al. (2007) and Aterido et al. (2007) show that subjective responses and objective measures
are highly correlated in the IC variables.
3Classication of regions: Marmara, Aegean, Central Anatolia, Black Sea and South and classi-
cation of rm sizes: small (<20 employees), medium (>=20 and <100), and large (>=100).
4The method is called the ICA method. See Escribano and Pena (2009) for details of this method.
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the industry-region-size averages for the missing values of the plant-level IC variables
as proxies to reduce the endogeneity of IC variables. Many papers in IC literature
adopt this technique.5 Average variables are important determinants of rm-level per-
formances, but rm-level performances have only limited impact on averages. This
moderates the degree of endogeneity because of reverse causality. When the response
rate of the variables is neither too low nor large enough, we substitute the missing
values of rm characteristics by industry-region-size imputation techniques, to keep as
many observations and explanatory variables as possible in the regression. By doing
that, we reduce the omitted variable problems and gain e¢ ciency at the cost of some
measurement errors; but the trade-o¤ is worthwhile, as was shown by Escribano and
Pena (2009).
2.3 Methodology to Construct an Investment Climate In-
dex (ICI)
While it is of interest to have a large number of variables to measure the investment cli-
mate of a country, an abundance of the IC explanatory variables creates multicollinear-
ity problems and makes the econometric analysis di¢ cult. One way to overcome this
problem is to create a composite index to measure the investment climate of a country.
Thus, we propose new composite measures that proxy positive and negative invest-
ment climates based on the World Banks Investment Climate Assessments (ICAs) of
Turkey in 2008. The composite indices of positive and negative investment climates
include the ve previously dened IC sub-indices. The objective of the sub-indices
is to provide a summary measure for the usual 5 main groups of investment climate
variables.
The estimation of the composite index (ICI) and each IC sub-index requires the
following four steps:
Step 1: imputation of the missing values of IC variables in the index;
Step 2: determination of the conditional and unconditional signs of the IC vari-
ables to be used in the index;
Step 3: discretization of continuous IC variables into binary 0-1 variables using
the 95% (or 5%) threshold level, and
Step 4: determination of the weighting scheme to be used in the aggregation:
equal weights or unequal weights.
In what follows of this section, we explain each step in detail.
5See, among others, Escribano and Guasch (2005 and 2008) and Escribano et al. (2008).
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2.3.1 Step 1: Imputation of missing values of IC variables
Following the ICA method developed by Escribano and Guasch (2005 and 2008) and
Escribano and Pena (2009), we replace the missing values of the IC variables by their
industry, region, and size averages in the rst stage. This technique also enables us
to reduce the endogeneity of IC variables and the number of omitted variables.6 We
remove outliers that are specied as those rms with ratios of labor cost to sales or ma-
terial to sales bigger than one in the second stage. After replacement and elimination
of outliers, we end up with a sample size of 903 rms.
2.3.2 Step 2: Sign determination, (+) or (-), of each IC variable
In the construction of the IC index, we have to determine the sign of each IC variable;
i.e, determine whether it provides a positive or a negative atmosphere in the economy
for the operations of the rms. We used three complementary methods at this stage.
2.3.2.a: We use economic intuition and/or economic theory to carry out a prelim-
inary determination of the unconditional signs of the IC variables.
2.3.2.b: We check the conditional signs of IC variables block by block based on
multiple regression analysis. We have ve blocks as explained in Section 2.1 and 2.2
and we analyze the conditional signs based for example on rm-level data on the
probability of export regression based on a linear probability model (LPM).
2.3.2.c: We add each IC variable one by one to the preliminary probability of the
export equation to check the conditional signs of IC variables.
From 2.3.2a we get the unconditional signs of the IC variables and from 2.3.2.b and
2.3.2.c we get the conditional signs. If two conditional signs (signs from 2.3.2.b and
2.3.2.c) of any IC variable are di¤erent from what is expected from economic theory
(sign from 2.3.2.a), we list this IC variable in a contrary sign group of variables of the
corresponding conditional index. Tables 1.1-1.5 list all of the variables with results of
the signs of the three methods that we used. We show with two signs all the contrary
sign IC variables.
In particular, for the sign consideration method of 2.3.2.b, we regress ve di¤erent
blocks of IC variables on the probability of export after controlling for TFP and region,
industry and size dummies, and we take the sign of each IC variable in each IC block.
That is, we run the following LPM regression for 5 di¤erent IC blocks from the 636
rms of the sample.
Xi = 0 + 1 log TFPi + 
0
2DI;i + 
0
3DR;i + 
0
4DS;i + ICj;i + "i (2.1)
6For a deeper analysis see Escribano and Pena (2009).
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for j = 1; 2 : : : 5 represents the di¤erent IC blocks; infrastructure; corruption and crime;
nance; quality, innovation, and labor skills; and control. The dependent variable, Xi,
in the linear probability model is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if exports
are greater than 10% of sales and 0 otherwise. TFP is the total factor productivity
(in logs) and DI;i; DR;i; and DS;i are the industry, region and size dummies. IC1 for
j = 1 is the vector of IC variables in the infrastructure group; IC2 for j = 2 is the
vector of IC variables in the red tape and corruption group; IC3 for j = 3 is the vector
of IC variables in the nance and corporate governance group; IC4 for j = 4 is the
vector of IC variables in the quality, innovation, and labor skills group; and IC5 for
j = 5 is the vector of variables in the control group. Specically, we estimate equation
(2.1) ve times; one for each IC block. The coe¢ cient of each IC variable in the IC
block represents the conditional sign in method 2.3.2.b. Hence,
ICk;j =

IC+k;j if
bk;j > 0 in equation (2.1)
IC k;j if bk;j < 0 in equation (2.1)
from each of the ve IC blocks, j = 1; 2 : : : 5; and for each IC variable, k = 1; 2 : : : 122.
In this equation, bk;j represents the estimated coe¢ cient of kth IC variable in block j
from equation (2.1), and ICk;j represents the sign of kth IC variable in block j.
Finally, in method 2.3.2.c, we obtain a preliminary linear probability model (LPM)
for the probability of exporting equation by using the general to specicapproach
of Escribano and Guasch (2005 and 2008) and Escribano et al. (2008) and we add
each IC variable one by one to this baseline LPM model to see its sign.
Xi = 0 + 1 log TFPi + 2interneti + 3inventoryi + 4inspi
+5paygovctrcti + 6cerwaiti + 7fxa_equi + 8clt_landi (2.2)
+9isoi + 10newprdi + 11priceupi + 12 log agei
+013DI;i + 
0
14DR;i + 
0
15DS;i + kICk;i + "i
where the dependent variableXi in the linear probability model is a dummy variable as
dened before, TFP is the total factor productivity, internet is dummy for web page,
inventory is days of inventory, insp is number of inspections, paygovctrct is dummy
for payments to obtain a contract with the government, cerwait is days spent obtaining
compulsory certicates, fxa_equ is new xed assets nanced by equity, clt_land is
dummy for land and buildings as collateral, iso is dummy for quality certication,
newprd is dummy for new product, priceup is dummy for increased prices, age is age
of the rm, DI;i; DR;i; DS;i are the industry, region and size dummies, and ICk;i is
the IC variable in the index. Because the total number of IC variables in the index is
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equal to 122 and we have 11 of them in the preliminary export equation, we include
the remaining 111 IC variable one by one in equation (2.2). We also determine the
signs of the initial 11 variables from equation (2.2). Hence,
ICk =

IC+k if
bk > 0 in equation (2.2)
IC k if bk < 0 in equation (2.2)
for k = 1; 2 : : : 122. In this equation, bk represents the estimated coe¢ cient of kth IC
variable from equation (2.2), and ICk represents the sign of kth IC variable.
Finally, we di¤erentiate between conditional and unconditional indices, and use
conditional signs in the conditional index and unconditional signs in the unconditional
index. If conditional and unconditional signs of an IC variable are equal, then the sign
of that IC variable is the same in both conditional and unconditional indices. On the
other hand, if the conditional sign of any IC variable is di¤erent from the economic
theory, we include these variables in the contrary sign groups and they are not used
in the conditional index and sub-index.
[TABLE 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, and 1.5 ABOUT HERE]
2.3.3 Step 3: Discretization of IC variables into binary values (0,1)
In the third step, we assign 0 or 1 values for each IC variable, both in the positive
and negative IC indices. For the binary IC variables, assignment of zeros and ones is
automatic and immediate. If the binary variable has a value of 0 in one observation,
it has also a 0 value in the index for that observation, and if it has a value 1, it takes
a value of 1 in the index for that observation.
However, for the continuous IC variables, we use the 95% (5%) threshold level to
assign 0 or 1 to a specic IC variable. For any rm which has a IC variable value that
is less than the 95% threshold level, we assign the value 0, and any rm which has
a value of the IC variable that is larger than the 95% threshold level, we assign the
value 1. We use the 95% threshold level to measure the e¤ect of extremely good and
extremely bad IC. The results are robust to other threshold given by 75% and 90%.
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
IC+k;i =

1 if IC+k;i  0:95  IC+k
0 otherwise
IC k;i =

1 if IC k;i  0:95  IC k
0 otherwise
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2.3.4 Step 4: Aggregation to construct the IC sub-indices
Once we have transformed all the IC variables into binary variables, the sum of all
the ones in any positive (negative) IC subgroup of the ith rm gives the number of
positive (negative) IC values for that rm in the corresponding IC sub-index.
Aggregation to construct an IC index with equal weights
In order to normalize the IC indices to have values between 0 and 1, we divide each sub-
index by the maximum number of IC variables in that group. Applying this procedure
to our data set from Turkey, we ended up with 10 conditional and 10 unconditional
sub-indices: positive ICI for infrastructure (ICIpos1), negative ICI for infrastructure
(ICIneg1), positive ICI for red tape (ICIpos2), negative ICI for red tape (ICIneg2),
positive ICI for nance (ICIpos3), negative ICI for nance (ICIneg3), positive ICI for
quality and innovation (ICIpos4), negative ICI for quality and innovation (ICIneg4),
positive ICI for controls (ICIpos5), and negative ICI for controls (ICIneg5) where for
each of the 5 IC blocks we have:
ICIpos1;i =
1
n1;i;pos
 n1;i;posX
k=1
IC+1k;i
!
; ICIneg1;i =
1
n1;i;neg
 n1;i;negX
k=1
IC 1k;i
!
;
ICIpos2;i =
1
n2;i;pos
 n2;i;posX
k=1
IC+2k;i
!
; ICIneg2;i =
1
n2;i;neg
 n2;i;negX
k=1
IC 2k;i
!
;
ICIpos3;i =
1
n3;i;pos
 n3;i;posX
k=1
IC+3k;i
!
; ICIneg3;i =
1
n3;i;neg
 n3;i;negX
k=1
IC 3k;i
!
;
ICIpos4;i =
1
n4;i;pos
 n4;i;posX
k=1
IC+4k;i
!
; ICIneg4;i =
1
n4;i;neg
 n4;i;negX
k=1
IC 4k;i
!
;
ICIpos5;i =
1
n5;i;pos
 n5;i;posX
k=1
IC+5k;i
!
; ICIneg5;i =
1
n5;i;neg
 n5;i;negX
k=1
IC 5k;i
!
;
where for the positive ICI in block j we have that k = 1::::nj;i;pos represents the
number of IC variables in each of 5 IC positive blocks, and for the negative ICI in
block j we have that k = 1::::nj;i;neg represents the number of IC variables in each of 5
IC negative blocks. Note that although we have the above sub-indices at the rm-level,
the numbers of IC variables used in each sub-index are the same for all rms.
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If the conditional sign of any IC variable is di¤erent from the economic theory,
we include these variables in the contrary sign groups and those IC variables are not
used in the conditional sub-index. Because of these contrary sign groups, we have
only 7 additional conditional sub-indices as opposed to 10 unconditional sub-indices.
For example in Table 2 and 3, we have 17 (34-17) contrary sign IC variables that are
not used in the conditional red tape, corruption, and crime group index as compared
to the unconditional red tape, corruption, and crime index. Over all ve groups, the
total number of IC variables used in the unconditional index is 122, while this number
is reduced to 83 in the conditional index of Tables 2 and 3.
[TABLE 2 & 3 ABOUT HERE]
The value of n in each sub-index shows the maximum possible value of the index
for that IC block. For example, the maximum possible value of positive unconditional
infrastructure index is 3 because we only have three positive infrastructure variables.
The maximum possible value of negative unconditional infrastructure index is 19, etc.
The objective of the sub-indices is to provide a summary measure for the ve blocks of
investment climate variables. Hence, an establishment which has a value of n = 8 in the
ICIneg1 is clearly more a¤ected by the negative infrastructure than an establishment
which has a value of 4 in ICIneg1 :
We then combine the sub-indices into positive and negative multidimensional com-
posite IC indices (ICI) as a single measure of positive and negative aspects of the
investment climate. The multidimensional composite positive and negative ICIs are
an equally weighted average of the sub-indices. Because we do not have any rationale
to value one of the sub-indices more than the others, we use equal weights for the
sub-indices of each of the 5 IC blocks.
ICIposi =
1
5
0@ 5X
j=1
ICIposj;i
1A = 0eICposi (2.3a)
where 0e =
 
1
5 ; :::
1
5

ICInegi =
1
5
0@ 5X
j=1
ICInegj;i
1A = 0eICnegi (2.3b)
where 0e =
 
1
5 ; :::
1
5

:
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Aggregation to construct an IC index with unequal weights
We call the above index the equally weighted index, as the weights attached to each
of the IC variables are identical and equal to 1nji . Alternatively, we use principal
component analysis (PCA) to determine the weights for a sub-index of IC. This method
reduces data dimensionality while keeping the maximum possible information. If we
have IC data of correlated variables on 636 rms, then PCA looks for a transformation
of the original indices of IC variables into new uncorrelated variables. As it is explained
in Jolli¤e (2002), PCA works as follows:
Step 1: being IC a vector of n IC variables for an IC sub-index and 1 a vector of
n constants (1112::::1n) of the same IC sub-index, rst nd a linear function 01IC
of the elements of IC with maximum variance,
Step 2: nd a linear function 02IC, having no correlation with 01IC obtaining
maximum variance, and so on,
Step 3: in the nal kth step, a linear function 0kIC (kth principal component) is
found that obtain maximum variance and has no correlation with 01IC; 02IC; ::::0k 1IC.
Because the rst principal component (FPC) is the weighted sum of the original
variables that captures as much of the variances in the data as possible, we use the
FPC as a proxy for ten sub-indices. The last row of Table 4 shows the percentage
of variation explained by the rst PC. We use the rst PC to represent the highest
variability that we can observe in the IC data.
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]
2.4 The IC Indices and their Relationship with the Prob-
ability to Export
In this section, we will see the application of our IC indices in modeling the proba-
bility of export with a linear probability model (LPM). It is very well documented in
trade literature that there are considerable productivity di¤erences among domestic
rms, exporters and multinational rms. Hence, we need to control for productivity
di¤erences among the rms in our sample. We use production function variables to
calculate the productivity (TFP) of each establishment. Similar to the IC variable, we
have the missing values problem in the production function variables as well. Follow-
ing the missing values imputation method developed by Escribano and Guasch (2005
and 2008) and Escribano and Pena (2009), we replace the missing values of the pro-
duction function variables by their industry, region, and size averages. If all of the
production function variables of a rm are missing, we delete this rm from the analy-
sis. Escribano and Guasch (2005 and 2008) and Escribano et al. (2008) empirically
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analyze robust results to 10 di¤erent productivity measures in the IC surveys. We
adopt the same robust productivity methodology. The key point of this methodology
is to nd IC coe¢ cients which are robust to di¤erent productivity measures, and then
use the group of signicant explanatory variables as instruments for productivity in
other rm performance equations (exports, FDI, etc.) a¤ected by TFP and other IC
variables. Specically, they apply standard IV estimators (2SLS) using as instruments
the industry-region-size averages of IC variables, IC proxies with only missing values
replaced by the industry-region-size averages and other exogenous IC variables.
We use nonparametric cost-shares approach from Hall (1990) to generate logarithm
of Solows residuals both for restricted and unrestricted versions. In the restricted
version, we use input cost shares for the whole sample. In the unrestricted version, we
use input cost shares for each manufacturing sector. This nonparametric approach does
not require exogenous inputs and constant or homogeneous input-output elasticities.
On the other hand, it has assumptions of competitive input markets and constant
returns to scale.7
After getting our logTFP measures, we regress a binary variable of export, on
logTFP and positive and negative conditional/unconditional ICI indices by using 2SLS.
Xi = 0 + 1 log TFPi + 2ICIpos1;i + 3ICIneg1;i + 4ICIpos2;i
+5ICIneg2;i + 6ICIpos3;i + 7ICIneg3;i + 8ICIpos4;i (2.4)
+9ICIneg4;i + 
0
10DI;i + 
0
11DR;i + 
0
12DS;i + "i
where Xi is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if exports are greater than 10%
of sales and 0 otherwise, TFP is the total factor productivity, ICIpos1 is condi-
tional/unconditional positive infrastructure index, ICIneg1 is conditional/unconditional
negative infrastructure index, ICIpos2 is conditional/unconditional positive corrup-
tion index, ICIneg2 is conditional/unconditional negative corruption index, ICIpos3 is
conditional/unconditional positive nance index, ICIneg3 is conditional/unconditional
negative nance index, ICIpos4 is conditional/unconditional positive quality and inno-
vation index, and ICIneg4 is conditional/unconditional negative quality and innovation
index. Because the interpretation of the other control variables group is not clear in a
probability of export regressions, we did not include this group in the regressions.
IC has complex e¤ects and rms in di¤erent regions and industries are a¤ected
di¤erently from the IC. We include industry and region dummies to control for industry
and region specic e¤ects. We do not report coe¢ cients of these dummies to save
space. We use robust cluster standard errors in the regression to control for di¤erent
7See Escribano and Guasch (2005 and 2008) for details.
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forms of heteroskedasticity and cross-correlation within the di¤erent clusters. As it is
more likely for larger and older rms to export, we put size dummies and also the age
of the rm as additional control variables. Table 5 presents descriptive statistics for
conditional and unconditional sub-indices as well as composite positive and negative
indices.
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]
First, we run the above equation for a LPM to see which groups of indices have a
signicant e¤ect on the probability of export. Because the mean value of our dependent
variable (0.48) is far from the extreme values of 0 or 1, LPM provides analogous results
to Probit or Logit models. On the other hand, LPM has the advantages of easier
coe¢ cient interpretation and easier treatment of endogeneity by using, for example,
2SLS. In Table 6, column (1) and (2) show the results for conditional IC indices and
column (3) and (4) show the results for unconditional IC indices. In column (1) and
(3), we use the restricted Solow residuals and in column (2) and (4), we use unrestricted
Solow residual as our TFP measure.
Out of eight IC groups, positive infrastructure; negative red tape, corruption,
and crime; and positive innovation groups have a statistically signicant e¤ect on
the probability of export in all specications and they have the expected sign. The
results are robust (in terms of the sign, signicance and magnitude) to conditional or
unconditional construction of the indices and usage of restricted or unrestricted Solow
residual as the TFP measure. On the other hand, the coe¢ cient of the corruption
group is lower in the unconditional index as compared to conditional counterpart.
There are 17 di¤erent IC variables in the conditional and unconditional corruption
groups. This di¤erence gives slightly di¤erent results for the corruption group between
conditional and unconditional indices. Note that after controlling for the IC elements,
medium size rms are 14% more likely to export than small rms and large rms
are 25% more likely to export than small rms. Hence, there is a sorting pattern
among the small, medium and large rms based on the probability to export. The
probability of exporting decreases with rmsage after controlling productivity and
IC. It seems that, in the Turkish context, younger rms are more likely to export
than older ones. Finally, as expected, our results also conrm that the probability of
exporting is increasing with productivity.
[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]
In Table 7 from column 1 to 4, we use the signicant IC groups from previous
results in the IV estimation. Because of the endogenous nature of the TFP (due to
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simultaneity), following Escribano (2005 and 2008), we trust more IV estimators than
OLS. The instrumental variables (IV) considered are the IC exogenous variables and
the excluded exogenous IC variables of the LPM. The list of IC variables used as ex-
cluded restrictions are domestic shipment losses and dummy for informal competitors.
After determining valid instruments for baseline specication, we use the same set of
instruments for all IV estimations. We only replace missing values from IC variables
by the corresponding region-industry-size average to avoid facing an omitted variables
problem. The results are quite similar to our OLS estimation in Table 6. P-values of
the rst-stage F-test show that instruments for TFP are highly correlated with TFP
and the Hansen test (over-identifying restrictions) does not reject the null hypothesis
that the instruments can be excluded from the second-stage regression. TFP is signif-
icant only at 10% in two specications of IV estimations. The positive infrastructure
group includes telecommunication variables such as having a web page and access to
e-mail. Those properties increase probability of export by 30%. On the other hand,
quality and innovation group includes variables such as R&D activities, quality cer-
tications, and having an educated work-force. Our results show that rms having
those activities and an educated work-force are 50% more likely to export. In addi-
tion, the probability of exporting decreases by 48% if rms are faced with security and
corruption problems. This e¤ect is greater when we consider conditional indices.
The instruments used for TFP are the IC exogenous variables and the excluded ex-
ogenous IC variables of the LPM with only IC missing values replaced by the industry-
region-size averages. We report OLS estimation result in column (5)-(8) of Table 7.
The magnitude of the coe¢ cient of TFP is changes from IV estimation to OLS estima-
tion. Instrumenting productivity is providing a bigger coe¢ cient for TFP. However,
the changes in the magnitude of the coe¢ cient of the IC variables are relatively small
between IV and OLS estimations.
Our objective in the remaining part of this section is to check the robustness of
these results to di¤erent index construction techniques.
[TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE]
In the construction of the indices, we used the 95% threshold level to discretize the
continuous variable into binary variables. What if we change this threshold level? Do
our results depend on specic threshold level? To answer these questions and check
whether the results are robust to di¤erent threshold considerations, we constructed the
indices using the 90% and 75% threshold levels, and then we run the above regression.
The results are presented in column (1)-(3) in Table 8 for conditional indices and in
column (5)-(7) in Table 8 for unconditional indices. Our results conrm that previous
conclusions are independent from the threshold level of our IC indices. In the next
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step, instead of doing discretization, we make a normalization to continuous variables
by dividing one specic IC variable by the maximum value of that variable. In this
way, we get all the individual IC variables between 0 and 1. Some of them are binary,
and some are continuous. The results of these considerations are presented in column
(4) and (8) of Table 8. Again, the results are similar. We see that once we decrease
the threshold level, the values of coe¢ cients are decreasing. This means that the
probability of exporting changes more for the rms which are extremely positively
and extremely negatively a¤ected by the IC. Because the coe¢ cients are very close in
the continuous and 95% threshold level results, the 95% discretization level is working
well, as expected. In Table 8, we use restricted Solow residuals as our TFP measure.
However, our results are same if we switch to unrestricted productivity measure. To
save space we did not report those results.
[TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE]
We use simple averaging in the construction of our IC indices. It is interesting to
see whether the averaging technique of the IC indices has any e¤ect on the results.
To check the robustness of the results to the weighting scheme, we run the above
regressions for the indices derived by using PCA. The results in Table 9 for PCA are
nearly identical to those of simple averaging in the sense that we get the same ICI as
signicant and their signs are the same as in the equally weighted case. The simple
averaging approach is therefore robust to alternative weighted averaging technique. On
the other hand, there is a small di¤erence in the values of coe¢ cient in two models.
We believe that equally weighted indices are better than unequally weighted indices
based on PCA for two reasons. First, because Hadi and Ling (1998) show that for the
regression purposes taking the rst principal component of the IC variables directly
is not a good idea even though in order to represent the variability of the data taking
the weights from rst PC is usually recommended. Second, Kolenikov and Angeles
(2004) show that PCA is not the best procedure for discrete data as is the case for our
IC indices.
[TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE]
As a nal robustness check, without considering conditional signs of the IC vari-
ables, we combine four positive and four negative unconditional sub-indices in order
to get composite positive and negative indices as a multidimensional measure of pos-
itive and negative IC. Multidimensional composite positive and negative indices are
the equally weighted average of the positive and negative sub-indices. To evaluate the
e¤ects, we add these two indices into our regression of the LPM of exports and use IV
estimation.
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Xi = 0+1 log TFPi+2ICIposi+3ICInegi+
0
4DI;i+
0
5DR;i+
0
6DS;i+"i (2.5)
where ICIpos =
P4
j=1 ICIposj=4 and ICIneg =
P4
j=1 ICInegj=4 are the multidimen-
sional composite positive and the negative IC indices and DI;i; DR;i; and DS;i are the
industry, region and size dummies. The results are presented in Table 10. Once again,
we get highly signicant positive and negative IC indices with expected signs in column
(1) and (3).
We have seen that IC may a¤ect rm performance in areas such as probability
of export, but high rm performance may increase the demand and supply of better
quality IC which might create endogeneity problems in several IC variables. Location
choice of rms is another source of endogeneity. To see whether the quality of the IC
a¤ect the location choice of rms with better performance, we present the results with
a sample of domestic, small, and medium rms. Those rms have less ability to move.
The robust empirical results are included in column (2) and (4).
[TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE]
One interesting result in columns (2) and (4) is that the negative IC index has a
higher value for small and medium rms which conrms that small and medium rms
are more a¤ected by the negative aspect of the IC. For example, it is more likely for
smaller rms to give bribes and less likely for them to access nance. In addition,
small and medium rms are a¤ected more from power outages while large rms have
alternative energy sources such as a generator.
2.5 Comparison of results with ICI versus individual IC
variables
In the previous section, we evaluated the performance of our IC indices in a linear
probability of export model. In this section, we estimate the same model but the
selection of the relevant list of individual explanatory IC variables goes from general
to specic to avoid omitted variable problems. Initially all IC variables are included
in the model. Then, the most insignicant IC variables are eliminated in the rst
stage to avoid having a high degree of multicollinearity. In the second step, a further
reduction in the number of insignicant IC variables is applied. The most insignicant
IC variable from each of the 5 blocks is eliminated, one by one. Following this process, a
nal model is reached in which all IC variables are signicant. Finally, each previously
removed IC variable is added into the nal model, one by one, to see if any of them
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is now signicant. This method is called the general to specic process and was
successfully applied by Escribano, Guasch, de Orte and Pena´s World Bank reports
to more than 60 developing countries. Using this methodology, Table 11 presents
the results of signicant IC variables and their corresponding IC groups. Column (2)
presents the percentage contribution of each IC variable relative to the sample mean
of the dependent variable. All the IC contributions represent the relative importance
of each IC factor for the exporting frequency. Finally, in column (3), we compute the
percentage contributions in absolute value to obtain a measure of the relevance of the
IC blocks.
The coe¢ cient of TFP in IV estimation (column 1) is 5 times the coe¢ cient of
TFP in OLS estimation (column 3). This is again conrming that there is a consid-
erable di¤erence in terms of the magnitude of the TFP variable between IV and OLS
estimations.
[TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE]
In the infrastructure group, we get two positive signicant IC variables. Using our
IC index, we have a similar and positive signicant result. Similarly, we get a negative
corruption index as signicant in the index method. In the innovation group, the result
of the two methods is again fully consistent. Finally, in the control group we have the
age of rm, and the dummy for large rm variables as signicant in both methods.
The only di¤erence between the two methods is that while there are few signicant
individual IC variables in nance, there is no signicant nance index. Nevertheless,
once we check the contribution of each group to the probability of export we have the
following results comparing the two methods.
[TABLE 12 ABOUT HERE]
The contribution of the nance group, using individual IC variables, is very small
relative to the average of the probability of export and it is not surprising that when
using the index the contribution is not relevant either. The ranking of each IC group
is the same in both methods and this is important for policy analysis. These results
conrm that the ICI methodology we have developed provides empirical results similar
to more technically demanding econometric techniques that use the long list of IC
variables.
2.6 Cross-Country Comparisons with the IC Indices
Because we have rm-level IC indices, we can express the distribution of all IC indices.
To do this, we rst reverse the negative indices by subtracting them from the highest
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possible value of 1. And then we combine the positive and negative aspects of all the
IC subgroups. Hence, for subgroup of IC index, the higher the score the better the
investment climate. Second, to get an aggregate nal number for all the IC subgroups,
we take the median of each distribution. Rankings of all countries in four IC groups8
are presented in Table 14. The objective of this section is to analyze these rankings
and to check the credibility and the advantages of having investment climate indices.
2.6.1 Credibility of the ICI
Qualitative rankings have special importance for policy makers and private sector
members. Some of those rankings include: i) the World Economic Forums Global
Competitiveness Index (GCI), ii) the World Banks Ease of Doing Business Index
(DBI), iii) the International Country Risk Guides (ICRG) index, iv) the Heritage
Foundations Index of Economic Freedom (IEF), and v) Transparency Internationals
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). In these rankings, GCI is the closest index to ICI
in terms of coverage. Before proceeding to the analysis, we test the credibility of the
ICI as an indicator of a friendly investment climate by looking at the rank correlation
of ICI with these indices. The rank correlation of ICI, GCI and ICRG is very high.
ICI is rank correlated at 0.52 with GCI, and 0.5 with ICRG. On the other hand, the
rank correlation of ICI with DBI is relatively smaller (0.36) for the sample of countries
for which all of these four indices are available. If we only concentrate on ICI and
DBI, the sample size increases to 111 countries. For this sample, the rank correlation
of ICI and DBI increases and becomes 0.44. Having a relatively lower rank correlation
of ICI with DBI could be due to DBIs lower coverage as compared to ICI. DBI mostly
measures formalities and regulations for business while ICI includes infrastructure and
nance as well as other information on formalities.
[TABLE 13 ABOUT HERE]
The CPI ranks countries based on perception of corruption in the public sector. It
captures information about the administrative and political aspects of corruption. The
second group of ICI covers variables on red tape, and corruption. When we construct
a corruption sub-index of this group, the rank correlation of this sub-index and CPI
is 0.54. The Heritage Foundations IEF has components on business regulations. The
coverage of this index is similar to the red tape and corruption group of ICI. The rank
correlation of these indices is 0.53. High rank correlation of ICI with that of other
economic indices shows the reliability of ICI. Moreover, regression analysis of ICI with
8We exclude the control group of variables because the economic interpretation of this group is not
clear.
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previous indices shows that ICI is statistically signicant at 1% in a simple bivariate
linear regression. On the other hand, ICI is superior to other well-known cross-country
level indices in that it provides additional information because of its availability at the
rm-level.
With the ICI being a summary measure of the investment climate, we expect
countries with a better ICI to have a higher level of GDP per capita. Figure 2 presents
this relationship and conrms our hypothesis by showing a clear and signicant positive
association between ICI and GDP per capita. A simple regression of ICI on GDP per
capita has an R-squared of 0.36, which conrms that the ICI by itself is able to explain
36% of the variability observed in cross-country incomes (or gross domestic product,
GDP).
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
2.6.2 Analysis of ICI in 113 Developing Countries
We continue with the analysis of ICI in developing countries by looking at the ranking
of 113 countries based on the ICI of each country. Table 14 presents the ranking
results for ICI and its four sub-indices. The countries with the highest levels of ICI
are Guyana, Slovenia, Chile, and Czech Republic. In this list, Slovenia and Czech
Republic were listed as developing countries until 2007 and 2009 respectively, and are
now included in advanced economies by the IMF. Guyanas high ranking depends only
on its top ranking in infrastructure. For the other three groups, its performance is quite
poor; for the red tape and corruption, nance, and innovation and labor skills groups
its positions are 66, 24, and 54 respectively. Among the 113 countries considered by
ICI, Uganda, Burundi, Ghana, Gabon, and Mongolia have the lowest levels of quality
of IC. The worst countries in terms of the ICI, except for Mongolia, are located in
Africa.
[TABLE 14 ABOUT HERE]
Recall that we have shown in previous sections, based on regression analysis, that
small and medium rms in Turkey were the most a¤ected rms when facing a bad
investment climate. In this section, we will further check whether these results are also
true for other developing countries. For example, having problems in infrastructure
and nance may a¤ect small rms more since smaller rms less frequently adopt new
technologies and usually carry out little labor training. On average, small rms do not
use additional resources more productively than medium and large rms. While 54%
of rms in the US have less than 10 employees, this ratio in Argentina and Mexico
is 84% and 90% respectively (Pages, 2010). These features are normally drivers of
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low productivity and low growth in developing countries. For example, Pages (2010)
considers too many resource allocations to too many small low-productivity rms is
the root problem of productivity in the Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) region.
Hence, rectication of this misallocation may have signicant impact on productivity
and growth.
Table 15 shows IC sub-indices by di¤erent rm sizes. Large rms have the biggest
IC value and the smallest variance which clearly indicates that large rms are less
a¤ected by poor IC conditions. Medium rms have bigger mean as compared to small
rms, which have less than 20 employees. If we consider the rms which have less
than 10 employees as micro rms, the situation of micro rms is even worse with
a mean value of 0.55 in IC. Figure 3 shows the cumulative distribution functions of
IC and we observe di¤erent rm size patterns. Infrastructure component of IC has
also similar patterns, indicating that large rms are less a¤ected by infrastructure
obstacles. Moreover, small rms have lowest mean IC values in nance and quality,
innovation and labor skills. These results are equally robust across di¤erent continents
and support the argument that too many resource allocations to too many small rms
decreases the productivity and growthspecially in developing countries where having
a poor IC is a critical barrier to grow.
[TABLE 15 ABOUT HERE]
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]
2.6.3 Advantages of the ICI Relative to Previous Indices
Our IC index provides a broader coverage in terms of countries. We have the ICI for
113 developing countries. The most important characteristic of the ICI is that it is
built on the rm-level information and this has important implications. For example,
none of the previous indices used to compare with the ICI could be used to make a
micro-econometric analysis to understand the main obstacles to a rms growth.
Furthermore, we can use country-level ICI to compare countries and regions within
each country (cross-country or cross-region analysis). Although using an aggregate
measure of IC could mask the quality of IC in di¤erent regions of a given country,
building our rm-level IC index by regions allows us to compare the IC of di¤erent
regions as well.
Another important advantage of our ICI is that it can be decomposed into IC
groups such as: infrastructure, red tape and corruption, nance, and innovation and
labor skills. Moreover, these groups could also be decomposed into subgroups, etc.
Therefore, for example, we could analyze the main IC bottlenecks of certain regions
using the IC subgroups of rms. This would allow us to provide more precise and
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disaggregated policy proposals, contingent on the characteristics of the IC region and
the characteristics of rms in that environment.
The ICI value of a rm represents how much the rm is a¤ected by the investment
climate. For example, one of the disadvantages of using a physical indicator is that it
is not possible to measure government e¢ ciency from any average physical indicator
such as number of telephones per worker and supply of electricity per rm. Building a
dam to meet the electricity needs of rms and households has a positive impact on the
economy, but building one more dam may not have the same e¤ect. A good example
is the Itaipú and Yacyreta dams in Paraguay. Itaipú, the worlds biggest hydroelectric
dam in terms of annual energy generation, has 18 turbines. A total of 90% of all
the electricity consumption in Paraguay is provided by only one turbine. When we
consider average the electricity generating capacity of Paraguay, it seems that the
country does not have a problem regarding electricity. However, a deeper analysis
makes it clear that the network of energy infrastructure is not su¢ cient in Paraguay.
Moreover, while the country can generate more than enough electricity from only one
dam even with only few turbines, it is not equally benecial to construct additional
dams. If the resources used to construct a second dam are used to improve the energy
infrastructure network, overall productivity of the country could obviously increase.
The general message we take from this example is that sometimes having a proxy on
qualitative measures of government investment is better than having a quantitative
one. The ICI takes into account those qualitative aspects by measuring the IC impact
on rms.
2.7 Conclusions
In this paper, we present a simple methodology to construct investment climate indices
(ICI) based on a rm-level data. In previous literature, most of the research done on
the investment climate used simplied versions of the general to specic approach
suggested by Escribano and Guasch (2005 and 2008) but, from the econometric point
of view, this approach is too demanding and time-consuming to be applied to more
than 100 countries. Here, we propose an easier way to do an IC analysis based on
rmssurveys done from many countries.
In most IC surveys, around 49% of the IC variables are binary variables and the
rest are continuous, therefore there is no clear index methodology to be applied. In
this paper we have proposed an IC index methodology and evaluated its e¤ects using
alternative econometric approaches.
Because positive IC e¤ects may cancel out the negative IC e¤ects, we start building
the index by separating rst the IC variables into two groups: variables with positive
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and negative IC impacts. Using a 95% threshold level, we suggest transforming all the
continuous IC variables into binary. The reason to choose this threshold level is to
measure the e¤ect of extremely good and extremely bad investment climate; however,
we show that the results are robust to the use of other thresholds such as those of 90%
and 75%. Counting the zeros and the number ones of the rms in each IC group will
gives us the IC index of that group. To evaluate if our IC indices give econometric
results similar to previous rm-level methodologies, we use a probability of export
model. The empirical results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar, showing
that in the aggregation process of ICI we are able to keep the relevant information
of the IC of each country. The empirical results are robust to the use of di¤erent
thresholds, di¤erent estimation methods and also di¤erent weights in the aggregation
process. Building conditional and unconditional processes in the construction of the
indices does not change the results and, therefore, we suggest using the unconditional
methodology, which is simpler. Furthermore, we show that our IC index based on
rm-level data for each country is highly correlated with other international indices
such as the GCI of World Economic Forum. However, we show that our ICI provides
additional information as compared to GCI, because the ICI is based on richer rm-
level information.
While most studies in IC literature restricted their analysis to a subgroup of IC
variables, facing the possible omitted variable bias, in our index we use all of the IC
variables and therefore minimize the omitted variable problem.
In summary, the index methodology that we have developed in this paper has
several advantages over previous IC methodologies. First, it is simpler and can be im-
plemented using basic econometric techniques. Second, it reduces the multicollinearity
problem in the IC literature without removing any of the IC variables at hand. When
we include all of the IC variables separately in a regression, many of them are dropped
because of multicollinearity and here we suggest aggregating a number of specic IC
variables into broader sub-indices such as: infrastructure, corruption and crime, -
nance and quality and innovation. Third, using all of the IC variables in an index, or
in few sub-indices, eliminates the dimensionality problem. Fourth, putting as many
IC variables as we can into the index and by doing the discretization procedure that
we suggest to build the index, we decrease the degree of endogeneity of many of the
IC variables. Finally, the fth advantage is that having an aggregate ICI and the
sub-indices at a country and regional level can help policy makers detect the main
bottlenecks to economic growth, opening up opportunities to make interesting cross-
country macroeconomic comparisons based on countriesinvestment climates.
Chapter 3
Barriers to Export Performance
of Turkish Firms
3.1 Introduction
Turkish exports increased more than ve-fold from 1996 to 2008. While the value of
Turkish exports was 23 billion dollars in 1996, it reached 132 billion dollars in 2008.
Average annual growth rate of Turkish exports was 16% in this period. Figure 1
presents total exports of Turkey for this period with only one year 1.4% decline in
1999. Sectoral composition of exports shows that manufacturing sector is the main
driving force behind the export growth. Manufacturing exports share in total exports
rose from 88% in 1996 to 95% in 2008.
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Although the Turkish economy has successful export growth performance for the
recent years, the long term success of Turkish export will be associated with the
competitiveness of the Turkish economy. Based on World Competitiveness Report of
IMD and Doing Business Survey of the World Bank, Turkey is still far behind many of
its competitors. Although Turkeys competitiveness ranking changed from 56 in 2003
to 48 in 2007, the ranking in 2007 is still the same as in the crisis year 2001. The
positions of Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Spain, Portugal, Hungary, Greece, and
Poland are 28, 30, 33, 37, 38, 42, and 44 respectively. Moreover, ranking of Turkey is 57
out of 178 countries in Doing Business Survey. Investment climate (IC) factors could
be microeconomic restrictions in front of the competitiveness of the Turkish economy,
and our objective in this paper is to identify those restrictions for the exporters of the
manufacturing sector.
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World Development Report (2005) denes the IC as the set of location-specic
factors shaping the opportunities and incentives for rms to invest productively, create
jobs and expand.IC constraints are competitive barriers for the rms; hence a good
IC may raise country competitiveness by enhancing rm-level performance. The aim
of this paper is to investigate how IC constraints in Turkey a¤ect exports by showing
which components of IC have a particular importance for the exporters. This analysis
helps us to understand the basic obstacles faced by rms operating in Turkey.
The Turkish economy until early 2000s was not stable and su¤ering from hyperin-
ation. In addition, there was political instability because of continual formation of
coalition governments, populist policies of coalitions, and rapid change of governments
until 2002. Apart from the macroeconomic and political uncertainties, the countrys
IC was another important obstacles faced by both the domestic producers and ex-
porters in Turkey. Poor IC of Turkey is one of the most important factors in the
countrys competitiveness with respect to its competitors. Enormous institutional and
legal di¢ culties and entry barriers were discouraging investors away from the country.
For example, opening a new business in Turkey is 70 times costly in comparison to
the US.
As it is emphasized in OECD Economic Survey (2002) on Turkey, macroeconomic
instability, a fragmented political system, cumbersome bureaucracy, and an unfriendly
business environment are the major factors that keep Turkey from being an attrac-
tive place for investment compared to its competitors. Although macroeconomic and
political instability could be the deterrent reasons for poor rm-level performance in
Turkey with respect to other emerging countries until early 2000s, currently more sta-
ble period may increase the relative importance of IC constraints on the rm-level
performance. The Turkish economy has improved in the last few years. Macroeco-
nomic indicators such as an annual GDP growth rate of 9.9% in 2004, an ination rate
of 8%, and a debt to GNP ratio of 67% in 2005 provide condence and stability. Thus,
cumbersome bureaucracy, prevalent corruption, and heavy indirect taxation have been
the main bottlenecks that preclude favorable IC.
The paper by Morisset and Neso (2002) show the unfriendly IC nature of Turkey
in terms of administrative procedures among 32 developing countries. An excellent
example of adverse e¤ect of administrative procedures in FDI is Hyundais decision to
locate in the Czech Republic in 2004. Hyundai has announced that they would like
to invest in Turkey and employ 3000 people. However, because of the delay in the
allocation of building plot, the rm decided to invest in Czech Republic.
The similar result is also valid for corruption. Although Turkey was ranked 50th
in the 2000 Corruption Perception Index by Transparency International, it decreased
to 64 in 2007 behind to its competitors such as Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary.
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In terms of taxes, Tusiad and Yased (2004) report shows that Turkey has relatively
higher taxes with respect to other emerging economies. Similar result was emphasized
by Deik (2001): corporate taxes are the highest in Turkey compared to the other
emerging countries. This high tax burden increases the cost of labor in Turkey. Be-
cause of extremely high burden of income and social security taxes on the employee and
the employers, Turkey has higher gross minimum wage as compared to the minimum
wages in the Central and Eastern European (CEEs) countries (see Yilmaz, 2007).
Moreover, Turkey is also lag behind its competitors in human capital investment.
For instance, total expenditure on education as percentage of GDP in Turkey, Poland,
Portugal, and Hungary are 3.91, 5.31, 5.69, and 5.15, respectively in 2004. Techni-
cally skilled worker supply in Turkey is considered as one of the serious problems in
manufacturing sector because of the inadequacy of vocational training.
It is demonstrated in a recent paper by Escribano, de Orte and Pena (2008b) that
the IC plays an important role on the productivity (TFP) of Turkey and preventing
the e¢ cient use of resources in the economy. Turkey is lag behind the countries
such as South Africa, Brazil, and Chile based on the e¢ cient use of resources by
the rms because of worse IC. Finally, you can see the list of several infrastructural
factors from IMDs World Competitiveness Yearbook that negatively a¤ects Turkeys
competitiveness with respect to its competitors in Table 1.
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
As is clear from the above discussion, although certain improvements after 2004
were mainly related to the implementation of macroeconomic policies and public -
nance reforms, all of the above mentioned factors deteriorate the IC and a¤ect the
rm-level performance. Thus, Turkey needs to implement microeconomic structural
reforms to realize long run success and to transform todays positive dynamics into
sustainable development (Hadjit and Moxon-Browne, 2005). Hence, the IC plays a
crucial role in determining the country competitiveness and sustainable economic de-
velopment. The aim of this paper is to evaluate and measure the export impacts of
having poor quality IC.
We use rm-level data for the manufacturing sector based on the World Banks
Investment Climate survey (ICs) of Turkey in 2008. The econometric model to analyze
the impact of IC variables on the export decision and the volume of export is the
Heckman model. Since we have censored cross-sectional dependent variable, the OLS
is not appropriate for this analysis. Other models such as the Tobit, the Poisson
Pseudo-Maximum-Likelihood (PPML), and the Heckman are superior to OLS when
the data are censored. Although the Tobit model is the standard econometric model
used with the censored data, we choose the Heckman model. Similarly, although the
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Poisson model is proposed to deal with the zero trade ows in the international trade
literature, this model does not di¤erentiate between the decision to trade and the level
of trade. Hence, the Heckman model is the unique alternative to analyze not only the
export decision but also the volume of it.
Our ndings indicate that infrastructure and quality, innovation, and labor skills
are the two most important factors for the export market entry decisions of the rms
while productivity (TFP) and the export experience of the rms are the main determi-
nants for the survival of the rms in international market. Turkish authorities need to
implement policies to improve quality of infrastructure and quality and innovation in
order for more rms to be exporter in the manufacturing sector. On the other hand,
policies to improve the productivity of the exporters are the key for the success of
Turkish exporters in the international market.
This paper quantitatively shows how important IC is for the export decisions of
rms and for the success of exporters in Turkey, by using 2008 rm-level export as
the dependent variable. Unlike the previous IC studies of Turkey, which use an LPM
to analyze the probability of export, in this paper, we not only analyze probability of
export but also the determinants of volume of it. Another important contribution of
this paper is the methodology to deal with the endogeneity of the productivity in export
equation. Although previous studies in the IC literature use industry-region-size IC
variables to instrument productivity, we use lag value of sales to proxy productivity.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The review of the current
literature on trade and IC are given in Section 3.2. In section 3.3, the data for the
analysis are presented. The models for this analysis are discussed in Section 3.4 and
the results are given in Section 3.5. Finally, Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Literature Review
Current trade literature emphasizes the role of rm-level heterogeneity in terms of
productivity to analyze export structure of rms. Today the sorting pattern of do-
mestic rms, exporters, and multinational enterprises (MNEs) based on productivity
levels is very well documented in the literature. First, a large empirical literature has
analyzed the productivity di¤erences between exporting and non-exporting rms, and
has concluded that exporting rms are more productive than non-exporters. There is
evidence now for the US (Bernard and Jensen 1999 and 2004), the UK (Girma, Green-
away, and Kneller 2004), Italy (Castellani 2002), Spain (Delgado, Fariñas, and Ruano
2002), Canada (Baldwin and Gu 2003), Germany (Fryges 2004, Bernard and Wag-
ner 1997, Arnold and Hussinger 2005a), Japan (Kimura and Kiyota 2004), Colombia,
Mexico, and Morocco (Clerides, Lach, and Tybout 1998), Korea (Hahn 2004), Taiwan
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(Liu, Tsou, and Hammitt 1999), Indonesia (Blalock ang Gertler 2004), and Ethiopia
(Bigsten and Gebreeyesus 2009).
Second, various studies have documented that MNEs are more productive than
exporters. Support for the predicted order is available for the US (Doms and Jensen
1998, Yeaple 2005), the UK (Girma, Kneller, and Pisu 2005), Italy (Barba Navaretti
and Castellani 2004, Castellani and Zanfei 2007), Indonesia (Arnold and Javorcik
2005), Japan (Kimura and Kiyota 2004), Ireland (Girma, Görg, and Strobl 2004), and
Germany (Wagner 2005, Arnold and Hussinger 2005b).
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
The general message coming from the above studies is that MNEs are more produc-
tive than exporters, and exporters are more productive than non-exporters. Moran
(1998) claims that friendly IC tends to attract more dynamic MNEs that use new
technology, and are highly e¢ cient.
The 2005 World Development Report indicates that a pleasant IC drives growth
by encouraging investment and higher productivity.It has been analyzed from rm-
level studies that four components of IC (infrastructure; red tape, corruption, and
crime; nance; and competition and regulation of factor markets) does indeed mat-
ter for explaining rm-level performance, see, among others, Escribano and Guasch
(2005) for Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua; Hallward-Driemeier, Wallsten, and
Xus (2006) for China; Bastos and Nasir (2004) for Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Poland,
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan; Dollar et al. (2005) for Bangladesh, China, India, and
Pakistan; Reinikka and Svensson (2002) for Uganda; and Aterido and Hallward-
Driemeier (2007) for Africa. IC factors such as taxes, the regulatory burden, in-
frastructure quality, cost of nance, and corruption are more important in developing
countries because of inducing high cost of doing business. For instance, poor infrastruc-
ture increases the cost of doing business by increasing logistic cost.
In conclusion, improvements in IC may raise competitiveness by increasing rm-
level performance, provide a sustainable growth perspective through higher productiv-
ity (TFP), and moderate the severe unemployment problem of Turkey by encouraging
both domestic and foreign investment. For this reason, the main goal of this paper
is to determine the fundamental IC constraints that a¤ect rm-level performance in
manufacturing exports.
Because of the existence of within-country heterogeneity, rm-level studies are
superior to macro-studies and provide more robust outcomes. In addition, rm-level
studies enable one to propose clear policy recommendations.
At this point, it is necessary to represent three closely related empirical papers that
analyze the e¤ects of IC variables in Turkey. Working paper of Escribano, Guasch, de
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Orte, and Pena (2008b) group the IC variables into four categories: a) infrastructure,
b) red tape, corruption, and crime, c) nance, and corporate governance, d) quality,
innovation, and labor skills. They use the World Banks ICs data for Turkey in 2005
to measure the total factor productivity (TFP) e¤ects of IC variables. They show
that the most important IC constraints in Turkey are taxes and tax administration
and security, and the most important groups are red tape, corruption, and crime from
the analysis of rmsperception. The second severe obstacle is infrastructure block
with the single element being the number of days to clear custom to import. They
show that all these institutional factors have a negative e¤ect on IC and business
environment, which in turn decrease the competitive conditions and deteriorate the
average productivity (TFP).
Employing the same data, the working paper of Escribano, Guasch, de Orte, and
Pena (2008a) analyzes the impact of IC constraints on employment, real wage, ex-
port, and FDI by controlling for TFP using the simultaneous equations system. They
conclude that red tape, corruption, and crime is the most important group for em-
ployment, real wage, and export. On the other hand, probability of receiving FDI
is mostly a¤ected by quality, innovation, and labor skill, while the second important
group is infrastructure.
Using the methodology developed by Escribano and Guasch (2005 and 2008) and
Escribano et al (2008b), Escribano, de Orte, and Pena (2008) estimated a structural
system of equations, which is composed of productivity (TFP), employment, proba-
bility of exporting, and probability of receiving FDI for the 2008 IC dataset of Turkey.
They conclude that the TFP of Turkish manufacturing sector is constrained by the
IC. For other economics performance measures, the main IC blocks of variables to the
sample average of employment is quality, innovation, and labor skills; to the proba-
bility of exporting is infrastructure; and to the probability of receiving FDI is nance
and corporate governance. In addition, the individual contribution of TFP is higher
than any IC group for the probabilities of exporting and receiving FDI. As a second
objective, they also evaluate how the IC has changed from 2005 to 2008.
Unlike the above-mentioned IC studies of Turkey, which use an LPM to analyze
the probability of export, in this paper, we not only analyze the probability of export
but also the determinants of volume of it. We evaluate the IC determinants of both the
probability of export and the volume of export. Another important di¤erence of this
paper is our methodology to deal with the endogeneity of the productivity in export
equation. We use lag value of sales to proxy productivity. This is a common method-
ology employed in the literature. Our work goes beyond the above studies in exploring
another potential source of endogeneity because of the location choice of rms. We
control this endogeneity by excluding rms that are mobile, i.e. multinationals and
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larger domestic rms. Finally, we check the e¤ect of IC barriers for di¤erent sizes of
the rms, which is also di¤erent from the above three related studies.
3.3 Data: Investment Climate Survey (ICS) of Turkey
Investment climate assessments (ICAs) are very useful for analyzing the main obsta-
cles based on the perception of the rms. They cover both subjective assessments of
bottlenecks by rms and objective numerical evaluations related to cost and produc-
tivity. These surveys include rm-level data on: a) infrastructure, b) bureaucracy,
informalities, corruption, and crime, c) accessibility and cost of nance, and audit-
ing, d) quality, innovation, and labor skills, and d) other control variables such as
exporting, importing, and FDI status, size and age of the rm, etc.1
Potential weaknesses of subjective indicators as opposed to quantitative data has
been importantly debated area in the literature. Gelb et al. (2007) and Aterido et al.
(2007) conclude that subjective responses are reasonably well correlated with objective
measures related to the IC.2
We use manufacturing sector data based on the World Banks ICs of Turkey in
2008. It contains a rich rm-level representative sample in terms of size, region, and
sector. The database includes the IC, control (C), perception and production function
variables of each rm.3
Because exports are the primary driving force of the manufacturing sector in Turkey
in recent years, the main emphasis in this paper will be on the manufacturing sectors.
Firms are categorized into nine di¤erent sectors based on their ISIC code: 1) food;
2) textiles; 3) garments; 4) chemicals; 5) plastics and rubber; 6) non-metallic mineral
products; 7) basic metals and fabricated metal products; 8) machinery and equipment;
9) other manufactures including electronics. In addition, two other classications of
rms are based on their region and size.4
We use production function variables to calculate the productivity (TFP) of each
rm. Because there is no unique measure of productivity, any empirical analysis of
productivity in the context of IC might depend on the specic productivity measure
chosen. Escribano and Guasch (2005 and 2008) investigate the empirical results which
are robust to alternative productivity measures in the IC data. They evaluate the
productivity impact of IC for 10 di¤erent productivity measures, and conclude that
the results are robust to all these measures. We use the same robust productivity
1See Appendix C.2 for all the variables in each category.
2See Dethier, Hirn, and Straub (2008) for further discussion.
3See Appendix C.2 for description of all variables.
4Classication of regions: Marmara, Aegean, Central Anatolia, Black Sea, and South. Classication
of sizes: small (<20 employees), medium (>=20 and <100), and large (>=100).
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methodology developed by Escribano and Guasch (2005 and 2008) and Escribano et
al. (2008b).
We estimate logarithm of Solow residuals for both the same cost shares of inputs for
all rms in the country (restricted Solow residual) and di¤erent cost shares of inputs
among industries in the country (unrestricted Solow residual) using the nonparametric
approach of cost shares from Hall (1990). This approach eliminates the endogeneity
problem of the inputs, and it does not require constant or homogeneous input-output
elasticities. On the other hand, it makes constant returns to scale and competitive
input market assumptions.5 Specically, for the restricted case, we rst calculate the
averages of the rm-level cost shares of each input across the whole sample in Turkey.
Second, we get the restricted Solow residuals (Solow 1957; Hall 1990) from (3.1)
log Yi = sL logLi + sM logMi + sK logKi + logPi (3.1)
where sr is the average cost share of input r, r = K (capital), L (labor),M (material),
and logP is the restricted Solow residual.
In the unrestricted case, rst we calculate the averages of the rm-level cost shares
of each input for each manufacturing sector in Turkey. Second, we get the unrestricted
Solow residuals from (3.2)
log Yi = sL;j logLi + sM;j logMi + sK;j logKi + logPi (3.2)
where sr;j is the average cost share of input r, r = K;L;M; in industry j and logP is
the unrestricted Solow residual.
Two important problems in the IC data set are missing observations and outliers.
We have missing values both in the production function and IC variables. We have a
total sample of 903 rms. Following the recently generated econometric methodology
by Escribano and Guasch (2005 and 2008) and Escribano and Pena (2009) for the
World Bank, we replace the missing values of the variables by their industry, region,
and size averages, which is the rst step of the cleaning process (imputation method).6
In the second step, we remove the outliers that are characterized by the rms with
labor cost to sales or material to sales ratios is bigger than one. We do not replace
production function variables if all the production function variables are missing for a
given rm. After replacement of production function and IC variables and eliminating
outliers, we get a sample size of 640 rms.
Endogeneity of some of the IC variables is another problem that we should solve
while estimating a model with IC variables. Because we have data for only one year,
5See Escribano and Guasch (2005) for details.
6The method is called ICA method. See Escribano and Pena (2009) for details of the method.
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we cannot use own lag values as instruments. As another solution, replacing the
missing values of the IC variables by their industry-region-size average of plant-level
rm characteristics is accepted in the IC literature to reduce the degree of endogeneity
of IC variables. Using averages also enables us to replace missing observations at
the rm level.7 If we have su¢ ciently large observations, we use industry-region-size
imputation technique to preserve as many observations as possible in the regression.
Here, we obtain observations at the cost of maybe some measurement error.
3.4 Empirical Model
To estimate the impact of IC and control variables on export, we use the following
model;
logXi = 0 + p logPi + 
0
ICICi + 
0
CCi + 
0
DIDI;i + 
0
DRDR;i + 
0
DSDS;i + "i (3.3)
where, logXi is log of export, logPi is the log of productivity, ICi are the IC variables,
Ci are the control variables and DI;i; DR;i; and DS;i are the industry, region, and
size dummies. Although the Heckman model assumes that the errors are independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d.), the endogeneity of some of the IC variables vio-
lates independence assumption, and heteroskedasticity violates identical distribution
assumption. That is,
E("ijPi; ICi; Ci; DI;i; DR;i; DS;i) 6= 0
V ar("ijPi; ICi; Ci; DI;i; DR;i; DS;i) 6= 2":
Following the common methodology in the IC literature, we use the imputation
technique of industry-region-size average of plant-level rm characteristics for missing
values to reduce the degree of endogeneity of rm characteristics. Many papers in IC
literature use this method to alleviate the degree of endogeneity.8 The intuition is
the following: industry-region-size averages are important determinants of change in
rm performance, but individual performances have only limited e¤ect on industry-
region-size averages, alleviating, therefore, the degree of endogeneity. Regarding the
heteroskedasticity problem, we use heteroskedasticity-robust-White standard errors.
In addition, we use cluster standard errors by considering for correlation within indus-
try, region, and size.
7For a deeper analysis see Escribano and Pena (2009).
8See, among others, Escribano and Guasch (2005 and 2008) and Escribano et al. (2008).
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Zero trade ows are common in international trade studies. We have the same
situation in our sample: 52% of the export values are equal to zero. This causes two
problems. First, because log(X) is not dened for X = 0, we lose 52% of observations
if we take the logarithm of export. Second, the OLS estimation is not appropriate for
this case. OLS estimates tend to bias because of the existence of zeros. Thus, OLS
cannot be used both on full sample, and on positive subsample.
The recent trade literature proposes three main solutions to zero trade problem:
1) Ad hoc solution, 2) the Poisson model, and 3) Heckman selection model.
Because log(X) is not dened if X = 0, log(X+1) is calculated in ad hoc solution.
Although policy literature widely uses this solution, it does not have a theoretical
basis and generally leads to inconsistent estimators. Poisson model (Santos Silva and
Tenreyro, 2006) does not have a special consideration about zeros. They are only
included in the estimation sample. One of the advantages of the Poisson maximum
likelihood (ML) estimators is that they are unbiased even with heteroskedastic data.
It also models both the decision to trade and the level of trade. Heckman selection
model makes a di¤erentiation between the decision to trade and the level of trade. A
rst group of IC variables identies the probability of export, and a second group of
variables identies the intensity of export, given the existence of the export. Because
our objective is to determine not only the IC barriers in front of the probability of
export but also IC barriers in front of the volume of export, we choose Heckman model
to deal with zero trade problem.
3.4.1 The Probit Model
Before using Heckman model, we generate a binary random variable for export which
takes value 1 if the share of export is greater than 10% and 0 otherwise to analyze
the determinants of probability of export. We estimate this model by using the Probit
model in order to be consistent with the normality assumption behind the identication
of the Heckman model. Then, we use this set of IC variables in the rst stage of the
Heckman model.
3.4.2 The Heckman Sample Selection Model
We are investigating the export decision of Turkish rms. Because of xed cost of
exports, export decision can be considered as a two-stage process. First, rms decide
whether to export or not, and second, they decide the volume of export. Because
the two decisions are interdependent, Heckman model accounts for both decisions,
and hence avoids any bias when they are treated separately. The omission of zeros
in the sample because of the cost of export makes the sample non-random and OLS
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estimation in this case is biased. To overcome this problem, Heckman selection method
should be used.
Another important advantage of the Heckman model is related to the missing
observation problem of the data at hand. If the missing data mechanism is corre-
lated with the dependent variable of the regression, the parameters are not consistent.
Heckman model provide robust results in this case by taking into account the sample
selection problem.9
Two equations that should be estimated are the following:
DX;i = 0 + p logPi + 
0
ICICi + 
0
CCi + 
0
DIDI;i + 
0
DRDR;i + 
0
DSDS;i + ui (3.4)
logXi = 0 + p logPi + 
0
ICICi + 
0
CCi + 
0
DIDI;i + 
0
DRDR;i + 
0
DSDS;i + "i (3.5)
where the dependent variable is a binary variable for export in the rst equation with
DX;i = 1 if DX;i > 0
DX;i = 0 if DX;i  0
and
Xi = X

i if DX;i = 1
Xi = 0 if DX;i = 0
where the rst regression shows the export participation decision and the second one is
the export share regression. Observable export share (Xi) is positive if the rm decides
to export (DX;i = 1) and zero otherwise. We assume that the error terms (ui; "i) have
bivariate normal distribution with correlation . If  6= 0, two decisions of the rm
(participation decision and volume decision) are correlated. If they are correlated,
estimating only equation (3.5) causes sample selection bias in the estimators because
the error term "i and the regressors in equation (3.5) will be correlated. We need to
estimate both equations to overcome this problem. ML or two-step methods can be
used for the estimation. We use ML estimation in one step, because this provides
considerable e¢ ciency gains.
9See Escribano and Pena (2009) for details.
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3.4.3 Selection of the Relevant Models
The selection of signicant IC variables in the models moves from the general to
the specic. Full group of IC variables consist of 125 variables. To avoid the multi-
collinearity problem, we eliminate IC variables that present similar information. Then,
we eliminate the most insignicant variable one by one in each step until we get a sig-
nicant nal set of IC variables. After obtaining a preliminary model, we check the
signicance of omitted variables by including previously dropped IC variables to the
selected model.
In addition to robust standard errors, we use cluster standard errors to take into
account the correlation within industries, regions, and sizes. To check the robustness of
the results for di¤erent productivity (TFP) measures, we estimate the models both for
the restricted and unrestricted Solow residuals. The results are given in the appendix.
3.5 Results
In our sample, 23% of the rms are small, 40% are medium, and 36% are large. Table
3 represents the percentage of exporting rms by di¤erent sizes. While only 22% of
small rms export, this ratio increases to 48 and 63% for medium and large rms,
respectively. A large portion of small rms in our sample do not export which means
that what is important for this group is whether to export or not. On the other hand,
most of the large rms export and what is important for this group is the volume of
export.
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
Although Poisson ML model is one of the methods to deal with the zero trade
problem in trade literature, it is not possible to di¤erentiate the two-stage export
decision of the rms in this model. Because our objective is to not only analyze the
probability of export, but also its volume, we prefer the Heckman MLE approach.
We conduct the Heckman MLE as follows: the rst step is a Probit regression to
determine the signicant IC variables using the above-mentioned general-to-specic
procedure. In the second step, we use these signicant variables in the selection stage
of the Heckman model. For the outcome stage, determination of the signicant IC
variables uses the same general-to-specic procedure. In both steps, after obtaining
preliminary models, we test for the signicance of omitted IC variables by including
the previously dropped variables to the selected models in the selection and outcome
stages.
In Table 4, we estimate the probability of export regression using Probit and Pro-
bit with marginal e¤ect. Because current trade literature shows the importance of
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productivity to analyze export structure of rms, we control rm-level productivity in
our estimations. To determine the robustness of our analysis for di¤erent productivity
(TFP) calculations, we estimated the models using both the restricted Solow residuals
and the unrestricted Solow residuals. We included region, industry, and size dum-
mies for all the regressions. This is important to control for the e¤ects of industry-
and region-specic and di¤erent unobservable size-specic determinants. We also use
robust cluster standard errors in the regression to control for di¤erent form of het-
eroskedasticity in di¤erent clusters. Columns (1) and (2) show the results for the re-
stricted Solow residuals and columns (3) and (4) show the results for the unrestricted
Solow residuals in Table 4. The results are robust (in terms of the magnitude, sign,
and signicance) to usage of restricted or unrestricted Solow residual as TFP measure.
Note that we have IC variables from all four groups. This is the key point of the
econometric methodology developed by Escribano and Guasch (2005 and 2008). If we
control multiple dimensions of the IC factors simultaneously, we have robust empirical
results. If we do not control all of the IC groups, we may nd di¤erent signs on some
coe¢ cients because of the omitted variables problem. After controlling IC factors,
medium rms are 17% more likely to export than small rms and large rms are 28%
more likely to export than small rms. Hence, there is a sorting pattern among the
small, medium, and large rms based on the probability to export.
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]
The regression results for Heckman model are contained in Table 5. To realize sta-
tistical identication, equation (3.4) should have an IC variable that is not included
in equation (3.5). We choose ISO certication as the excluded variable from equation
(3.5). As explained by Naudé and Matthee (2012) ISO accreditation is more of an
obstacle in deciding to enter export markets in the rst place, than on the extent of
subsequent exports.Similarly, exporting experience more likely determine the subse-
quent exports and it does not have any e¤ect on the rms decision to enter the export
market. That is why exporting experience does not appear in equation (3.4).
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]
One of the di¤erences between the Probit model in Table 4 and the selection stage
of Heckman model in Table 5 is the signicant IC variable showing the percentage of
sta¤ using computer. Although this variable is not signicant in the Probit model, it is
signicant in the selection stage of Heckman model. In the last stage of the selection
of the relevant model, we check the signicance of omitted variables by including
the previously dropped IC variables to the selected model. In this stage, sta¤ with
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computer variable turned out as signicant. That is why we kept it in the Heckman
model. The results are independent from the usage of di¤erent TFP measures. They
are robust in terms of magnitude, sign, and signicance. The signicant rho in Table
5 proves that the Heckman MLE model is appropriate.
While productivity is a signicant determinant of both probability of export and
the volume of export, it has bigger impact on the volume of export. This result
conrms that more productive rms export more and compete relatively easily in
the international market. The coe¢ cient of dummy for quality certication (0.56)
in the selection part shows that rms with ISO accreditation are 56% more likely to
export. This is the biggest coe¢ cient in the individual IC variables in the selection
part referring that quality certication matters for the rms to enter the export market
in Turkey. In the control group, the dummy for importer variable is signicant at 1%
with a coe¢ cient of 0.43. Importers are 43% more likely to export than would the
non-importer. Waiting for an import license in the infrastructure group has a negative
e¤ect on the probability of export. This signicant IC variable supports the important
e¤ect of being an importer in the exporting decision. In the infrastructure variables
group, the dummy for web page has the biggest e¤ect on probability of export. Firms
that have a web page are 45% more likely to export. The other variable of this group
with a signicant association with the probability of export is days of inventory of main
input. That is, those rms that are able to store a larger number of days in their main
input are associated with higher probability of being exporters. In the block of red
tape, corruption, and crime, what matters with exports are the IC variables associated
with the relations between government and private sector. Dummy for conict with
a court involved and dummy for payments to obtain a contract with the government
are negatively associated with the probability of export. In the nance and corporate
governance block, the main contributor is the new xed assets nanced by equity. In
addition, our estimation results indicate that both the probability of export and the
volume of export increase signicantly with rm size.
Export experience is the most important determinant of the volume of export.
This variable is signicant at 1% with a coe¢ cient of 0.86. A 1% increase in exporting
experience causes 0.86% increase in the mean volume of export. This coe¢ cient is
larger than all of the signicant IC variables in the model. The other variable of
interest in the control group is the dummy for more than 5 competitors. This variable
could be an indicator of the degree of competitiveness in the domestic market. Having
more than 5 competitors is associated with a 42% increase in the volume of export.
The biggest contributor to volume of export in the IC variables is the dummy for
external auditory in nance group. Having external auditory is associated with a 32%
increase in the volume of export.
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We obtain our TFP measures nonparametrically using Solow residuals. This non-
parametric estimation method eliminates the endogeneity problem because of simul-
taneous determination of factor inputs and productivity. On the other hand, we still
have the endogeneity problem of productivity variable in an export equation. Escrib-
ano and Guasch (2005 and 2008) methodology depends on instrumenting productivity
because of its endogeneity. They use either the industry-region-size averages or ex-
ogenous IC variables as instruments. In this paper, we follow a di¤erent approach.
We use sales to proxy productivity. This is a common methodology applied in the
literature.10 We have past values of sales in our data. Using a lag value of sales on the
right-hand side of a regression eliminates the reverse causation problem. Obviously,
while past sales should explain variation in rm performance, current performance of
rm has no impact on past sales. This solves reverse causality problem.
In Table 6, we use logarithm of sales three years ago as a proxy for productivity.
In column (1) we estimate the model with all of the rms in our sample. The results
are similar to previous estimations in Table 5.
[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]
One reason for endogeneity is related to the choice of location of the rms. Firms
with better performance choose their locations according to the quality of the IC. To
see if this is signicant, we present the results by restricting the sample to domestic,
small, and medium rms that are less likely to move. Those rms are located at the
place of birth or at the residence of the rm owner. Large and foreign rms are more
likely to select their locations. The results are very robust in column (2).
Using rm-level data allow us to analyze the di¤erential e¤ects of IC across rm
size. We estimate equations (3.4) and (3.5) on large rm size subsample. We report
the results in column (3) of Table 6. First, note that the exporting experience is always
signicant at 1%. Second, small and medium rms are more credit constrained. Third,
productivity is an important determinant in the volume of export which is independent
from the rm size. Higher productivity is an indicator of domestic rmsability to
compete in the international market.
After analyzing the e¤ects of individual IC variables, we go one step further and
look at the joint relative importance of IC blocks on rmsexport performance. This
ranking can support policymakers to plan policies for expanding exports of rms. We
evaluate the contribution of each IC groups by excluding the dummies, constant term
and the residuals.
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
10See, for example, Helpman et al. (2004) and Eaton et al. (2008).
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Figure 2 presents the percentage contribution of each IC group relative to the
sample mean of our dependent variable in the selection stage of Heckman model. All
the contributions could be interpreted as the relative importance of each IC blocks.
As it is clear from Figure 2, export market entry decisions of rms is mainly a¤ected
by infrastructure in Turkey. This block is followed by quality, innovation and labor
skills; productivity and other control variables. Finance and red tape, corruption and
crime have relatively small e¤ects. Improving the quality of infrastructural factors is
necessary to increase the number of Turkish rms in the international market. In ad-
dition, facilitating rmstechnological progress can be considered as a complementary
second step. On the other hand, relative importance of infrastructure and red tape,
corruption, and crime decrease for the level of export as represented in Figure 3. We
nd that the manufacturing export intensity is rst determined by productivity (32%),
and then by export experience (23%), which is included in other control variables.
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]
3.6 Conclusion
In this study, we have employed Heckman model to measure the competitive restric-
tions of the exporters of Turkish manufacturing sector in terms of the IC variables.
We use rm-level data for the manufacturing sector based on the World Banks ICs
of Turkey in 2008. The database includes the IC, control, perception, and production
function variables of each rm.
Our ndings indicate that infrastructure and quality, innovation and labor skills
groups of IC are the two most important factors for the export market entry decisions
of the rms while productivity (TFP) and the export experience of the rms are the
main determinants for the survival of the rms in international market. Hence, Turkish
authorities need to implement policies to improve the quality of IC in infrastructure
and quality, innovation and labor skills in order for more rms to be exporters in the
manufacturing sector. On the other hand, one can say that promoting productivity
(TFP) is required to provide a sustainable export growth in the sector. Another
interesting nding is that small and medium rms are more credit constrained.
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Figure 2: Severity of the Inadequacies of Finance and Infrastructure in Developing
Countries (Source: World Bank Investment Climate Surveys)
Figure 3: World FDI Inows, 1990-2011
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
113 Countries Africa Asia Latin America Eastern Europe
Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
Log GDP per capita in 2007 2.2379 1.1299 1.2807 0.9262 2.0689 0.7714 2.8979 .8785 3.2561 .5881
Investment climate .57988 .05864 .5474 .05 .5553 .0593 .6141 .0452 .6187 .0382
Infrastructure .5961 .0850 .5563 .0733 .5602 .0822 .6398 .0822 .6488 .04841
Red tape, corruption and crime .9045 .0270 .8894 .0284 .9095 .0283 .9114 .0167 .9155 .0247
Finance .5371 0642 .5069 .0531 .5164 .091 .5688 .034 .5708 .0355
Human capital 1.5624 .7161 1.2971 .6468 1.4476 .5292 1.6576 .8358 2.0566 .5985
Local technology .0028 .0069 .0005 .0032 .0030 .0073 n/a n/a .0109 .0102
Average investment 22.9 9.07 20.6 8.55 22.9 9.03 26 10.94 22.24 4.98
Average population growth 1.34 1.21 2.48 .8244 1.14 .8469 1.106 .8281 -.2146 .5463
NOTES: Infrastructure, corruption and crime and finance are components of investment climate (IC). A higher score in IC, human capital and local
technology means better IC, human capital and local technology respectively. The investment (s) and population growth (n) rates are averages for the
period 2000-2010.
Table 2: OLS Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable is log GDP per capita in 2007
ln(Investment climate) 6.028*** 3.004*** 3.730*** 0.3464
[0.893] [0.880] [0.813]
ln(Human capital and local tech) 2.694* 0.615 0.0228
[1.634] [1.187]
ln(Human capital) 10.14*** 3.060
[2.133] [1.909]
ln(λh+x-λ) -6.161*** -0.991
[1.792] [1.351]
ln(s) 0.768*** 0.778*** 0.785*** 0.639*** 0.2176
[0.177] [0.190] [0.178] [0.190]
ln(n+x+δ) -0.910*** -0.658*** -0.864*** -0.700*** -0.4374
[0.126] [0.112] [0.127] [0.114]
Constant 0.510 1.446*** 5.555*** 1.549 -6.016 1.342
[0.555] [0.314] [0.481] [0.985] [4.031] [3.187]
R-squared 0.44 0.16 0.31 0.56 0.45 0.54 0.54
Implied α 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.38 0.38
Observations 113 113 113 113 113 113 113
NOTES: A higher score in IC, human capital and local technology means better IC, human capital and local technology respectively. The
investment (s) and population growth (n) rates are averages for the period 2000-2010. Following Kim (2008), we take x=0.02. It is assumed
that x+δ = 0.05 as in Mankiw et al. (1992). Column (7) shows beta coefficients. α is share of physical capital. All regressions are cross-
sectional OLS with one observation per country. White's correction of heteroscedasticity is used. Standard errors are in brackets denoting
*** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance.
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Table 3: Correlations of Measures of Institutions
Investment
Climate (IC)
Risk of
Expropriation
The Rule
of Law
Institutions
Index
Social
Infrastructure
Investment climate (IC) 1
Risk of expropriation 0.1633** 1
The rule of law 0.2347*** 0.4842 1
Institutions index 0.4012*** 0.3671 0.8865 1
Social infrastructure 0.4491*** 0.4305 0.2475 0.4055 1
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4: Correlations of Institutions and Instruments (Acemoglu et. al, 2001)
Investment
Climate (IC)
Average protection
against expropriation
risk
Settler
Mortality
Investment climate (IC) 1
Average protection against
expropriation risk
0.2379 1
Settler mortality-IV -0.5752 -0.2191 1
Table 5: Correlations of Institutions of Instruments (Hall and Jones, 1999)
Investment
Climate (IC)
Social
Infrastructure
Frac. of the
Pop Speaking
English
Frac. of the
Pop Speaking
other
European Lang
Investment climate (IC) 1
Social infrastructure 0.3296 1
Pop speaking English-IV 0.5804 0.3541 1
Pop speaking other European lang-IV 0.2307 0.2243 0.4226 1
Table 6: Correlations of Institutions and Instruments (Easterly and Levine, 2003)
Investment
Climate (IC)
Institutions
Index Landlocked Latitude
Investment climate (IC) 1
Institutions index 0.4043 1
Landlocked-IV -0.0318 -0.2406 1
Latitude-IV 0.2525 0.4524 -0.014 1
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Table 7: IV Regressions
Ex-Colonies
Sample
Base Sample Easterly and
Levine Sample
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable is log GDP per capita in 2007
ln(Investment climate) 5.904** 11.30*** 3.729***
[2.952] [2.233] [1.363]
ln(Human capital and local tech) -0.872 -3.605* -0.233
[1.504] [2.053] [1.644]
ln(s) 0.635* 0.343 0.659**
[0.345] [0.287] [0.268]
ln(n+x+δ) -1.03 -0.365*** -1.253**
[0.686] [0.132] [0.548]
Constant 6.414 16.28*** 3.981
[4.791] [6.132] [3.999]
First Stage R-squared: IC 0.32 0.30 0.43
Partial R-squared: IC 0.0948 0.1616 0.4352
Partial R-squared F test (p-value): IC 0.0475 0 0
Hansen test (p-value) 0.3917 0.4918
Observations 60 113 53
NOTES: Instrumenting for investment climate (IC). Instrument in column (1) is log settler mortality. The
regression is estimated using 60 countries (former colonies) out of 113 country “base” sample due to the
availability of log settler mortality data. Instruments in column (2) are fraction of the population speaking English,
and fraction of the population speaking other European languages. Instruments in column (3) are settler mortality,
latitude, landlocked and crops/mineral (10 variables). Settler mortality is the logarithm of annualized deaths per
thousand of European soldiers. “First Stage R-squared: IC” is the R-squared from the regression of IC on both the
included and excluded instruments. The “partial R-squared: IC” measures the squared partial correlation between
the excluded instruments and the IC. “Partial R-squared F test (p-value): IC” is the p-value of the F-test of joint
significance of the excluded instruments that corresponds to the partial R-squared. “Hansen test (p-value)” shows
the p-value of the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions. The null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid
instruments, that is, uncorrelated with the error term, and therefore the excluded instruments are correctly excluded
from the estimated equation. All regressions are cross-sectional with one observation per country. White's
correction of heteroscedasticity is used. Standard errors are in brackets denoting *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%
significance. Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the data appendix.
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Table 8: IV Regressions (IC vs Average Protection against Expropriation Risk)
(1) (2)
log GDP per capita in 1995
ln(Investment climate) 8.059***
[1.546]
Average protection against expropriation risk 2.523
[1.657]
Constant 12.31*** -7.688
[0.833] [10.21]
First Stage R-squared: IC 0.31 0.0356
Partial R-squared: IC 0.3319 0.048
Partial R-squared F test (p-value): IC 0 0.1991
Hansen test (p-value)
Observations 48 48
NOTES: Instrumenting for IC using log settler mortality. The regression is estimated using 48 countries
(developing former colonies) out of 113 country “base” sample due to the availability of log settler
mortality and IC data. Settler mortality is the logarithm of annualized deaths per thousand of European
soldiers. Average protection against expropriation risk is the mean value (1985-1995) for the risk of
expropriation of private foreign investment by government, from 0 to 10, where a higher score means
less risk. Instruments evaluation is the same for Table 7. All regressions are cross-sectional with one
observation per country. White's correction of heteroscedasticity is used. Standard errors are in brackets
denoting *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance. Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the
data appendix.
Table 9: Robustness to Geography (Rodrik et al., 2004 )
Baseline (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
IV Regressions: Dependent variable is log GDP per capita in 2007
ln(Investment climate) 11.30*** 13.19*** 9.989*** 8.210*** 11.78*** 9.314*** 10.20*** 9.058***
[2.233] [2.740] [1.674] [1.466] [2.006] [1.780] [1.587] [2.390]
ln(Human capital and local tech) -3.605* -4.551** -1.569 -0.134 -4.913** -2.585 -3.591** -3.263
[2.053] [2.322] [1.203] [1.214] [2.142] [1.838] [1.761] [2.549]
ln(s) 0.343 0.31 0.654* 0.680** 0.407 0.285 0.249 0.51
[0.287] [0.335] [0.335] [0.285] [0.321] [0.316] [0.460] [0.497]
ln(n+x+δ) -0.365*** 0.0201 -0.31 -0.430** 0.022 -0.149 -0.283 -0.103
[0.132] [0.282] [0.226] [0.191] [0.262] [0.184] [0.303] [0.326]
Distance from the equator 0.0167 -0.0321
[0.0133] [0.0320]
Area under tropics -0.294 -1.059
[0.350] [0.709]
Access to sea -0.453* -0.487
[0.274] [0.296]
Days under frost 0.0353* 0.193
[0.0194] [0.118]
Area under frost 0.673* -2.735*
[0.372] [1.524]
Temperature -0.0382 0.0196
[0.0442] [0.0721]
First Stage R-squared: IC 0.30 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.37 0.37 0.36 0.44
Partial R-squared: IC 0.1616 0.1547 0.2188 0.2224 0.189 0.2198 0.2834 0.2409
Partial R-squared F test (p-value): IC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hansen test (p-value) 0.3917 0.1198 0.3789 0.6675 0.1532 0.2925 0.1342 0.3007
Observations 113 110 82 81 101 89 67 58
NOTES: Instrumenting for investment climate (IC). Instruments are fraction of the population speaking English, and fraction of the population speaking
other European languages. Geography control variables (distance from the equator, area under tropics, access to sea, days under frost, area under frost and
temperature) are from Rodrik et al. (2004). Instruments evaluation is the same for Table 7. All regressions are cross-sectional with one observation per
country. White's correction of heteroscedasticity is used. Standard errors are in brackets denoting *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance. Detailed variable
definitions and sources are given in the data appendix.
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Table 10: Robustness to Geography (Acemoglu et al., 2001)
Baseline (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IV Regressions: Dependent variable is log GDP per capita in 2007
ln(Investment climate) 11.30*** 13.68*** 9.785*** 10.48*** 8.963*** 9.755*** 11.49***
[2.233] [3.006] [1.808] [1.929] [1.439] [1.585] [2.649]
ln(Human capital and local tech) -3.605* -5.150* 0.22 -1.873 -1.196 -1.133 -3.179
[2.053] [2.907] [1.612] [1.847] [1.263] [1.370] [2.845]
ln(s) 0.343 0.353 0.379 0.481 0.32 0.411 0.367
[0.287] [0.375] [0.306] [0.312] [0.260] [0.297] [0.307]
ln(n+x+δ) -0.365*** -0.012 -0.357*** -0.406*** -0.478*** -0.438*** 0.162
[0.132] [0.315] [0.126] [0.145] [0.139] [0.110] [0.277]
Temperature variables (0.1321) (0.1599)
Humidity variables (0.1037) (0.0587)
Soil quality (0.5467) 80.5830)
Natural resources (0.0044) (0.0003)
Dummy for being landlocked 0.0229 -0.0837
[0.248] [0.236]
First Stage R-squared: IC 0.30 0.50 0.37 0.39 0.37 0.38 0.50
Partial R-squared: IC 0.1616 0.1439 0.2209 0.2297 0.2703 0.2392 0.1501
Partial R-squared F test (p-value): IC 0 0.0001 0 0 0 0 0.0015
Hansen test (p-value) 0.3917 0.2416 0.6521 0.3714 0.5008 0.4532 0.224
Observations 113 97 97 97 92 99 92
NOTES: Instrumenting for investment climate (IC). Instruments are fraction of the population speaking English, and fraction of the population
speaking other European languages. Geography control variables are from Acemoglu et al. (2001). The temperature and humidity variables are
average, minimum, and maximum monthly high temperatures, and minimum and maximum monthly low temperatures, and morning minimum
and maximum humidity, and afternoon minimum and maximum humidity. Measures of soil quality/climate are steppe (low latitude), desert (low
latitude), steppe (middle latitude), desert (middle latitude), dry steppe wasteland, desert dry winter, and highland. Measures of natural resources
are percent of world gold reserves today, percent of world iron reserves today, percent of world zinc reserves today, number of minerals present
in country, and oil resources (thousands of barrels per capita). Instruments evaluation is the same for Table 7. All regressions are cross-sectional
with one observation per country. White's correction of heteroscedasticity is used. Standard errors are in brackets denoting *** 1%, ** 5%, *
10% significance and p-values for joint significance tests are in parentheses. Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the data
appendix.
Table 11: Robustness to Health (McArthur and Sachs, 2001)
Baseline (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IV Regressions: Dependent variable is log GDP per capita in 1995
Instrumenting only for IC
Instrumenting for IC and
Health
ln(Investment climate) 11.30*** 7.345* 6.881** 7.386* 8.617** 7.303** 7.696**
[2.233] [3.796] [3.413] [4.044] [3.422] [3.407] [3.443]
ln(Human capital and local tech) -3.605* 1.309 1.629 1.444 2.186 2.344 -2.619
[2.053] [2.231] [3.021] [3.083] [2.737] [5.039] [9.077]
ln(s) 0.343 0.326 0.275 0.324 0.434 0.292 0.513
[0.287] [0.471] [0.443] [0.484] [0.607] [0.498] [0.601]
ln(n+x+δ) -0.365*** -0.703** -0.670** -0.709** -0.904* -0.742 -0.649
[0.132] [0.341] [0.323] [0.348] [0.522] [0.492] [0.538]
Life expectancy -0.0127 -0.0115 -0.0315 -0.0734
[0.0320] [0.0336] [0.0411] [0.0923]
Infant mortality 0.00242 0.000544 0.00445 -0.0189
[0.00849] [0.00941] [0.0133] [0.0343]
First Stage R-squared: IC 0.30 0.44 0.45 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44
Partial R-squared: IC 0.1616 0.1276 0.1406 0.1162 0.3769 0.3769 0.3769
Partial R-squared F test (p-value): IC 0 0.0178 0.0055 0.0193 0 0 0
Hansen test (p-value) 0.3917 0.6439 0.6173 0.6496 0.9448 0.8365 0.8884
Observations 113 45 45 45 45 45 45
NOTES: Instrumenting for investment climate (IC). Instruments are fraction of the population speaking English, and fraction of the population
speaking other European languages. Health variables and instruments for health variables are from McArthur and Sachs (2001). Column (1)-(3)
instrument only IC and consider health as exogenous. Column (4)-(6) consider health endogenous and include average temperature, amount of territory
within 100 km of the coast, and latitude as instruments. Instruments evaluation is the same for Table 7. All regressions are cross-sectional with one
observation per country. White's correction of heteroscedasticity is used. Standard errors are in brackets denoting *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance.
Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the data appendix.
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Table 12: Robustness to Integration
Baseline (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IV Regressions: Dependent variable is log GDP per capita in 1995
Instrumenting with FR IV Instrumenting with RST IV
ln(Investment climate) 11.30*** 9.636*** 9.683*** 7.983*** 9.633*** 9.672*** 8.094***
[2.233] [1.931] [1.920] [1.427] [1.932] [1.918] [1.455]
ln(Human capital and local tech) -3.605* -2.623 -2.5 -4.110** -2.718 -2.614 -4.226**
[2.053] [1.752] [1.781] [1.870] [1.778] [1.812] [1.943]
ln(s) 0.343 0.158 0.152 0.169 0.175 0.169 0.191
[0.287] [0.366] [0.365] [0.354] [0.368] [0.367] [0.368]
ln(n+x+δ) -0.365*** -0.129 -0.104 -0.255** -0.14 -0.119 -0.261**
[0.132] [0.155] [0.171] [0.106] [0.155] [0.169] [0.106]
Integration 0.357 0.404 0.317 0.357
[0.317] [0.330] [0.315] [0.326]
Land area 2.53E-08 2.04E-08
[4.85e-08] [4.58e-08]
Real openness 0.311 0.266
[0.277] [0.293]
First Stage R-squared: IC 0.30 0.33 0.32 0.36 0.33 0.32 0.36
Partial R-squared: IC 0.1616 0.2278 0.2269 0.2574 0.2242 0.2230 0.2554
Partial R-squared F test (p-value): IC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hansen test (p-value) 0.3917 0.4855 0.4707 0.2494 0.5299 0.5148 0.2633
Observations 113 82 82 77 82 82 77
NOTES: Instrumenting for investment climate (IC). Instruments are fraction of the population speaking English, and fraction of the population
speaking other European languages. Integration is trade to GDP and real openness is trade to GDP on a PPP basis. Land area is the area of the
country. Integration is an endogenous variable. In columns (1)-(3) the instrument for integration is from Frankel and Romer (1999). In columns (4)-
(6) the instrument for integration is from Rodrik et al. (2001) and derived by re-estimating the gravity equation in Frankel and Romer (1999) with the
left-hand side variable defined as nominal bilateral trade to nominal GDP. Instruments evaluation is the same for Table 7. All regressions are cross-
sectional with one observation per country. White's correction of heteroscedasticity is used. Standard errors are in brackets denoting *** 1%, ** 5%, *
10% significance. Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the data appendix.
Table 13: Robustness to Macro Policy
Baseline (1) (2) (3) (4)
IV Regressions: Dependent variable is log GDP per capita in
2007
ln(Investment climate) 11.30*** 11.10*** 11.40*** 8.550*** 6.289***
[2.233] [2.310] [2.320] [1.956] [1.288]
ln(Human capital and local tech) -3.605* -3.574* -3.577* -3.178 -4.17
[2.053] [2.026] [2.023] [2.024] [2.778]
ln(s) 0.343 0.38 0.329 0.371 0.555
[0.287] [0.290] [0.306] [0.396] [0.358]
ln(n+x+δ) -0.365*** -0.385*** -0.363*** -1.031** -1.297***
[0.132] [0.129] [0.133] [0.456] [0.310]
Inflation -0.0159 -0.0682
[0.147] [0.233]
Government consumption 0.00244 -0.0123
[0.0142] [0.0126]
Exchange rate overvaluation -0.00158 -0.00278**
[0.00176] [0.00121]
First Stage R-squared: IC 0.30 0.29 0.30 0.37 0.38
Partial R-squared: IC 0.1616 0.1513 0.1587 0.2885 0.3295
Partial R-squared F test (p-value): IC 0 0 0 0 0
Hansen test (p-value) 0.3917 0.4279 0.3875 0.1439 0.1913
Observations 113 109 113 56 56
NOTES: Instrumenting for investment climate (IC). Instruments are fraction of the population speaking English, and fraction of the population speaking
other European languages. Macroeconomic policy variables are log average inflation, government consumption defined over 2000–2010, and exchange
rate overvaluation defined over 1960-1997. They are taken from World Development Indicator, Penn World Tables (PWT) and Acemoglu and Johnson
(2005) respectively. Instruments evaluation is the same for Table 7. All regressions are cross-sectional with one observation per country. White's
correction of heteroscedasticity is used. Standard errors are in brackets denoting *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance. Detailed variable definitions and
sources are given in the data appendix.
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Table 14: Robustness to Other Controls
Baseline (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IV Regressions: Dependent variable is log GDP per capita in 2007
ln(Investment climate) 11.30*** 11.55*** 11.41*** 10.14*** 9.810*** 9.272*** 11.82***
[2.233] [4.192] [2.799] [2.072] [2.475] [1.631] [2.389]
ln(Human capital and local tech) -3.605* -2.497 -1.572 -0.99 -2.723 -1.328 -2.439
[2.053] [2.695] [1.883] [1.403] [1.976] [1.341] [1.963]
ln(s) 0.343 0.369 0.622* 0.643** 0.332 0.435 0.347
[0.287] [0.342] [0.357] [0.309] [0.264] [0.305] [0.361]
ln(n+x+δ) -0.365*** -0.403 -0.356* -0.405** -0.322** -0.415*** -0.129
[0.132] [0.261] [0.203] [0.192] [0.157] [0.111] [0.189]
Religion (0.8012)
Ethnolinguistic fragmentation 0.364
[0.604]
Capitalist system indicator 0.023
[0.0796]
Continent dummies (0.4464)
British colonial dummy -0.0346
[0.259]
French colonial dummy -0.304
[0.362]
French legal origin -0.600*
[0.329]
First Stage R-squared: IC 0.30 0.39 0.36 0.28 0.33 0.37 0.39
Partial R-squared: IC 0.1616 0.0874 0.1844 0.1834 0.1450 0.2450 0.1892
Partial R-squared F test (p-value): IC 0 0.0015 0.0006 0 0.0005 0 0
Hansen test (p-value) 0.3917 0.6364 0.4174 0.8748 0.3370 0.3266 0.8238
Observations 113 97 78 84 113 99 99
NOTES: Instrumenting for investment climate (IC). Instruments are fraction of the population speaking English, and fraction of the
population speaking other European languages. Instruments evaluation is the same for Table 7. All regressions are cross-sectional with one
observation per country. White's correction of heteroscedasticity is used. Standard errors are in brackets denoting *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%
significance and p-values for joint significance tests are in parentheses. Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the data
appendix.
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Table 15: IV Regressions with Different Human Capital and ICI
Baseline (1) (2)
Dependent variable is log GDP per capita in
2007
ln(Investment climate) 11.30*** 10.08*** 13.23***
[2.233] [1.988] [2.674]
ln(Human capital and local tech) -3.605* 0.137 -4.012*
[2.053] [0.0890] [2.229]
ln(s) 0.343 0.596 0.379
[0.287] [0.446] [0.269]
ln(n+x+δ) -0.365*** -0.0864 -0.411***
[0.132] [0.511] [0.137]
First Stage R-squared: IC 0.30 0.41 0.31
Partial R-squared: IC 0.1616 0.1839 0.171
Partial R-squared F test (p-value): IC 0 0 0
Hansen test (p-value) 0.3917 0.5518 0.454
Observations 113 56 113
NOTES: Instrumenting for investment climate (IC). Instruments are fraction of the population speaking
English, and fraction of the population speaking other European languages. IC in column (2) is calculated from
the mean value of each country. Instruments evaluation is the same for Table 7. All regressions are cross-
sectional with one observation per country. White's correction of heteroscedasticity is used. Standard errors are
in brackets denoting *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance and p-values for joint significance tests are in
parentheses. Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the data appendix.
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A.3 Variables
A.3.1 IC variables
IC-Infrastructure Variables
Days to clear customs to export : Average number of days to clear customs to
export (log).
Days to clear customs to import : Average number of days to clear customs to
imports (log).
Dummy for power outages: Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant has
su¤ered any power outages during last year.
Number of power outages: Number of power outages su¤ered by the plant in last
year (log).
Average duration of power outages: Average duration of power outages su¤ered by
the plant in hours (log).
Total duration of power outages by year : Total duration of power outages su¤ered
by the plant by month, in hours, conditional on the plat reports having power outages.
Losses due to power outages: Value of the losses due to the power outages as a
percentage of sales (conditional on the plant reporting power outages).
Wait for a power supply : Current delay to obtain a power supply in days (log).
Dummy for own generator : Dummy variable taking value 1 if the rm has its own
power generator.
Electricity from a generator : Percent of the electricity used by the plat provided
by a own generator.
Dummy for insu¢ cient water supply : Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the
rm has experienced insu¢ cient water supply for production during last year.
Water outages: Number of water outages su¤ered by the plant in last year (log).
Average duration of water outages: Average duration of water outages su¤ered by
the plant in hours (log).
Total duration of water outages by year : Total duration of water outages su¤ered
by the plant by month in hours, conditional on the plant reports having water outages.
Wait for a water supply : Current delay to obtain a water connection in days (log).
Wait for a phone connection: Current delay to obtain a phone connection in days
(log).
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Dummy for webpage: Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant has a website.
Dummy for e-mail : Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant uses email.
Shipment losses, exports: Fraction of the value of the plants average cargo con-
signment that was lost in transit due to breakage, theft or spoilage in the international
market.
Shipment losses, domestic: Fraction of the value of the plants average cargo con-
signment that was lost in transit due to breakage, theft or spoilage in the domestic
market.
Days of inventory of main input : Number of days of inventory of the main input
(log).
Wait for an import license: Current delay to obtain an import license related in
days (log).
IC-Red Tape, Corruption and Crime Variables
Dummy for conicts with clients with a court involved : Dummy variable that
takes value 1 if the conict of the rm with clients solved in courts were generally
enforced.
Managers time spent in bureaucratic issues: Percentage of managerstime spent
in dealing with bureaucratic issues.
Weeks to bureaucracy : Managerstime spent in dealing with bureaucratic issues
in weeks (log).
Number of inspections: In the last year, total number of inspections (log).
Number of working days spent with inspections: Number of working days spent
with inspections (log).
Dummy for tax inspections: Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the rm has
been visited by tax o¢ cials during last year.
Number of tax inspections: Total number of inspections of tax o¢ cials received by
the plant in 2007 (log).
Number of working days spent with tax inspections: Number of working days spent
with tax inspections (log).
Dummy for gifts in tax inspections: Gifts expected or requested in inspections with
tax o¢ cials.
Dummy for payments to obtain a contract with the government : Dummy variable
that takes value 1 if in plants sector it is common to pay an extra amount of money
in order to obtain a contract with the government.
Payments to obtain a contract with the government : Illegal payment in order to
obtain a contract with the government. Related as percentage of contract value.
Dummy for payments to deal with bureaucratic issues: Dummy that takes value 1
if rms in the main sector occasionally need to give gifts or make informal payments
to public o¢ cers in order to get things donewith regard to customs, taxes, licenses,
legislations, services, etc.
Wait for an operation license: Actual delay to obtain a main operating license in
days (log).
Dummy for gifts to obtain an operating license: Gifts expected or requested to
obtain an operating license, conditional on submit an operating license.
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Dummy for security expenses: Dummy taking value 1 if the plant has security
expenses.
Security expenses: Cost in security (equipment, sta¤, etc) (log).
Dummy for crime losses: Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant su¤ered
any criminal attempt during last year.
Crime losses: Value of losses due to criminal activity (log).
Wait for a construction permit : Actual delay to obtain a construction related in
days (log).
Dummy for gifts to obtain a construction permit : Gifts expected or requested to
obtain a construction permit, conditional on submit a construction permit.
Number of permits: Number of permits obtained in last two years (log).
Validity of permits: Average validity, in months, of permits obtained (log).
Time spent with permits: Number of working days spent in obtaining all permits
(log).
Wait for a permit : Days waiting for obtaining a permit (log).
Dummy for gift to obtain a permit : Gifts expected or requested to obtain a permit,
conditional on submit a permit.
Dummy for compulsory certicate: Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the rm
has to have any compulsory certicate to produce or sell any product.
Sales with compulsory certicates: Percentage of sales subject to compulsory cer-
ticates.
Number of compulsory certicates: Number of compulsory certicates obtained
(log).
Time spent with compulsory certicates: Number of working days spent when
obtaining compulsory certicates (log).
Wait for compulsory certicate: Days waiting for obtaining compulsory certicates
(log).
Dummy for gift to obtain compulsory certicates: Gifts expected or requested to
obtain a compulsory certicate, conditional on submit a compulsory certicate.
Dummy for gifts to obtain a power supply : Dummy variable that takes value 1
if gifts are expected or requested to obtain an electrical connection, conditional on
submit an electrical connection.
Dummy for gifts to obtain a water supply : Dummy variable that takes value 1
if gifts are expected or requested to obtain a phone supply, conditional on submit a
phone connection.
Dummy for gifts to obtain a phone connection: Dummy variable that takes value
1 if gifts are expected or requested to obtain a phone supply, conditional on submit a
phone connection.
Dummy for gifts to obtain an import license: Gifts expected or requested to obtain
an import license, conditional on submit an import license.
IC-Finance Variables
Dummy for purchases paid after delivery : Dummy variable that takes value 1 if
any percentage of annual purchases are paid for after the delivery.
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Purchases paid after delivery : Percentage of annual purchases paid for after the
delivery.
Sales paid before delivery : Percentage of annual sales paid for before the delivery.
Sales paid on delivery : Percentage of annual sales paid for before the delivery.
Sales paid after delivery : Percentage of annual sales paid for after the delivery.
Dummy for purchase xed assets: Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the rm
has purchaser xed assets during last year.
New xed assets nanced by internal founds: Percentage of rms working capital
nanced with funds from informal sources.
New xed assets nanced by equity : Percentage of rms working capital nanced
with funds from equity.
New xed assets nanced by private banks: Percentage of investments in new xed
assets nanced with funds from private commercial banks.
New xed assets nanced by state-owned banks: Percentage of investments in new
xed assets nanced with funds state owned banks.
New xed assets nanced by trade credit : Percentage of investments in new xed
assets nanced with credits from suppliers.
Dummy for checking or saving account : Dummy that takes value 1 if the rm has
a saving account
Dummy for overdraft facility : Dummy that takes value 1 if the rm has access to
an overdraft facility.
Dummy for loan: Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant reports that it
has a bank loan.
Dummy for loan from state-owned banks: Dummy variable that takes value 1 if
the rm has a loan from a state owned banks.
Dummy for loan from private banks: Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the rm
has a loan from a domestic private commercial banks.
Dummy for loan from non-nancial institutions: Dummy variable that takes value
1 if the rm has a loan from a non-nancial institutions.
Dummy for loan with collateral : Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the loan is
on collateral.
Value of the collateral : Value of the collateral as a percentage of the loan value
(conditional on having a loan with collateral).
Dummy for land, buildings as collateral : Dummy that takes value 1 if the rm uses
land or buildings as collateral (conditional on having a loan with collateral).
Dummy for machinery and equipment as collateral : Dummy that takes value 1 if
the rm uses machinery or equipment as collateral (conditional on having a loan with
collateral).
Dummy for accounts receivable and inventories as collateral : Dummy that takes
value 1 if the rm uses accounts receivable or inventories as collateral (conditional on
having a loan with collateral).
Dummy for personal assets as collateral : Dummy that takes value 1 if the rm
uses personal assets as collateral (conditional on having a loan with collateral).
Dummy no loan because of complexity : Dummy that takes value 1 if the rm did
not apply for loan because of its complexity.
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Dummy no loan because of cost : Dummy that takes value 1 if the rm did not
apply for loan because of its cost.
Dummy no loan because of collateral : Dummy that takes value 1 if the rm did
not apply for loan because of its cost.
Dummy for rejected credit applications: Dummy variable that takes value 1 if a
credit application has been rejected in the last year.
Dummy for external auditory : Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant uses
an external auditory.
Largest shareholder : Percentage of rms capital owned by the largest shareholder.
Dummy for subsidy : Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the rm receives any
subsides from the national, regional and local government or EU.
IC-Innovation Variables
Dummy for quality certication: Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant
has a quality certication.
Dummy for foreign technology : Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the rm used
a licensed technology of a foreign company in the last year.
Dummy for new line of products: Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant
has developed a new product or product line.
Sales of new products: Percentage of total sales corresponding with new products.
Dummy for product upgraded : Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant
upgraded an existing product last year.
Dummy for R&D : Dummy that takes value 1 if the rm performed R&D activities
during last year.
R&D expenditures as % of total sales: Total R&D expenditures as percentage of
annual sales
IC-Human Capital Variables
Sta¤ - nonproduction workers: Percentage of nonproduction workers in sta¤.
Sta¤ - female workers: Percentage of female workers in rms sta¤.
Sta¤ - skilled workers: Percentage of skilled workers in rms sta¤.
Sta¤ - university education: Percentage of sta¤with at least one year of university.
Dummy for training : Dummy taking value one if the rm provides formal (beyond
on the job) training to its employees.
Training to non-production workers: Percentage of non-production workers receiv-
ing formal (beyond on the job) training.
Experience of the manager : Number of years of experience of the manager in the
establishments sector (log).
A.3.2 Non IC variables and sources
1987 mean annual temperature in degrees Celsius. Source: McArthur and Sachs
(2001).
Access to sea: Dummy variable taking value 1 for countries without access to the
sea, 0 otherwise. Source: Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004).
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Africa continent dummy : Dummy variable taking value 1 if a country belongs to
Africa, 0 otherwise.
Area under frost : Proportion of land with >5 frost-days per month in winter.
Source: Masters and McMillan (2001).
Area under tropics: Percentage of tropical land area. Source: Gallup and Sachs
(1998).
Asia continent dummy: Dummy variable taking value 1 if a country belongs to
Asia, 0 otherwise.
Average protection against expropriation risk : Risk of expropriation of private
foreign investment by government, from 0 to 10, where a higher score means less risk.
Mean value for all years from 1985 to 1995. Source: This data was previously used
by Knack and Keefer (1995) and was organized in electronic form by the IRIS Center
(University of Maryland); originally Political Risk Services.
Capitalist System Indicator : Variable taking the value of 1 for countries that are
categorized as capitalist or mixed-capitalist by the Freedom House (1994). Source:
Hall and Jones (1999).
Crops/Minerals: A series of ten one-zero dummy variables of whether the country
has ever had the following crops/minerals: bananas, co¤ee, copper, maize, millet,rice,
rubber, silver, sugarcane, or wheat. Source: Easterly and Levine (2003).
Days under frost : Average number of frost-days per month in winter. Source: CID
Harvard University (2002) from Masters and McMillan (2001).
Distance from the equator : Distance from Equator of capital city measured as
abs(Latitude)/90. Source: World Bank (2002).
Dummy for landlocked : Dummy variable equal to 1 if country does not adjoin the
sea. Source: Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001).
British colonial dummy : Dummy variable indicating whether country was a British
colony. Source: Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001).
French colonial dummy : Dummy variable indicating whether country was a French
colony. Source: Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001).
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF): Average of ve di¤erent indices of ethno-
linguistic fragmentation. Source: Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001).
Europe continent dummy : Dummy variable taking value 1 if a country belongs to
Europe, 0 otherwise.
Exchange rate overvaluation dened over 1960-1997. Source: Acemoglu and John-
son (2005).
Fraction of the population speaking English. Source: Hall and Jones (1999).
Fraction of the population speaking one of the major languages of Western (English,
French, German, Portuguese, or Spanish). Source: Hall and Jones (1999).
French legal origin dummy: Legal origin of the company law or commercial code
of each country. Source: Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001).
Government Consumption Share of PPP Converted GDP Per Capita at current
prices. 2000-2010. Source: Penn World Tables (PWT).
Humidity Variables: Humidity variables are morning minimum, morning maxi-
mum, afternoon minimum, and afternoon maximum, all in percent. Source: Acemoglu,
Johnson, and Robinson (2001).
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Infant mortality rate (deahs per 1000 live births) in 1995. Source: McArthur and
Sachs (2001).
Land area (thousands sq. mt.). Source: Frankel and Romer (1999).
Latin america and the carribean continent dummy : Dummy variable taking value
1 if a country belongs to LAC, 0 otherwise.
Latitude: Absolute value of the latitude of the country, scaled to take values be-
tween 0 and 1, where 0 is the equator. Source: La Porta et al (1999).
Life expectancy at birth in 1995. Source: McArthur and Sachs (2001).
Log of average ination: 2000-2010. Source: World Development Indicator.
Natural logarithm of realopenness: Real openness is given by the ratio of nominal
imports plus exports to GDP in Purchasing-Power-Parity US dollars (PPP GDP).
Source: Penn World Tables, Mark 5.6 and World Bank (2002).
Natural logarithm of openness: Openness is given by the ratio of (nominal) imports
plus exports to GDP (in nominal US dollars). Source: Penn World Tables, Mark 6.
Natural logarithm of predicted trade shares: Computed as for natural logarithm
of predicted trade shares except that the dependent variable in the bilateral trade
(gravity) equation is nominal trade divided by nominal GDP (both in US dollars).
Source: Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004).
Natural logarithm of predicted trade shares: Computed following Frankel and Romer
(1999) from a bilateral trade equation with pure geography variables. Source:
Frankel and Romer (1999).
Natural Resources: Measures of natural resources are: percent of world gold re-
serves today, percent of world iron reserves today, percent of world zinc reserves today,
number of minerals present in country, and oil resources (thousands of). Source: Ace-
moglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001).
Proportion of land area withnin 100 km of the sea coast. Source: McArthur and
Sachs (2001).
Religion Variables: Percentage of the population that belonged to the three most
widely spread religions of the world in 1980 (or for 1990-95 for countries formed
more recently). The four classications are Roman Catholic, Protestant, Muslim,
and "other". Source: Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001).
Rule of Law index : Refers to 2001 and approximates for 1990s institutions. Source:
Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton (2002).
Settler mortality : The logarithm of annualized deaths per thousand of European
soldiers. Source: Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001).
Social infrastructure: It is combination of two indexes. The rst is an index of
government anti-diversion policies (GADP) created from data assembled by a rm
that specializes in providing assessments of risk to international investors, Political
Risk Services. The second element of our measure of social infrastructure captures
the extent to which a country is open to international trade. Source: Hall and Jones
(1999).
Soil Quality : Measures of soil quality/climate are steppe (low latitude), desert (low
latitude), steppe (middle latitude), desert (middle latitude), dry steppe wasteland,
desert dry winter, and highland. Source: Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001).
Temperature Variables: Temperature variables are average temperature, minimum
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monthly high, maximummonthly high, minimummonthly low, and maximummonthly
low, all in centigrade. Source: Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001).
Temperature: Average temperature (Celsius). Source: CID Harvard University
(2002).
The institution index : Average of the six Kaufman, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton
(1999) measures: (i) voice and accountability, (ii) political instability and violance,
(iii) government e¤ectiveness, (iv) regulatory burden, (v) rule of law, and (vi) graft,
and (2) one of the three policy variables: ination, trade openness, or real exchange
rate overvaluation. Source: Easterly and Levine (2003).
Years of schooling : Years of schooling of the total population aged over 25. This
variable is constructed as the average from 1960 through 2000; or for specic years as
needed in the tables. Source: Barro, Robert J. and Jong-Wha Lee, International Data
on Educational Attainment: Updates and Implications.
A.4 Construction of Investment Climate Index
A.4.1 Investment Climate Data
We use the World Banks enterprise survey data of 113 developing and transition coun-
tries. The reason to use this data is because of its big coverage of rm characteristics
and measures of rm performance. It is stratied by size, regions, and industries.
Rich set of rm characteristics reduces the necessity of using panel data to solve the
omitted variables problem. Specically, the data set provides rm-level information on
infrastructure, nance, red tape and corruption, human capital and innovation. This
allows us to construct quality of IC, innovation and local technology variables in our
model. There are both objective and subjective measures. We use objective measures
because of the disadvantages of subjective measures like the e¤ect of optimism and
pessimism of respondents, di¤erent reference point of respondents, performance bias
of the respondents, and di¤erences in the willingness to report by the respondents.
The survey questions are generally answered by top managers or owner of the rm
sometimes in cooperation with accountant and human-resource manager of the com-
pany in face-to-face interviews. To reduce measurement error, particularly questions
on corruption and accounting, condentiality of answers are assured. In addition, to
minimize coding and processing errors quality control procedures are developed.
Despite special attention is placed on the survey, missing observations and out-
liers are important problems regarding the data set. We have missing values both
in performance and rm characteristics variables. Following the recent econometric
methodology developed for the World Bank by Escribano and Guasch (2005, 2008), we
replace the missing values of the variables by their industry, region, and size averages,
which is the rst step of the cleaning process (imputation method1). In the second
step, we eliminate the outliers that are dened as those observations with ratios of
material to sales and/or labor cost to sales larger than one. We are not replacing
production function variables if all the production function variables are missing for a
1The method is called as ICA method. See Escribano and Pena (2009) for details of the method.
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given rm. We deate the nominal values using the appropriate year of the countrys
Producer Price Index (PPI).
Endogeneity of rm characteristics is another problem that we should solve while
working with this data set. That is, the possibility of simultaneous determination
of rm specic quality of IC, innovation, and local technology causes endogeneity in
the estimation. Since we have data for just one year, we cannot use own lag values as
instruments. That is why following the common methodology in this literature, we use
the industry-region-size average of plant-level rm characteristics to reduce the degree
of endogeneity of rm characteristics. On the other hand, using too many industry-
region-size variables causes measurement errors and multicollinearity problem. Thus,
we only substitute the missing values of rm characteristics. When the response rate
of the variables is not large enough, we use industry-region-size imputation technique
in order to keep as many observations as possible in the regression. Here, we gain
e¢ ciency maybe at the cost of some measurement errors.
A.4.2 Firm-Level Investment Climate Measure
We construct a relative measure, which ranks the rms based on the e¤ect of IC. For
example, as one dimension of infrastructure, we assign values to rms based on the
insu¢ cient provision of electricity. The one which is assigned the highest value in
electricity dimension is the one which is a¤ected most from the insu¢ cient provision.
We apply the same technique to all variables. The calculation of each rm-specic
quality of IC variables requires the following three steps:
 Step 1: determination of the signs of each variable to be used in the variable
calculation,
 Step 2: normalization of continuous variables into 0-1 variables,
 Step 3: combining the negative and positive series by taking the reverse of
the negative series.
We apply the same steps to construct innovation and local technology variables in
our model. See Escribano and Hacihasanoglu (2012) for details of these steps and the
applications of the IC index.
A.5 Sample Countries and Years
Africa: Angola (2010), Benin (2009), Botswana (2010), Burkina Faso (2009), Bu-
rundi (2006), Cameroon (2009), Cape Verde (2009), Chad (2009), Congo (2009), Do-
minican Republic (2010), Eritrea (2009), Gabon (2009), Gambia (2006), Ghana (2007),
Guinea (2006), Guinea Bissau (2006), Ivory Coast (2009), Kenya (2007), Lesotho
(2009), Liberia (2009), Madagascar (2009), Malawi (2009), Mali (2010), Mauritius
(2009), Mozambique (2007), Namibia (2006), Niger (2009), Nigeria (2007), Philip-
pines (2009), Rwanda (2006), Senegal (2007), Sierra Leone (2009), South Africa (2007),
Swaziland (2006), Tanzania (2006), Togo (2009), Uganda (2006), Zambia (2007).
Asia: Afghanistan (2008), Armenia (2009), Azerbaijan (2009), Bangladesh (2007),
Bhutan (2009), Fiji (2009), Indonesia (2009), Kazakhstan (2009), Kyrgyz Republic
(2009), LaoPDR (2009), Micronesia (2009), Mongolia (2009), Nepal (2009), Pakistan
(2007), Russia (2009), Samoa (2009), Tajikistan (2008), Timor Leste (2009), Tonga
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(2009), Turkey (2008), Uzbekistan (2008), Vanuatu (2009), Vietnam (2009), Yemen
(2010).
Europe: Albania (2007), Belarus (2008), Bosnia and Herzegovina (2009), Bul-
garia (2009), Croatia (2007), Czech Republic (2009), Estonia (2009), Fyr Macedonia
(2009), Georgia (2008), Hungary (2009), Kosovo (2009), Latvia (2009), Lithuania
(2009), Moldova (2009), Montenegro (2009), Poland (2009), Romania (2009), Serbia
(2009), Slovak Republic (2009), Slovenia (2009), Ukraine (2008).
Latin America and the Caribbean: Antigua and Barbuda (2010), Argentina
(2010), Bahamas (2010), Barbados (2010), Belize (2010), Bolivia (2010), Brazil (2009),
Chile (2010), Colombia (2010), Costarica (2010), DRC (2010), Dominica (2010), Ecuador
(2010), Elsalvador (2010), Grenada (2010), Guatemala (2010), Guyana (2010), Hon-
duras (2010), Jamaica (2010), Mexico (2010), Nicaragua (2010), Panama (2010),
Paraguay (2010), Peru (2010), St Kitts and Nevis (2010), St Lucia (2010), St Vin-
cent and Grenadines (2010), Suriname (2010), Trinidad and Tobago (2010), Uruguay
(2010), Venezuela (2010).
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B.1 Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Discritization of Continuous Variables
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Figure 2: GDP Per Capita and Investment Climate (IC)
Figure 3: Cumulative Distribution Function of ICI for Di¤erent Sizes of the Firms
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Table 1.1: Sign of the Investment Climate (IC) Variables: Infrastructures
Expected
Unconditional
Sign
Sign in the Regressions Sign in the Indices
#22 IC Variables
Block by
Block
Regression
Preliminary
Export
Equation
Unconditional
Index
Conditional
Index
Days to clear customs to export -- ++ ++ - +
Days to clear customs to import - - - - -
Dummy for power outages - - + - -
Number of power outages -- ++ ++ - +
Average duration of power outages - - + - -
Total duration of power outages by year - - + - -
Losses due to power outages - - - - -
Wait for a power supply -- ++ ++ - +
Dummy for own generator - - - - -
Electricity from a generator - - - - -
Dummy for insufficient water supply -- ++ ++ - +
Number of water outages - - + - -
Average duration of water outages - - + - -
Total duration of water outages by year -- ++ ++ - +
Wait for a water supply - - - - -
Wait for a phone connection - - + - -
Dummy for webpage + + + + +
Dummy for e-mail + + + + +
Shipment losses, exports -- ++ ++ - +
Shipment losses, domestic - - - - -
Days of inventory of main input + + + + +
Wait for an import license - - - - -
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Table 1.2: Sign of the Investment Climate (IC) Variables: Red tape, Informality and Corruption
Expected
Unconditional
Sign
Sign in the Regressions Sign in the Indices
#35 IC Variables
Block by
Block
Regression
Preliminary
Export
Equation
Unconditional
Index
Conditional
Index
Dummy for conflicts with clients with a court
involved - - - - -
Manager's time spent in bureaucratic issues - dropped - - -
Weeks to bureaucracy - - - - -
Number of inspections - - - - -
Number of working days spent with inspections -- ++ ++ - +
Dummy for tax inspections -- ++ ++ - +
Number of tax inspections - - - - -
Number of working days spent with tax inspections - - + - -
Dummy for gifts in tax inspections - - - - -
Dummy for payments to obtain a contract with the
government - - - - -
Payments to obtain a contract with the government - - - - -
Dummy for payments to deal with bureaucratic issues - + - - -
Wait for an operation license - - + - -
Dummy for gifts to obtain an operating license - - - - -
Dummy for security expenses -- ++ ++ - +
Security expenses -- ++ ++ - +
Dummy for crime losses -- ++ ++ - +
Crime losses -- ++ ++ - +
Wait for a construction permit -- ++ ++ - +
Dummy for gifts to obtain a construction permit -- ++ ++ - +
Number of permits - - - - -
Validity of permits + + + + +
Time spent with permits - + - - -
Wait for a permit - + - - -
Dummy for gift to obtain a permit -- ++ ++ - +
Dummy for compulsory certificate -- ++ ++ - +
Sales with compulsory certificates - - - - -
Number of compulsory certificates - - - - -
Time spent with compulsory certificates -- ++ ++ - +
Wait for compulsory certificate - - - - -
Dummy for gift to obtain compulsory certificates - - - - -
Dummy for gifts to obtain a power supply -- ++ ++ - +
Dummy for gifts to obtain a water supply - + - - -
Dummy for gifts to obtain a phone connection -- ++ ++ - +
Dummy for gifts to obtain an import license - - - - -
B. Appendix to Chapter 2 82
Table 1.3: Sign of the Investment Climate (IC) Variables: Finance and Corporate Governance
Expected
Unconditional
Sign
Sign in the Regressions Sign in the Indices
#30 IC Variables
Block by
Block
Regression
Preliminary
Export
Equation
Unconditional
Index
Conditional
Index
Dummy for purchases paid after delivery - - + - -
Purchases paid after delivery - - - - -
Sales paid before delivery + + + + +
Sales paid on delivery + + - + +
Sales paid after delivery + + + + +
Dummy for purchase fixed assets + + - + +
New fixed assets financed by internal founds + + - + +
New fixed assets financed by equity + + + + +
New fixed assets financed by private banks ++ -- -- + -
New fixed assets financed by state-owned banks ++ -- -- + -
New fixed assets financed by trade credit + + + + +
Dummy for checking or saving account + + + + +
Dummy for overdraft facility + + - + +
Dummy for loan + dropped + + +
Dummy for loan from state-owned banks + + - + +
Dummy for loan from private banks + + + + +
Dummy for loan from non-financial institutions + + + + +
Dummy for loan with collateral ++ -- -- + -
Value of the collateral + - + + +
Dummy for land, buildings as collateral + + + + +
Dummy for machinery and equipment as
collateral + - - + -
Dummy for accounts receivable and inventories
as collateral + + + + +
Dummy for personal assets as collateral ++ -- -- + -
Dummy no loan because of complexity -- ++ ++ - +
Dummy no loan because of cost - - - - -
Dummy no loan because of collateral - - - - -
Dummy for rejected credit applications -- ++ ++ - +
Dummy for external auditory + + + + +
Largest shareholder - - - - -
Dummy for subsidy + + + + +
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Table 1.4: Sign of the Investment Climate (IC) Variables: Quality, Innovation, and Labor Skills
Expected
Unconditional
Sign
Sign in the Regressions Sign in the Indices
#20 IC Variables
Block by
Block
Regression
Preliminary
Export
Equation
Unconditional
Index
Conditional
Index
Dummy for quality certification + + + + +
Dummy for foreign technology + - + + +
Dummy for new line of products + + + + +
Sales of new products ++ -- -- + -
Dummy for R&D + + + + +
R&D expenditures as % of total
sales + + + + +
Staff with computer + + + + +
Dummy for outsourcing ++ -- -- + -
Dummy for discontinued - - - - -
Dummy for product upgraded + + + + +
Staff - production workers + - + + +
Staff - nonproduction workers ++ -- -- + -
Staff - female workers + + + + +
Staff - skilled workers + + + + +
Staff - unskilled workers -- ++ ++ - +
Staff - university education ++ -- -- + -
Dummy for training + + + + +
Training to production workers + - + + +
Training to non-production workers + - + + +
Experience of the manager ++ -- -- + -
Table 1.5: Sign of the Investment Climate (IC) Variables: Other Control Variables
Expected
Unconditional
Sign
Sign in the Regressions Sign in the Indices
#15 IC Variables
Block by
Block
Regression
Preliminary
Export
Equation
Unconditional
Index
Conditional
Index
Dummy for incorporated company ++ -- -- + -
Dummy for limited company + + + + +
Dummy for FDI + + + + +
Dummy for state-owned firm - - + - -
Dummy for importer + + + + +
Share of imports + + + + +
Capacity utilization + + + + +
Dummy for local monopoly + + + + +
Dummy for less that 5 competitors + + + + +
Dummy for more than 5
competitors + + - + +
Dummy for increased sales + + - + +
Dummy for decreased sales - + - - -
Dummy for increased prices - + - - -
Dummy for decreased prices ++ -- -- + -
Dummy for informal competitors - - - - -
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Table 2: Number of IC Variables Used in Each Conditional Index
(1) Infrastructure
(2)   Red tape and
corruption (3)   Finance (4)   Quality (5)   Control
Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative
3 13 1 17 20 3 13 1 8 4
Table 3: Number of IC Variables Used in Each Unconditional Index
(1) Infrastructure
(2)   Red tape and
corruption (3)   Finance (4)   Quality (5)   Control
Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative
3 19 1 34 25 5 18 2 11 4
Table 4: Share of FPC
(1) Infrastructure
(2)   Red tape and
corruption (3)   Finance (4)   Quality (5)   Control
Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative
n=3 n=14 n=2 n=21 n=16 n=12 n=13 n=7 n=10 n=6
48% 19% 53% 13% 13% 23% 19% 19% 14% 20%
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics
Conditional ICI Unconditional ICI
IC Groups Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
Investment climate (positive) .3102 .0959 .2877 .0913
Investment climate (negative) .1447 .1047 .1318 .0781
Infrastructure (positive) .5847 .2098 .5847 .2098
Infrastructure (negative) .1076 .0942 .0948 .0901
Red tape, corruption and crime (positive) .0598 .2372 .0598 .2372
Red tape, corruption and crime (negative) .10442 .0857 .1351 .0904
Finance (positive) .3476 .1231 .3282 .1319
Finance (negative) .0361 .1049 .0401 .0838
Quality, innovation and labor skills (positive) .2361 .1622 .1969 .1332
Quality, innovation and labor skills (negative) .2236 .4169 .1373 .2341
Observations 903
Notes: Investment climate (IC) is on a scale from 0 to 1, where a higher score means better investment
climate. Infrastructure; corruption and crime; finance and quality, innovation and labor skills are
components of IC. They are on a scale from 0 to 1, where a higher score means better corresponding index.
I I I I I I I I 
I I I I I I I I 
I I I 
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Table 6: ICI Coefficients with respect to the Probability of Exporting –OLS Estimation
Conditional ICI Unconditional ICI
Dependent Variable: Probability of
Exporting
Restricted TFP Unrestricted TFP Restricted TFP Unrestricted TFP
(1) (2) (3) (4)
logTFP 0.0452** 0.0443** 0.0396* 0.0389*
[0.0201] [0.0197] [0.0203] [0.0200]
Infrastructure (positive) 0.333*** 0.333*** 0.310*** 0.310***
[0.0925] [0.0926] [0.0927] [0.0928]
Infrastructure (negative) -0.0636 -0.0624 0.136 0.137
[0.192] [0.192] [0.217] [0.217]
Red tape, corruption and crime (positive) 0.0988 0.0998 0.0887 0.0895
[0.0713] [0.0712] [0.0733] [0.0733]
Red tape, corruption and crime (negative) -0.797*** -0.797*** -0.438* -0.437*
[0.254] [0.255] [0.252] [0.252]
Finance (positive) 0.159 0.158 0.0934 0.0924
[0.142] [0.142] [0.140] [0.140]
Finance (negative) -0.374* -0.372* -0.121 -0.121
[0.198] [0.198] [0.226] [0.226]
Quality, innovation and labor skills (positive) 0.508*** 0.508*** 0.505*** 0.505***
[0.127] [0.127] [0.152] [0.152]
Quality, innovation and labor skills (negative) -0.0482 -0.0485 -0.0755 -0.0754
[0.0458] [0.0458] [0.0822] [0.0822]
Age -0.0439* -0.0437* -0.0449* -0.0447*
[0.0259] [0.0259] [0.0265] [0.0265]
Dummy for medium-size firms 0.147*** 0.148*** 0.161*** 0.162***
[0.0453] [0.0452] [0.0451] [0.0450]
Dummy for large-size firms 0.258*** 0.259*** 0.282*** 0.283***
[0.0531] [0.0531] [0.0512] [0.0512]
R-squared 0.21 0.21 0.19 0.19
Observations 636 636 636 636
Notes: White's correction of heteroscedasticity is used. Each regression includes a set of industry and region dummies and a constant term.
Standard errors are in brackets denoting *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance. Detailed variable definitions are given in the data appendix.
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Table 7: ICI Coefficients with respect to the Probability of Exporting
IV Estimation OLS Estimation
Conditional ICI Unconditional ICI Conditional ICI Unconditional ICI
Dependent variable: probability
of exporting
Rest.
TFP
Unrestr.
TFP
Rest.
TFP
Unrestr.
TFP
Rest.
TFP
Unrestr.
TFP
Rest.
TFP
Unrestr.
TFP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
logTFP 0.303* 0.305* 0.256 0.257 0.0415** 0.0406** 0.0390* 0.0382*
[0.166] [0.167] [0.159] [0.160] [0.0202] [0.0198] [0.0204] [0.0201]
Infrastructure (positive) 0.297*** 0.300*** 0.300*** 0.303*** 0.314*** 0.314*** 0.310*** 0.310***
[0.108] [0.109] [0.104] [0.105] [0.0912] [0.0913] [0.0916] [0.0917]
Red tape, corruption and crime
(negative)
-0.854*** -0.850*** -0.480* -0.478* -0.775*** -0.774*** -0.416* -0.416*
[0.263] [0.264] [0.247] [0.248] [0.248] [0.248] [0.239] [0.239]
Quality, innovation and labor skills
(positive)
0.533*** 0.536*** 0.494*** 0.494*** 0.529*** 0.530*** 0.538*** 0.538***
[0.132] [0.133] [0.160] [0.161] [0.126] [0.126] [0.150] [0.150]
Age -0.0690** -0.0687** -0.0665** -0.0662** -0.0446* -0.0445* -0.0468* -0.0466*
[0.0309] [0.0312] [0.0302] [0.0304] [0.0252] [0.0252] [0.0257] [0.0257]
Dummy for medium-size firms 0.113* 0.117* 0.128** 0.132** 0.159*** 0.159*** 0.164*** 0.165***
[0.0622] [0.0613] [0.0577] [0.0567] [0.0441] [0.0440] [0.0442] [0.0441]
Dummy for large-size firms 0.286*** 0.290*** 0.294*** 0.298*** 0.280*** 0.280*** 0.285*** 0.285***
[0.0591] [0.0589] [0.0544] [0.0543] [0.0517] [0.0518] [0.0505] [0.0505]
Constant term -0.32 -0.349 -0.201 -0.225 0.179 0.177 0.203 0.201
[0.354] [0.366] [0.336] [0.349] [0.139] [0.140] [0.141] [0.141]
First Stage R-squared: productivity 0.0284 0.0298 0.0306 0.032
Partial R-squared: productivity 0.0167 0.0163 0.0178 0.0174
First-stage F-statistics 10.7 10.12 10.98 10.48
First-Stage F-test  (p-value) 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
Hansen test (p-value) 0.8748 0.878 0.9186 0.9208
R-squared 0.2 0.2 0.18 0.18
Observations 636 636 636 636 636 636 636 636
Notes: Instrumenting for TFP using domestic shipment losses and dummy for informal competitors. Only missing values from these variables are replaced by the
corresponding region-industry-size average to avoid facing an omitted variables problem. “First Stage R-squared: productivity” is the R-squared from the
regression of productivity on both the included and excluded instruments. The “partial R-squared: productivity” measures the squared partial correlation between
the excluded instruments and the productivity. “First-Stage F-test (p-value)” is the p-value of the F-test of joint significance of the excluded instruments that
corresponds to the partial R-squared. “Hansen test (p-value)” shows the p-value of the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions. The null hypothesis is that the
instruments are valid instruments, that is, uncorrelated with the error term, and therefore the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated
equation. Each regression includes a set of industry and region dummies. White's correction of heteroscedasticity is used. Standard errors are in brackets denoting
*** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance. Detailed variable definitions are given in the data appendix.
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Table 8: ICI Coefficients with Different Threshold Levels –IV Estimation
Conditional ICI Unconditional ICI
Dependent Variable: Probability of
Exporting
95% 90% 75% normalized 95% 90% 75% normalized
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
logTFP 0.303* 0.310* 0.287* 0.314* 0.256 0.263* 0.265* 0.264*
[0.166] [0.166] [0.166] [0.164] [0.159] [0.160] [0.161] [0.155]
Infrastructure (positive) 0.297*** 0.298*** 0.214** 0.307*** 0.300*** 0.311*** 0.222*** 0.310***
[0.108] [0.0957] [0.0837] [0.108] [0.104] [0.0912] [0.0820] [0.103]
Red tape, corruption and crime
(negative)
-0.854*** -0.603** -0.351** -1.221*** -0.480* -0.481** -0.332** -0.753**
[0.263] [0.251] [0.158] [0.362] [0.247] [0.237] [0.164] [0.326]
Quality, innovation and labor skills
(positive)
0.533*** 0.461*** 0.369*** 0.430*** 0.494*** 0.394*** 0.342*** 0.418***
[0.132] [0.123] [0.113] [0.121] [0.160] [0.152] [0.128] [0.153]
Age -0.0690** -0.0726** -0.0685** -0.0660** -0.0665** -0.0688** -0.0714** -0.0654**
[0.0309] [0.0313] [0.0309] [0.0314] [0.0302] [0.0301] [0.0306] [0.0301]
Dummy for medium-size firms 0.113* 0.123* 0.133** 0.120* 0.128** 0.138** 0.146** 0.129**
[0.0622] [0.0644] [0.0621] [0.0622] [0.0577] [0.0592] [0.0592] [0.0582]
Dummy for large-size firms 0.286*** 0.292*** 0.303*** 0.297*** 0.294*** 0.308*** 0.321*** 0.300***
[0.0591] [0.0603] [0.0562] [0.0591] [0.0544] [0.0549] [0.0525] [0.0542]
Constant term -0.32 -0.319 -0.235 -0.313 -0.201 -0.184 -0.166 -0.215
[0.354] [0.346] [0.348] [0.346] [0.336] [0.333] [0.337] [0.326]
First Stage R-squared: productivity 0.0284 0.0294 0.0306 0.0319 0.0306 0.0311 0.0313 0.0332
Partial R-squared: productivity 0.0167 0.0176 0.0178 0.017 0.0178 0.0181 0.0182 0.0186
First-stage F-statistics 10.7 11.72 10.55 10.49 10.98 11.76 11.13 11.16
First-Stage F-test  (p-value) 0.0001 0 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0 0 0
Hansen test (p-value) 0.8748 0.8626 0.7755 0.6208 0.9186 0.8999 0.7941 0.7657
Observations 636 636 636 636 636 636 636 636
Notes: Instrumenting for TFP using domestic shipment losses and dummy for informal competitors. Only missing values from these variables are replaced by
the corresponding region-industry-size average to avoid facing an omitted variables problem. Instruments evaluation is the same for Table 7. Each regression
includes a set of industry and region dummies. White's correction of heteroscedasticity is used. Standard errors are in brackets denoting *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%
significance. Detailed variable definitions are given in the data appendix.
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Table 9: ICI Coefficients with Equal and Unequal Weights
IV Estimation
Conditional ICI Unconditional ICI
Dependent Variable: Probability of
Exporting
Equal PCA Equal PCA
(1) (2) (3) (4)
logTFP 0.303* 0.263 0.256 0.253
[0.166] [0.162] [0.159] [0.155]
Infrastructure (positive) 0.297*** 0.148*** 0.300*** 0.151***
[0.108] [0.0560] [0.104] [0.0551]
Red tape, corruption and crime (negative) -0.854*** -0.290*** -0.480* -0.450***
[0.263] [0.101] [0.247] [0.174]
Quality, innovation and labor skills
(positive)
0.533*** 0.275*** 0.494*** 0.308***
[0.132] [0.0739] [0.160] [0.0874]
Age -0.0690** -0.0608** -0.0665** -0.0630**
[0.0309] [0.0305] [0.0302] [0.0298]
Dummy for medium-size firms 0.113* 0.116* 0.128** 0.120**
[0.0622] [0.0596] [0.0577] [0.0580]
Dummy for large-size firms 0.286*** 0.275*** 0.294*** 0.285***
[0.0591] [0.0566] [0.0544] [0.0555]
Constant term -0.32 -0.218 -0.201 -0.151
[0.354] [0.337] [0.336] [0.321]
First Stage R-squared: productivity 0.0284 0.0289 0.0306 0.0309
Partial R-squared: productivity 0.0167 0.017 0.0178 0.0177
First-stage F-statistics 10.7 11.07 10.98 11.23
First-Stage F-test  (p-value) 0.0001 0 0.0001 0
Hansen test (p-value) 0.8748 0.9016 0.9186 0.8865
Observations 636 636 636 636
Notes: Instrumenting for TFP using domestic shipment losses and dummy for informal competitors.
Only missing values from these variables are replaced by the corresponding region-industry-size average
to avoid facing an omitted variables problem. Instruments evaluation is the same for Table 7. Each
regression includes a set of industry and region dummies. White's correction of heteroscedasticity is
used. Standard errors are in brackets denoting *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance. Detailed variable
definitions are given in the data appendix.
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Table 10: ICI Coefficients with Aggregate Indices
IV Estimation
Conditional ICI Unconditional ICI
Dependent Variable: Probability of
Exporting
All Firms Small & Medium All Firms Small & Medium
(1) (2) (3) (4)
logTFP 0.131 0.128 0.0815 0.056
[0.157] [0.170] [0.159] [0.148]
Investment Climate (positive) 1.116*** 1.167*** 0.964*** 1.032***
[0.220] [0.289] [0.225] [0.287]
Investment Climate (negative) -0.576*** -0.726*** -0.700** -0.881***
[0.200] [0.226] [0.280] [0.316]
Age -0.0434 -0.0532 -0.0424 -0.0492
[0.0308] [0.0340] [0.0307] [0.0327]
Dummy for medium-size firms 0.125** 0.125** 0.149*** 0.154***
[0.0523] [0.0557] [0.0508] [0.0531]
Dummy for large-size firms 0.254*** 0.283***
[0.0547] [0.0516]
Constant term 0.0208 0.139 0.197 0.354
[0.321] [0.359] [0.325] [0.311]
First Stage R-squared: productivity 0.0305 0.0281 0.0309 0.0305
Partial R-squared: productivity 0.0168 0.0192 0.0152 0.0211
First-stage F-statistics 10.95 6.38 10.07 6.26
First-Stage F-test  (p-value) 0.0001 0.0031 0.0001 0.0034
Hansen test (p-value) 0.6746 0.6929 0.7011 0.6527
Observations 636 395 636 395
Notes: Instrumenting for TFP using domestic shipment losses and dummy for informal competitors. Only missing
values from these variables are replaced by the corresponding region-industry-size average to avoid facing an
omitted variables problem. Instruments evaluation is the same for Table 7. Each regression includes a set of industry
and region dummies. White's correction of heteroscedasticity is used. Standard errors are in brackets denoting ***
1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance. Detailed variable definitions are given in the data appendix.
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Table 11: IC Linear Probability Model Coefficients with respect to the Probability of Exporting
IV Estimation OLS
Estimation
Coefficient %
Contrib
% Contrib of
group
Coefficient
Blocks Explanatory IC variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
logTFP 0.253 116.95 40.5 0.0513***
Infrastructure Dummy for web page 0.133** 25.40 17.2 0.148***
Days of inventory 0.0324* 24.36 0.0299**
Red tape, corruption
and crime
Number of inspections -0.0467** -9.63 8.5 -0.0404*
Dummy for payments to obtain a
contract with the government
-0.221*** -8.48 -0.150***
Days spent for obtaining compulsory
certificates
-0.0265** -6.53 -0.0266**
Finance and corporate
governance
New fixed assets financed by equity 0.00229 1.83 2.7 0.00296**
Dummy for land, buildings as collateral 0.106*** 6.05 0.0687*
Quality, innovation and
labor skills
Dummy for quality certification 0.204*** 22.17 12 0.191***
Dummy for new product 0.113*** 12.56 0.0823**
Other control variables Dummy for increased prices -0.0818* -5.41 15.8 -0.0949**
Age of the firm -0.0567* -37.29 -0.0381
Dummy for large firm 0.211*** 12.00 0.216***
Constant term -0.275 0.133
Instruments evaluation First Stage R-squared: productivity 0.0499
Partial R-squared: productivity 0.0161
First-stage F-statistics 9.92
First-Stage F-test  (p-value) 0.0001
Hansen test (p-value) 0.8518
R-squared 0.23
Observations 636 636
Notes: Instrumenting for TFP using domestic shipment losses and dummy for informal competitors. Only missing values from these variables are
replaced by the corresponding region-industry-size average to avoid facing an omitted variables problem. Instruments evaluation is the same for
Table 7. Each regression includes a set of industry and region dummies. White's correction of heteroscedasticity is used. Stars are denoting ***
1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance levels. Detailed variable definitions are given in the data appendix.
Table 12: Percentage IC Contribution to the Exporting Frequency
of IC Groups: A Comparison of the Two Approaches
Individual IC
Variables
ICI by
GroupsIC Blocks
Productivity 40.5 48.8
Infrastructure 17.2 17.2
Red tape, corruption and crime 8.5 6.3
Finance and corporate governance 2.7 0
Quality, innovation and labor skills 12 9.6
Other control variables 15.8 18
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Table 13: Spearman Rank Correlation between Indices
ICI GCI ICRG DBI
ICI 1
GCI 0.5217*** 1
ICRG 0.5001*** 0.733 1
DBI 0.3673*** 0.6636 0.6012 1
Observations 62
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 14: Rankings of Countries according to the ICI and its Subindices
Country
Infrastructure
Red tape
and
corruption
Finance
Innovation
and labor
skills
Total
Guyana 0.7894654 0.8990509 0.585 0.537037 0.634936
Slovenia 0.6792845 0.9351889 0.6224 0.5648887 0.62967
Chile 0.7296028 0.9261248 0.6015 0.5444712 0.625925
Czech Republic 0.6807972 0.9086287 0.5998 0.5787812 0.625482
Ecuador 0.7096545 0.9255832 0.622 0.5751119 0.624904
Colombia 0.7040558 0.9244803 0.6195714 0.5456553 0.622292
Croatia 0.7034525 0.94183 0.6 0.5640502 0.621168
Argentina 0.726241 0.9135035 0.588 0.5443362 0.621013
Poland 0.6869853 0.9152731 0.5670108 0.5947555 0.618747
Estonia 0.6667966 0.9225253 0.6173 0.5755953 0.614816
Peru 0.7057098 0.9231892 0.604 0.5452037 0.61479
Turkey 0.7112421 0.9351754 0.596 0.5364646 0.614316
Latvia 0.6701064 0.894661 0.6198 0.5804012 0.613104
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.6809828 0.9238241 0.5695 0.5923182 0.612457
Dominican Republic 0.7016622 0.916857 0.604525 0.5228959 0.611011
Serbia 0.6858494 0.9143485 0.591 0.5633558 0.608454
Fyr Macedonia 0.6504564 0.9052032 0.5685 0.5842535 0.605597
Russia 0.711217 0.8962314 0.564 0.5643944 0.605593
Bahamas 0.6968975 0.9264665 0.5466175 0.5355556 0.604439
Vietnam 0.6857625 0.9304736 0.6 0.5646329 0.604287
Philippines 0.6961904 0.9272999 0.555 0.578018 0.602426
Lithuania 0.6759816 0.9237976 0.5984 0.547949 0.602248
Mexico 0.7031558 0.9341671 0.55 0.558547 0.601943
Brazil 0.7054408 0.9232257 0.570069 0.55589 0.601495
Slovak Republic 0.6590248 0.8946557 0.5709 0.5873179 0.601365
Elsalvador 0.6645083 0.9094743 0.60875 0.5419145 0.601325
Bolivia 0.6602454 0.9091331 0.6181543 0.5198613 0.601144
Paraguay 0.6844924 0.9026225 0.6 0.5281717 0.599207
Costarica 0.6916927 0.9275377 0.58 0.5195976 0.598879
Hungary 0.6656334 0.9197698 0.58 0.5300255 0.59696
St Kitts and Nevis 0.6711749 0.9083305 0.5715 0.5333334 0.59392
Albania 0.6693135 0.8950986 0.565 0.5324842 0.593845
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Barbados 0.6698538 0.9058695 0.5740161 0.5344445 0.592329
Romania 0.6537439 0.8989018 0.5773063 0.5675368 0.589511
Uruguay 0.6883852 0.919594 0.57 0.5296116 0.588971
Bulgaria 0.6631342 0.9022685 0.5526667 0.5726284 0.588842
Grenada 0.6621678 0.9046699 0.565 0.5361111 0.588377
Guatemala 0.6645053 0.9217215 0.5505385 0.5499458 0.585995
South Africa 0.6665528 0.920534 0.54 0.5303262 0.582017
Tonga 0.5995756 0.8687843 0.6283559 0.5369444 0.581633
Kenya 0.6322834 0.8767036 0.585 0.5630367 0.581599
Micronesia 0.5256476 0.8736711 0.5703503 0.5466667 0.578473
Honduras 0.650265 0.9193135 0.5675 0.5594358 0.578305
Nicaragua 0.5876336 0.9211655 0.5596795 0.5574405 0.576348
Mauritius 0.6112117 0.9439216 0.583 0.5237756 0.575865
Botswana 0.5894086 0.891585 0.61 0.5260261 0.574892
Jamaica 0.6391713 0.8913515 0.5666667 0.5115178 0.573986
St Vincent and Grenadines 0.5814285 0.9350739 0.5712758 0.5341667 0.573714
Rwanda 0.6234248 0.8822743 0.5965 0.4785543 0.572305
Niger 0.6370884 0.8794154 0.545 0.5197917 0.570611
Belarus 0.5967335 0.9182495 0.5481429 0.5693274 0.568182
Moldova 0.6009712 0.8962274 0.5491667 0.5577469 0.567534
Ukraine 0.6018839 0.9170547 0.51 0.5686193 0.565691
Afghanistan 0.651788 0.9185866 0.5215454 0.5282161 0.565667
Kazakhstan 0.5892674 0.9088655 0.515 0.559691 0.563999
Venezuela 0.600096 0.883818 0.565 0.5178818 0.561485
Malawi 0.5586425 0.8728513 0.547125 0.5302777 0.560521
Benin 0.6238601 0.8493648 0.5105 0.5208334 0.56029
Fiji 0.5686102 0.8919117 0.56 0.5416667 0.560097
Panama 0.6335775 0.9238169 0.5 0.5440623 0.559743
Cameroon 0.5831461 0.8749545 0.5402273 0.5130274 0.55875
Vanuatu 0.5653577 0.8644102 0.57625 0.5340278 0.557897
Bhutan 0.554928 0.9160115 0.5792063 0.5225225 0.557683
Togo 0.6207912 0.8870055 0.492 0.5305555 0.554715
Armenia 0.6312351 0.9121088 0.537 0.5262753 0.553016
Congo 0.6705996 0.8284926 0.5149 0.5412037 0.552765
Belize 0.5792751 0.8825079 0.5553375 0.5127924 0.552723
Burkina Faso 0.563612 0.8848812 0.53 0.513519 0.552624
Namibia 0.5939564 0.8946874 0.56 0.4765198 0.552533
Trinidad and Tobago 0.5871935 0.8880042 0.58 0.4658417 0.551668
Georgia 0.561684 0.9244187 0.5244445 0.5551606 0.550552
Kosovo 0.586853 0.8843137 0.51 0.5123618 0.54986
Nepal 0.5425733 0.9000008 0.615 0.4765889 0.549079
Samoa 0.5396569 0.8594653 0.59 0.5534722 0.546292
Continued on next page
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Madagascar 0.5710714 0.9141715 0.4964118 0.5437328 0.546084
Antigua and Barbuda 0.4838628 0.8981389 0.557 0.5099207 0.540853
Cape Verde 0.5344235 0.9212963 0.515 0.5329458 0.540683
Lesotho 0.5302442 0.8861111 0.5398333 0.5333334 0.539499
Swaziland 0.5623612 0.8737578 0.5406333 0.4731153 0.537605
Suriname 0.5185884 0.8936105 0.5590395 0.5099207 0.536613
Liberia 0.5922636 0.8597817 0.5263333 0.5115741 0.536103
Chad 0.5876017 0.8500788 0.4719149 0.5366161 0.536009
Nigeria 0.5990841 0.8866508 0.4 0.5411335 0.532108
LaoPDR 0.5595679 0.8942685 0.4811364 0.5416667 0.531918
Angola 0.5457026 0.8818889 0.4815909 0.5348786 0.526683
Tanzania 0.5347067 0.8767864 0.48775 0.5397042 0.52428
Eritrea 0.4833598 0.963745 0.53 0.5106838 0.523726
Gambia 0.5293368 0.8709173 0.48835 0.5100729 0.523086
Bangladesh 0.5695032 0.896106 0.28 0.5972885 0.519693
St Lucia 0.4738749 0.9225607 0.5329286 0.5078347 0.517785
Zambia 0.5403762 0.9230805 0.4825 0.5144476 0.51627
Senegal 0.5431378 0.9221576 0.46 0.5236652 0.516113
Azerbaijan 0.5285008 0.8963866 0.4876667 0.5425601 0.516058
Indonesia 0.4827239 0.9647053 0.4762 0.5582711 0.514313
Mali 0.4865268 0.8908525 0.5012698 0.5567811 0.512866
Tajikistan 0.5278735 0.9137115 0.502 0.5298569 0.509582
Dominica 0.4621002 0.9234215 0.536 0.5069444 0.509462
Yemen 0.489736 0.9098639 0.5167824 0.5180225 0.509192
Uzbekistan 0.4423354 0.9269508 0.4856 0.5457069 0.509123
Guinea Bissau 0.6070178 0.8510936 0.4193333 0.4309685 0.504072
Sierra Leone 0.4965252 0.8865358 0.4505 0.5392361 0.503481
Montenegro 0.5 1 0.5 0.5 0.5
DRC 0.5100723 0.8685172 0.4582143 0.5053358 0.497848
Kyrgyz Republic 0.4638889 0.8996868 0.48 0.5375846 0.497714
Guinea 0.5380668 0.8778368 0.44 0.4948482 0.496792
Ivory Coast 0.4610129 0.9002581 0.435 0.5579947 0.494981
Timor Leste 0.4251139 0.9283362 0.5008333 0.5285714 0.490832
Pakistan 0.4504964 0.9036003 0.46 0.5227513 0.490828
Mozambique 0.474333 0.9261494 0.4185 0.5459922 0.487961
Uganda 0.412659 0.8953328 0.47 0.4953086 0.48429
Burundi 0.4706229 0.8597828 0.484 0.4385263 0.481839
Ghana 0.3800654 0.922259 0.46 0.5455524 0.478372
Gabon 0.4267196 0.8643359 0.4986282 0.5121212 0.4736
Mongolia 0.4911383 0.9863055 0.2265 0.5471094 0.456704
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Table 15: Firm-Level Descriptive Statistics by IC Groups
Small Firms Medium Firms Large Firms
IC Groups Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
Investment climate .5609 .0822 .6156 .0838 .6573 .0722
Infrastructure .6025 .2108 .7493 .2060 .8489 .1557
Red tape, corruption and crime .9201 .0471 .9073 .0461 .8994 .0446
Finance .5307 .0845 .5393 .0981 .5346 .1210
Quality, innovation and labor skills .5265 .0705 .5321 .0759 .5573 .0792
Observations 11,091 9,662 6,871
Notes: Small firms have less than 20 employees, medium firms have between 20 and 99 employees, and large
firms have 100 or more employees. Investment climate (IC) is on a scale from 0 to 1, where a higher score
means better investment climate. Infrastructure; corruption and crime; finance and quality, innovation and
labor skills are components of IC. They are on a scale from 0 to 1, where a higher score means a better
corresponding index.
B.2 Variables of the Investment climate (IC) Survey
B.2.1 Production Function Variables
Sales: Used as the measure of output for the production function estimation.
Sales are dened as total annual sales. The series are deated by using the Producer
Price Indexes (PPI), base 2003.
Employment : Total number of permanent and temporal workers.
Total hours worked per year : Total number of employees multiplied by the average
hours worked per year.
Materials: Total costs of intermediate and raw materials used in production (ex-
cluding fuel). The series are deated by using the Producer Price Indexes (PPI), base
2003.
Capital stock : Net book value of machinery and equipment. The series are deated
by using the Producer Price Indexes (PPI), base 2003.
User cost of capital : The user cost of capital is dened in terms of the opportunity
cost of using capital; it is dened as a 15% of the net book value of machinery and
equipment.
Labor cost : Total expenditures on personnel. The series are deated by using the
Producer Price Indexes (PPI), base 2003.
B.2.2 Infrastructures Variables
Days to clear customs to export : Average number of days to clear customs to
export (log).
Days to clear customs to import : Average number of days to clear customs to
imports (log).
Dummy for power outages: Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant has
su¤ered any power outages during last year.
Number of power outages: Number of power outages su¤ered by the plant in last
year (log).
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Average duration of power outages: Average duration of power outages su¤ered by
the plant in hours (log).
Total duration of power outages by year : Total duration of power outages su¤ered
by the plant by month, in hours, conditional on the plat reports having power outages.
Losses due to power outages: Value of the losses due to the power outages as a
percentage of sales (conditional on the plant reporting power outages).
Wait for a power supply : Current delay to obtain a power supply in days (log).
Dummy for own generator : Dummy variable taking value 1 if the rm has its own
power generator.
Electricity from a generator : Percent of the electricity used by the plat provided
by a own generator.
Dummy for insu¢ cient water supply : Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the
rm has experienced insu¢ cient water supply for production during last year.
Water outages: Number of water outages su¤ered by the plant in last year (log).
Average duration of water outages: Average duration of water outages su¤ered by
the plant in hours (log).
Total duration of water outages by year : Total duration of water outages su¤ered
by the plant by month in hours, conditional on the plant reports having water outages.
Wait for a water supply : Current delay to obtain a water connection in days (log).
Wait for a phone connection: Current delay to obtain a phone connection in days
(log).
Dummy for webpage: Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant has a website.
Dummy for e-mail : Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant uses email.
Shipment losses, exports: Fraction of the value of the plants average cargo con-
signment that was lost in transit due to breakage, theft or spoilage in the international
market.
Shipment losses, domestic: Fraction of the value of the plants average cargo con-
signment that was lost in transit due to breakage, theft or spoilage in the domestic
market.
Days of inventory of main input : Number of days of inventory of the main input
(log).
Wait for an import license: Current delay to obtain an import license related in
days (log).
B.2.3 Red tape, Corruption and Crime Variables
Dummy for conicts with clients with a court involved : Dummy variable that
takes value 1 if the conict of the rm with clients solved in courts were generally
enforced.
Managers time spent in bureaucratic issues: Percentage of managerstime spent
in dealing with bureaucratic issues.
Weeks to bureaucracy : Managerstime spent in dealing with bureaucratic issues
in weeks (log).
Number of inspections: In the last year, total number of inspections (log).
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Number of working days spent with inspections: Number of working days spent
with inspections (log).
Dummy for tax inspections: Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the rm has
been visited by tax o¢ cials during last year.
Number of tax inspections: Total number of inspections of tax o¢ cials received by
the plant in 2007 (log).
Number of working days spent with tax inspections: Number of working days spent
with tax inspections (log).
Dummy for gifts in tax inspections: Gifts expected or requested in inspections with
tax o¢ cials.
Dummy for payments to obtain a contract with the government : Dummy variable
that takes value 1 if in plants sector it is common to pay an extra amount of money
in order to obtain a contract with the government.
Payments to obtain a contract with the government : Illegal payment in order to
obtain a contract with the government. Related as percentage of contract value.
Dummy for payments to deal with bureaucratic issues: Dummy that takes value 1
if rms in the main sector occasionally need to give gifts or make informal payments
to public o¢ cers in order to get things donewith regard to customs, taxes, licenses,
legislations, services, etc.
Wait for an operation license: Actual delay to obtain a main operating license in
days (log).
Dummy for gifts to obtain an operating license: Gifts expected or requested to
obtain an operating license, conditional on submit an operating license.
Dummy for security expenses: Dummy taking value 1 if the plant has security
expenses.
Security expenses: Cost in security (equipment, sta¤, etc) (log).
Dummy for crime losses: Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant su¤ered
any criminal attempt during last year.
Crime losses: Value of losses due to criminal activity (log).
Wait for a construction permit : Actual delay to obtain a construction related in
days (log).
Dummy for gifts to obtain a construction permit : Gifts expected or requested to
obtain a construction permit, conditional on submit a construction permit.
Number of permits: Number of permits obtained in last two years (log).
Validity of permits: Average validity, in months, of permits obtained (log).
Time spent with permits: Number of working days spent in obtaining all permits
(log).
Wait for a permit : Days waiting for obtaining a permit (log).
Dummy for gift to obtain a permit : Gifts expected or requested to obtain a permit,
conditional on submit a permit.
Dummy for compulsory certicate: Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the rm
has to have any compulsory certicate to produce or sell any product.
Sales with compulsory certicates: Percentage of sales subject to compulsory cer-
ticates.
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Number of compulsory certicates: Number of compulsory certicates obtained
(log).
Time spent with compulsory certicates: Number of working days spent when
obtaining compulsory certicates (log).
Wait for compulsory certicate: Days waiting for obtaining compulsory certicates
(log).
Dummy for gift to obtain compulsory certicates: Gifts expected or requested to
obtain a compulsory certicate, conditional on submit a compulsory certicate.
Dummy for gifts to obtain a power supply : Dummy variable that takes value 1
if gifts are expected or requested to obtain an electrical connection, conditional on
submit an electrical connection.
Dummy for gifts to obtain a water supply : Dummy variable that takes value 1
if gifts are expected or requested to obtain a phone supply, conditional on submit a
phone connection.
Dummy for gifts to obtain a phone connection: Dummy variable that takes value
1 if gifts are expected or requested to obtain a phone supply, conditional on submit a
phone connection.
Dummy for gifts to obtain an import license: Gifts expected or requested to obtain
an import license, conditional on submit an import license.
B.2.4 Finance and Corporate Governance Variables
Dummy for purchases paid after delivery : Dummy variable that takes value 1 if
any percentage of annual purchases are paid for after the delivery.
Purchases paid after delivery : Percentage of annual purchases paid for after the
delivery.
Sales paid before delivery : Percentage of annual sales paid for before the delivery.
Sales paid on delivery : Percentage of annual sales paid for before the delivery.
Sales paid after delivery : Percentage of annual sales paid for after the delivery.
Dummy for purchase xed assets: Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the rm
has purchaser xed assets during last year.
New xed assets nanced by internal founds: Percentage of rms working capital
nanced with funds from informal sources.
New xed assets nanced by equity : Percentage of rms working capital nanced
with funds from equity.
New xed assets nanced by private banks: Percentage of investments in new xed
assets nanced with funds from private commercial banks.
New xed assets nanced by state-owned banks: Percentage of investments in new
xed assets nanced with funds state owned banks.
New xed assets nanced by trade credit : Percentage of investments in new xed
assets nanced with credits from suppliers.
Dummy for checking or saving account : Dummy that takes value 1 if the rm has
a saving account
Dummy for overdraft facility : Dummy that takes value 1 if the rm has access to
an overdraft facility.
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Dummy for loan: Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant reports that it
has a bank loan.
Dummy for loan from state-owned banks: Dummy variable that takes value 1 if
the rm has a loan from a state owned banks.
Dummy for loan from private banks: Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the rm
has a loan from a domestic private commercial banks.
Dummy for loan from non-nancial institutions: Dummy variable that takes value
1 if the rm has a loan from a non-nancial institutions.
Dummy for loan with collateral : Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the loan is
on collateral.
Value of the collateral : Value of the collateral as a percentage of the loan value
(conditional on having a loan with collateral).
Dummy for land, buildings as collateral : Dummy that takes value 1 if the rm uses
land or buildings as collateral (conditional on having a loan with collateral).
Dummy for machinery and equipment as collateral : Dummy that takes value 1 if
the rm uses machinery or equipment as collateral (conditional on having a loan with
collateral).
Dummy for accounts receivable and inventories as collateral : Dummy that takes
value 1 if the rm uses accounts receivable or inventories as collateral (conditional on
having a loan with collateral).
Dummy for personal assets as collateral : Dummy that takes value 1 if the rm
uses personal assets as collateral (conditional on having a loan with collateral).
Dummy no loan because of complexity : Dummy that takes value 1 if the rm did
not apply for loan because of its complexity.
Dummy no loan because of cost : Dummy that takes value 1 if the rm did not
apply for loan because of its cost.
Dummy no loan because of collateral : Dummy that takes value 1 if the rm did
not apply for loan because of its cost.
Dummy for rejected credit applications: Dummy variable that takes value 1 if a
credit application has been rejected in the last year.
Dummy for external auditory : Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant uses
an external auditory.
Largest shareholder : Percentage of rms capital owned by the largest shareholder.
Dummy for subsidy : Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the rm receives any
subsides from the national, regional and local government or EU.
B.2.5 Quality, Innovation, and Labor Skills
Dummy for quality certication: Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant
has a quality certication.
Dummy for foreign technology : Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the rm used
a licensed technology of a foreign company in the last year.
Dummy for new line of products: Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant
has developed a new product or product line.
Sales of new products: Percentage of total sales corresponding with new products.
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Dummy for R&D : Dummy that takes value 1 if the rm performed R&D activities
during last year.
R&D expenditures as % of total sales: Total R&D expenditures as percentage of
annual sales.
Sta¤ with computer : Percentage of sta¤ using computer at job.
Dummy for outsourcing : Dummy taking value 1 if the plant subcontracts any part
of the activity.
Dummy for discontinued : Dummy taking value 1 if the plant has discontinued at
least one product line.
Dummy for product upgraded : Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant
upgraded an existing product last year.
Sta¤ - production workers: Percentage of production workers in sta¤.
Sta¤ - nonproduction workers: Percentage of nonproduction workers in sta¤.
Sta¤ - female workers: Percentage of female workers in rms sta¤.
Sta¤ - skilled workers: Percentage of skilled workers in rms sta¤.
Sta¤ - unskilled workers: Percentage of unskilled workers in rms sta¤.
Sta¤ - university education: Percentage of sta¤with at least one year of university.
Dummy for training : Dummy taking value one if the rm provides formal (beyond
on the job) training to its employees.
Training to production workers: Percentage of production workers receiving formal
(beyond on the job) training.
Training to non-production workers: Percentage of non-production workers receiv-
ing formal (beyond on the job) training.
Experience of the manager: Number of years of experience of the manager in the
establishments sector (log).
B.2.6 Other Control Variables
Age: Di¤erence between the year that the plant started operations and current
year.
Dummy for incorporated company : Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant
is an incorporated company.
Dummy for limited company : Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant is a
limited company.
Dummy for FDI : Dummy variable that takes value 1 if any part of the capital of
the rm is foreign.
Dummy for state-owned rm: Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the rm belongs
to the government.
Dummy for importer : Dummy variable that takes value 1 if imports are greater
than 10%.
Share of imports: Share of imported inputs over total purchases of intermediate
materials.
Dummy for exporter : Dummy variable that takes value 1 if exports are greater
than 10%.
Share of exports: Share of exports over total annual sales.
Exporting experience: Number of years of exporting experience (log).
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Capacity utilization: Average percentage of capacity used during last year.
Dummy for local monopoly : Dummy taking value one if the rm is a local monopoly.
Dummy for less that 5 competitors: Dummy taking value one if the plant has more
or equal than 5 competitors in the local market.
Dummy for more than 5 competitors: Dummy taking value one if the plant has
less than 5 competitors in the local market.
Dummy for increased sales: Dummy taking value 1 if the plant has increased its
sales.
Dummy for decreased sales: Dummy taking value 1 if the plant has decreased its
sales.
Dummy for increased prices: Dummy taking value 1 if the plant has increased its
prices.
Dummy for decreased prices: Dummy taking value 1 if the plant has decreased its
prices.
Dummy for informal competition: Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the rm
competes with informal (no registered) rms.
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Figure 2: Percentage Contribution of IC Groups for Selection Part
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Table 1: Infrastructure-related Factors Adversely Effecting Turkey’s Competitiveness
Turkey Poland Czech Rep. Hungary
Share of high technology export (%, 2006) 1.5 3.81 14.1 23.99
Ratio of illiterates (%, + 15 age, 2005) 12.6 1 1 1
Pupil/teacher ratio in primary education (%, 2005) 25.8 11.66 17.53 10.61
Telecommunication investments (ratio to GDP, 2006) 0.22 0.72 0.44 0.37
Number of internet users (per 1000 population, 2007) 241 413 587 443
Electricity cost in industry ($/kwh, 2006) 0.1 0.073 0.094 0.105
Human Development Index (2005) 0.78 0.87 0.89 0.87
Number of computers (per 1000 population, 2007) 83 260 375 306
Life expectancy at birth (2005) 71.5 75 76 73
R&D investments (USD per capita, 2006) 39.7 49.8 215.1 112.1
Source: Izmen and Yilmaz, 2009
Table 2: Evidence on Relative Productivity of Exporters and Multinationals
Exporters vs.
Non-exporters
MNEs vs.
ExportersAuthors Sample Methodology
Arnold and Hussinger (2005b) Germany, 1996–2002 K-S tests of stochastic
dominance
+ +
Castellani and Zanfei (2007) Italy, 1994–96 OLS 0 +
Girma, Görg and Strobl (2004) Ireland, 2000 K-S tests of stochastic
dominance
0 +
Girma et al. (2005a) UK, 1990–95 K-S tests of stochastic
dominance
+ +
Head and Ries (2003) Japan, 1989 OLS 0 0
Kimura and Kiyota (2004) Japan, 1994–2000 OLS + +
Wagner (2005) Germany,1995 K-S tests of stochastic
dominance
+ +
Source: Greenaway and Kneller (2007)
Notes: + the effect is positive and significant, - the effect is negative and significant, 0 the effect is insignificant and/or changes
sign and/or significance through the paper.
Table 3: Percentage of Firms that Export by Size in Turkey
Size Small Medium Large Total
Number of employees (1-19) (20-99) (100+)
21.94 47.64 63.52 47.48
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Table 4: Probit Estimation of Probability of Export
Restricted Solow Residual Unrestricted Solow Residual
Dependent Variable: Probability of Exporting
Probit Probit with
Marginal Effect
Probit Probit with
Marginal Effect
Blocks Explanatory IC Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Productivity 0.151** 0.0598** 0.150** 0.0593**
[0.0624] [0.0247] [0.0612] [0.0242]
Infrastructures Dummy for webpage 0.449*** 0.172*** 0.449*** 0.172***
[0.169] [0.0609] [0.169] [0.0610]
Days of inventory of main input 0.104** 0.0414** 0.104** 0.0414**
[0.0467] [0.0186] [0.0467] [0.0186]
Wait for an import license -0.241*** -0.0955*** -0.241*** -0.0954***
[0.0830] [0.0330] [0.0831] [0.0331]
Red tape, corruption
and crime
Dummy for conflicts with clients with a
court involved
-0.204* -0.0811* -0.203* -0.0806*
[0.115] [0.0456] [0.115] [0.0456]
Dummy for payments to obtain a contract
with the government
-0.436*** -0.167*** -0.439*** -0.168***
[0.157] [0.0565] [0.157] [0.0566]
Finance and
corporate
governance
New fixed assets financed by equity 0.0119** 0.00470** 0.0119** 0.00473**
[0.00466] [0.00185] [0.00467] [0.00185]
Quality, innovation
and labor skills
Dummy for quality certification 0.521*** 0.204*** 0.522*** 0.205***
[0.129] [0.0492] [0.129] [0.0491]
Other control
variables
Dummy for importer 0.280** 0.111** 0.280** 0.111**
[0.137] [0.0542] [0.137] [0.0542]
Dummy for increased prices -0.298** -0.117** -0.299** -0.117**
[0.139] [0.0535] [0.139] [0.0534]
Dummy for medium-size firms 0.424*** 0.168*** 0.426*** 0.168***
[0.140] [0.0545] [0.140] [0.0545]
Dummy for large-size firms 0.705*** 0.276*** 0.706*** 0.276***
[0.167] [0.0627] [0.167] [0.0627]
R-squared 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19
Observations 640 640 640 640
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. Region and industry dummies and the constant term are not reported. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 5: Heckman MLE Estimation of Export Equation
Restricted Solow
Residual
Unrestricted
Solow Residual
Outcome Stage: Export Share (1) (2)
Blocks Explanatory IC variables
Productivity 0.650*** 0.665***
[0.0888] [0.0877]
Infrastructures Total duration of water outages by year -0.0684 -0.0667
[0.0457] [0.0451]
Red tape, corruption
and crime
Weeks to bureaucracy -0.000110** -0.000112**
[4.57e-05] [4.58e-05]
Finance and
corporate governance
New fixed assets financed by private banks 0.00399* 0.00402*
[0.00211] [0.00212]
Dummy for external auditory 0.320*** 0.323***
[0.124] [0.123]
Quality, innovation
and labor skills
Dummy for outsourcing 0.319*** 0.315***
[0.121] [0.120]
Staff - female workers -0.00608** -0.00576*
[0.00308] [0.00308]
Other control
variables
Exporting experience 0.862*** 0.858***
[0.0727] [0.0725]
Capacity utilization 0.0102*** 0.0101***
[0.00298] [0.00296]
Dummy for more than 5 competitors 0.420*** 0.420***
[0.141] [0.140]
Dummy for decreased sales -0.760*** -0.759***
[0.179] [0.177]
Dummy for medium-size firms 0.989*** 0.980***
[0.227] [0.225]
Dummy for large-size firms 2.035*** 2.039***
[0.284] [0.278]
Table continues to next page.
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Selection Stage: Export Decision
Blocks Explanatory IC variables
Productivity 0.0991* 0.099*
[0.0601] [0.0616]
Infrastructures Dummy for webpage 0.448*** 0.452***
[0.151] [0.150]
Days of inventory of main input 0.133*** 0.133***
[0.0419] [0.0418]
Wait for an import license -0.201*** -0.199***
[0.0717] [0.0713]
Red tape, corruption
and crime
Dummy for conflicts with clients with a court
involved
-0.250** -0.253**
[0.115] [0.114]
Dummy for payments to obtain a contract
with the government
-0.458*** -0.451***
[0.151] [0.151]
Finance and
corporate governance
New fixed assets financed by equity 0.00974** 0.00958**
[0.00424] [0.00422]
Quality, innovation
and labor skills
Dummy for quality certification 0.566*** 0.566***
[0.128] [0.127]
Staff with computer 0.00652*** 0.00644***
[0.00240] [0.00240]
Other control
variables
Dummy for importer 0.435*** 0.432***
[0.126] [0.126]
Dummy for increased prices -0.314*** -0.311***
[0.120] [0.120]
Dummy for medium-size firms 0.555*** 0.553***
[0.131] [0.131]
Dummy for large-size firms 0.970*** 0.970***
[0.149] [0.149]
ρ -0.682*** -0.688***
[0.139] [0.136]
λ -0.872*** -0.878***
[0.238] [0.234]
Observations 640 640
Censored observations 269 269
Uncensored observations 371 371
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. Region and industry dummies and the constant term are not reported. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 6: Heckman MLE Estimation of Export Equation
All Firms Small &
Medium
Large
Firms
Outcome Stage: Export Share (1) (2) (3)
Blocks Explanatory IC variables
Productivity 0.311*** 0.223* 0.302***
[0.0779] [0.119] [0.110]
Infrastructures Total duration of water outages by year -0.102*** -0.0738 -0.129***
[0.0367] [0.0479] [0.0416]
Red tape, corruption
and crime
Weeks to bureaucracy -7.75e-05* -0.0000771 -0.0000605
[4.12e-05] [5.90e-05] [5.14e-05]
Finance and
corporate
governance
New fixed assets financed by private banks 0.00189 0.00472** -0.00196
[0.00203] [0.00238] [0.00281]
Dummy for external auditory 0.295** 0.625*** -0.0291
[0.144] [0.188] [0.138]
Quality, innovation
and labor skills
Dummy for outsourcing 0.403*** 0.341* 0.225
[0.148] [0.191] [0.170]
Staff - female workers -0.00484 -0.00308 -0.0063
[0.00337] [0.00463] [0.00399]
Other control
variables
Exporting experience 0.842*** 0.692*** 0.986***
[0.0690] [0.102] [0.0807]
Capacity utilization 0.00804** 0.00485 0.0173***
[0.00341] [0.00442] [0.00419]
Dummy for more than 5 competitors 0.330** 0.239 0.373**
[0.158] [0.204] [0.189]
Dummy for decreased sales -0.931*** -0.880*** -0.824***
[0.172] [0.246] [0.253]
Dummy for medium-size firms 0.844*** 0.809***
[0.253] [0.266]
Dummy for large-size firms 1.397***
[0.324]
Table continues to next page.
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Selection Stage: Export Decision
Blocks Explanatory IC variables
Productivity 0.105** 0.166*** 0.00799
[0.0414] [0.0613] [0.108]
Infrastructures Dummy for webpage 0.441*** 0.338** 1.183***
[0.168] [0.170] [0.378]
Days of inventory of main input 0.0968** 0.108* 0.0894
[0.0487] [0.0562] [0.0937]
Wait for an import license -0.222*** -0.186* -0.493***
[0.0780] [0.0994] [0.116]
Red tape, corruption
and crime
Dummy for conflicts with clients with a court
involved
-0.274** -0.250* -0.0319
[0.123] [0.145] [0.214]
Dummy for payments to obtain a contract
with the government
-0.267 -0.263 -0.662***
[0.170] [0.195] [0.247]
Finance and
corporate governance
New fixed assets financed by equity 0.00913** 0.00868* 0.013
[0.00418] [0.00477] [0.00957]
Quality, innovation
and labor skills
Dummy for quality certification 0.498*** 0.564*** 0.0478
[0.136] [0.155] [0.233]
Staff with computer 0.00790*** 0.00729* 0.0133**
[0.00284] [0.00437] [0.00649]
Other control
variables
Dummy for importer 0.405*** 0.465** 0.289
[0.136] [0.189] [0.215]
Dummy for increased prices -0.393*** -0.408** -0.602**
[0.147] [0.164] [0.303]
Dummy for medium-size firms 0.561*** 0.485***
[0.151] [0.162]
Dummy for large-size firms 0.756***
[0.210]
ρ -0.304 -0.528** -0.658**
[0.235] [0.223] [0.249]
λ -0.381 -0.695** -0.769***
[0.282] [0.361] [0.377]
Observations 640 411 229
Censored observations 268 216 52
Uncensored observations 372 195 177
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. Region and industry dummies and the constant term are not reported. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
C.2 Variables of the Investment climate (IC) Survey
C.2.1 Production Function Variables
Sales: Used as the measure of output for the production function estimation.
Sales are dened as total annual sales. The series are deated by using the Producer
Price Indexes (PPI), base 2003.
Employment : Total number of permanent and temporal workers.
Total hours worked per year : Total number of employees multiplied by the average
hours worked per year.
Materials: Total costs of intermediate and raw materials used in production (ex-
cluding fuel). The series are deated by using the Producer Price Indexes (PPI), base
C. Appendix to Chapter 3 109
2003.
Capital stock : Net book value of machinery and equipment. The series are deated
by using the Producer Price Indexes (PPI), base 2003.
User cost of capital : The user cost of capital is dened in terms of the opportunity
cost of using capital; it is dened as a 15% of the net book value of machinery and
equipment.
Labor cost : Total expenditures on personnel. The series are deated by using the
Producer Price Indexes (PPI), base 2003.
C.2.2 Infrastructures Variables
Days to clear customs to export : Average number of days to clear customs to
export (log).
Days to clear customs to import : Average number of days to clear customs to
imports (log).
Dummy for power outages: Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant has
su¤ered any power outages during last year.
Number of power outages: Number of power outages su¤ered by the plant in last
year (log).
Average duration of power outages: Average duration of power outages su¤ered by
the plant in hours (log).
Total duration of power outages by year : Total duration of power outages su¤ered
by the plant by month, in hours, conditional on the plat reports having power outages.
Losses due to power outages: Value of the losses due to the power outages as a
percentage of sales (conditional on the plant reporting power outages).
Wait for a power supply : Current delay to obtain a power supply in days (log).
Dummy for own generator : Dummy variable taking value 1 if the rm has its own
power generator.
Electricity from a generator : Percent of the electricity used by the plat provided
by a own generator.
Dummy for insu¢ cient water supply : Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the
rm has experienced insu¢ cient water supply for production during last year.
Water outages: Number of water outages su¤ered by the plant in last year (log).
Average duration of water outages: Average duration of water outages su¤ered by
the plant in hours (log).
Total duration of water outages by year : Total duration of water outages su¤ered
by the plant by month in hours, conditional on the plant reports having water outages.
Wait for a water supply : Current delay to obtain a water connection in days (log).
Wait for a phone connection: Current delay to obtain a phone connection in days
(log).
Dummy for webpage: Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant has a website.
Dummy for e-mail : Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant uses email.
Shipment losses, exports: Fraction of the value of the plants average cargo con-
signment that was lost in transit due to breakage, theft or spoilage in the international
market.
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Shipment losses, domestic: Fraction of the value of the plants average cargo con-
signment that was lost in transit due to breakage, theft or spoilage in the domestic
market.
Days of inventory of main input : Number of days of inventory of the main input
(log).
Wait for an import license: Current delay to obtain an import license related in
days (log).
C.2.3 Red tape, Corruption and Crime Variables
Dummy for conicts with clients with a court involved : Dummy variable that
takes value 1 if the conict of the rm with clients solved in courts were generally
enforced.
Managers time spent in bureaucratic issues: Percentage of managerstime spent
in dealing with bureaucratic issues.
Weeks to bureaucracy : Managerstime spent in dealing with bureaucratic issues
in weeks (log).
Number of inspections: In the last year, total number of inspections (log).
Number of working days spent with inspections: Number of working days spent
with inspections (log).
Dummy for tax inspections: Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the rm has
been visited by tax o¢ cials during last year.
Number of tax inspections: Total number of inspections of tax o¢ cials received by
the plant in 2007 (log).
Number of working days spent with tax inspections: Number of working days spent
with tax inspections (log).
Dummy for gifts in tax inspections: Gifts expected or requested in inspections with
tax o¢ cials.
Dummy for payments to obtain a contract with the government : Dummy variable
that takes value 1 if in plants sector it is common to pay an extra amount of money
in order to obtain a contract with the government.
Payments to obtain a contract with the government : Illegal payment in order to
obtain a contract with the government. Related as percentage of contract value.
Dummy for payments to deal with bureaucratic issues: Dummy that takes value 1
if rms in the main sector occasionally need to give gifts or make informal payments
to public o¢ cers in order to get things donewith regard to customs, taxes, licenses,
legislations, services, etc.
Wait for an operation license: Actual delay to obtain a main operating license in
days (log).
Dummy for gifts to obtain an operating license: Gifts expected or requested to
obtain an operating license, conditional on submit an operating license.
Dummy for security expenses: Dummy taking value 1 if the plant has security
expenses.
Security expenses: Cost in security (equipment, sta¤, etc) (log).
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Dummy for crime losses: Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant su¤ered
any criminal attempt during last year.
Crime losses: Value of losses due to criminal activity (log).
Wait for a construction permit : Actual delay to obtain a construction related in
days (log).
Dummy for gifts to obtain a construction permit : Gifts expected or requested to
obtain a construction permit, conditional on submit a construction permit.
Number of permits: Number of permits obtained in last two years (log).
Validity of permits: Average validity, in months, of permits obtained (log).
Time spent with permits: Number of working days spent in obtaining all permits
(log).
Wait for a permit : Days waiting for obtaining a permit (log).
Dummy for gift to obtain a permit : Gifts expected or requested to obtain a permit,
conditional on submit a permit.
Dummy for compulsory certicate: Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the rm
has to have any compulsory certicate to produce or sell any product.
Sales with compulsory certicates: Percentage of sales subject to compulsory cer-
ticates.
Number of compulsory certicates: Number of compulsory certicates obtained
(log).
Time spent with compulsory certicates: Number of working days spent when
obtaining compulsory certicates (log).
Wait for compulsory certicate: Days waiting for obtaining compulsory certicates
(log).
Dummy for gift to obtain compulsory certicates: Gifts expected or requested to
obtain a compulsory certicate, conditional on submit a compulsory certicate.
Dummy for gifts to obtain a power supply : Dummy variable that takes value 1
if gifts are expected or requested to obtain an electrical connection, conditional on
submit an electrical connection.
Dummy for gifts to obtain a water supply : Dummy variable that takes value 1
if gifts are expected or requested to obtain a phone supply, conditional on submit a
phone connection.
Dummy for gifts to obtain a phone connection: Dummy variable that takes value
1 if gifts are expected or requested to obtain a phone supply, conditional on submit a
phone connection.
Dummy for gifts to obtain an import license: Gifts expected or requested to obtain
an import license, conditional on submit an import license.
C.2.4 Finance and Corporate Governance Variables
Dummy for purchases paid after delivery : Dummy variable that takes value 1 if
any percentage of annual purchases are paid for after the delivery.
Purchases paid after delivery : Percentage of annual purchases paid for after the
delivery.
Sales paid before delivery : Percentage of annual sales paid for before the delivery.
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Sales paid on delivery : Percentage of annual sales paid for before the delivery.
Sales paid after delivery : Percentage of annual sales paid for after the delivery.
Dummy for purchase xed assets: Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the rm
has purchaser xed assets during last year.
New xed assets nanced by internal founds: Percentage of rms working capital
nanced with funds from informal sources.
New xed assets nanced by equity : Percentage of rms working capital nanced
with funds from equity.
New xed assets nanced by private banks: Percentage of investments in new xed
assets nanced with funds from private commercial banks.
New xed assets nanced by state-owned banks: Percentage of investments in new
xed assets nanced with funds state owned banks.
New xed assets nanced by trade credit : Percentage of investments in new xed
assets nanced with credits from suppliers.
Dummy for checking or saving account : Dummy that takes value 1 if the rm has
a saving account
Dummy for overdraft facility : Dummy that takes value 1 if the rm has access to
an overdraft facility.
Dummy for loan: Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant reports that it
has a bank loan.
Dummy for loan from state-owned banks: Dummy variable that takes value 1 if
the rm has a loan from a state owned banks.
Dummy for loan from private banks: Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the rm
has a loan from a domestic private commercial banks.
Dummy for loan from non-nancial institutions: Dummy variable that takes value
1 if the rm has a loan from a non-nancial institutions.
Dummy for loan with collateral : Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the loan is
on collateral.
Value of the collateral : Value of the collateral as a percentage of the loan value
(conditional on having a loan with collateral).
Dummy for land, buildings as collateral : Dummy that takes value 1 if the rm uses
land or buildings as collateral (conditional on having a loan with collateral).
Dummy for machinery and equipment as collateral : Dummy that takes value 1 if
the rm uses machinery or equipment as collateral (conditional on having a loan with
collateral).
Dummy for accounts receivable and inventories as collateral : Dummy that takes
value 1 if the rm uses accounts receivable or inventories as collateral (conditional on
having a loan with collateral).
Dummy for personal assets as collateral : Dummy that takes value 1 if the rm
uses personal assets as collateral (conditional on having a loan with collateral).
Dummy no loan because of complexity : Dummy that takes value 1 if the rm did
not apply for loan because of its complexity.
Dummy no loan because of cost : Dummy that takes value 1 if the rm did not
apply for loan because of its cost.
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Dummy no loan because of collateral : Dummy that takes value 1 if the rm did
not apply for loan because of its cost.
Dummy for rejected credit applications: Dummy variable that takes value 1 if a
credit application has been rejected in the last year.
Dummy for external auditory : Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant uses
an external auditory.
Largest shareholder : Percentage of rms capital owned by the largest shareholder.
Dummy for subsidy : Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the rm receives any
subsides from the national, regional and local government or EU.
C.2.5 Quality, Innovation, and Labor Skills
Dummy for quality certication: Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant
has a quality certication.
Dummy for foreign technology : Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the rm used
a licensed technology of a foreign company in the last year.
Dummy for new line of products: Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant
has developed a new product or product line.
Sales of new products: Percentage of total sales corresponding with new products.
Dummy for R&D : Dummy that takes value 1 if the rm performed R&D activities
during last year.
R&D expenditures as % of total sales: Total R&D expenditures as percentage of
annual sales.
Sta¤ with computer : Percentage of sta¤ using computer at job.
Dummy for outsourcing : Dummy taking value 1 if the plant subcontracts any part
of the activity.
Dummy for discontinued : Dummy taking value 1 if the plant has discontinued at
least one product line.
Dummy for product upgraded : Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant
upgraded an existing product last year.
Sta¤ - production workers: Percentage of production workers in sta¤.
Sta¤ - nonproduction workers: Percentage of nonproduction workers in sta¤.
Sta¤ - female workers: Percentage of female workers in rms sta¤.
Sta¤ - skilled workers: Percentage of skilled workers in rms sta¤.
Sta¤ - unskilled workers: Percentage of unskilled workers in rms sta¤.
Sta¤ - university education: Percentage of sta¤with at least one year of university.
Dummy for training : Dummy taking value one if the rm provides formal (beyond
on the job) training to its employees.
Training to production workers: Percentage of production workers receiving formal
(beyond on the job) training.
Training to non-production workers: Percentage of non-production workers receiv-
ing formal (beyond on the job) training.
Experience of the manager: Number of years of experience of the manager in the
establishments sector (log).
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C.2.6 Other Control Variables
Age: Di¤erence between the year that the plant started operations and current
year.
Dummy for incorporated company : Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant
is an incorporated company.
Dummy for limited company : Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant is a
limited company.
Dummy for FDI : Dummy variable that takes value 1 if any part of the capital of
the rm is foreign.
Dummy for state-owned rm: Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the rm belongs
to the government.
Dummy for importer : Dummy variable that takes value 1 if imports are greater
than 10%.
Share of imports: Share of imported inputs over total purchases of intermediate
materials.
Dummy for exporter : Dummy variable that takes value 1 if exports are greater
than 10%.
Share of exports: Share of exports over total annual sales.
Exporting experience: Number of years of exporting experience (log).
Capacity utilization: Average percentage of capacity used during last year.
Dummy for local monopoly : Dummy taking value one if the rm is a local monopoly.
Dummy for less that 5 competitors: Dummy taking value one if the plant has more
or equal than 5 competitors in the local market.
Dummy for more than 5 competitors: Dummy taking value one if the plant has
less than 5 competitors in the local market.
Dummy for increased sales: Dummy taking value 1 if the plant has increased its
sales.
Dummy for decreased sales: Dummy taking value 1 if the plant has decreased its
sales.
Dummy for increased prices: Dummy taking value 1 if the plant has increased its
prices.
Dummy for decreased prices: Dummy taking value 1 if the plant has decreased its
prices.
Dummy for informal competition: Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the rm
competes with informal (no registered) rms.
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